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THE TAX RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWSINCOME TAX LIABILITIES OF THE ESTATE
AND THE DEBTORt
William T. Plumb, Jr.*
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
(Commission), pursuant to congressional mandate/ has reported
its recommendations for the first comprehensive revision of the
bankruptcy laws since the Chandler Act of 1938.2 This Article
deals with the proposals concerning the obligation of the trustee in
bankruptcy to file returns of income and to pay federal and state
taxes on the income, and concerning the calculation of the taxable
incomes of the bankrupt estate and the debtor (including their
rights to utilize each other's carryovers), as well as with certain problems in those areas in which the Commission has made no recommendations.

T

HE

I.

THE FIDUCIARY'S TAX LIABILITY

The Commission recommends that a trustee in a straight bankruptcy proceeding, whether or not he is operating the business of
the debtor, be relieved of any obligation to file returns or pay taxes
imposed by federal or state law upon, or measured by, income of
the estate, unless the property available for distribution proves to
be greater than the allowable claims, in which event returns shall
be filed before final distribution and the accumulated taxes shall
be paid from the surplus otherwise distributable to the debtor.3 Income taxes incurred by the debtor, computed as if his taxable year
ended at the date of the petition, would be allowable as claims
against the estate, but the trustee (in straight bankruptcy) would not

t This Article is based in part on reports prepared by the writer as a consultant
to the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. As will be readily
apparent from the discussion, the views expressed herein are the author's and not
necessarily those of the Commission or its staff.
• Member of the District of Columbia Bar. A.B. 1936, Rochester University; LL.B.
1939, Cornell University.-Ed.
I. Jt. Res. of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
2. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
3. COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT pt. II, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, § 5-104(a) (1973) [hereinafter CoMMISSION
REPORT]. The proposed legislation has been introduced in Congress as H.R. 10792 and
S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
[937]
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be required to report the bankrupt's income in returns filed by him.4
In reorganization cases (which would embrace in one unified procedure those now covered by Chapters X, XI and XII 6), the trustee,
receiver, or debtor in possession would not be relieved of filing returns of income, but gains and losses on sales (other than those in
the ordinary course of business) made during the pendency of the
proceeding or pursuant to the provisions of a plan would be disregarded for tax purposes, except that the net ta."es otherwise payable on such sales would ultimately be allowed to the extent, if any,
that the plan would otherwise recognize an interest retained by the
debtor, its partners, or its shareholders.6

A. Power To Tax the Estate
It has been said that "under the common law, property in the
hands of a receiver was not taxable, or, rather, ••• property in custodia legis is taxable only upon statutory authorization." 7 This
statement, however, is nothing more than the truism that taxes must
be imposed by statutes and that the coverage of the tax law will generally not be extended beyond its express terms.8 There has never
been any doubt, for example, that, if the legislature clearly so intended, a state property tax could be imposed upon property and
money in the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy, for
[b]y the transfer to the trustee no mysterious or peculiar ownership
or qualities are given to the property. It is dedicated, it is true, to
the payment of the creditors of the bankrupt, but there is nothing in
that to withdraw it from the necessity of protection by the State and
municipality, or which should exempt it from its obligations to
either. If Congress has the power to declare otherwise and wished to
do so the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected
or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in administering the estate of the bankrupt,9
It has also been long established that a federal court receiver appointed to carry on the business of the corporation and thus exercising "the powers belonging to the corporation by legislative grant"
can be subjected to a state corporate franchise tax, if the legislature
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(b).
11 u.s.c. §§ 501-926 (1970).
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 7-315(c).
Howe v. Atlantic, Pac. & Gulf Oil Co., 4 F. Supp. 162, 164 (W.D. Mo. 1933) 1
revd, sub nom. Kansas City v. Johnson, 70 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 293 U,S, 617
(1934).
S. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).
9. Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441,444 (1904).
4.
5.
6.
7.
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so intends, for "[t]axes owing to the Government, whether due at the

beginning of a receivership or subsequently accruing, are the price
that business has to pay £or protection and security."10
A series of decisions, which distinguished taxes on property and
franchises from taxes on transactions engaged in by court officers,
held trustees and receivers in bankruptcy not- amenable to sales and
gross receipts taxes (at least in the absence of language expressly
including them).11 Congress, in 1934, reacted promptly to the earliest of those decisions by enacting the following statute:
[A]ny receiver, liquidator, referee, trustee, or other officers or
agents appointed by any United States court who is authorized by
said court to conduct any business, or who does conduct any business, shall, from and after June 18, 1934, be subject to all State and
loc:al taxes applicable to such business the same as if such business
were conducted by an individual or corporation.12
The reports on the bill declared: "No good reason is perceived why
a receiver should be permitted to operate under such an advantage
as against his competitors not in receivership, and the States and
local governments be deprived of this revenue." 13 Although the
statutory words, "conduct any business," suggest that only operating fiduciaries are to be subjected to tax liabilities, and although
some courts have so construed the language,14 other courts have
broadly interpreted the consent of Congress to embrace state and
local taxation of "any activity or operation in connection with the
handling and management of the bankrupt estate," whether with a
view to liquidation or with a view to rehabilitation.15
When title 28 of the United States Code was revised and codified
in 1948, the foregoing provision (§ 960) was reworded as follows:
"Any officers and agents conducting any business under authority
10. Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334, 344 (1932).
11. In re Messenger's Merchants Lunch Rooms, 85 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1936); In re
Flatbush Gum Co,, 73 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 713 (1935); Howe
v. Atlantic, Pac.&: Gulf Oil Co., 4 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1933), revd. sub nom. Kansas City v. Johnson, 70 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 617 (1934).
12. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 585, 48 Stat. 993, izs amended, 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1970). - ·
13. H.R. REP. No. 1138, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. l (1934); S, REP. No. 1372, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. l (1934). See Palmer v. Webster &: Atlas Natl. Banlc, 312 U,S. 156, 162-63 (1941).
14. In re Califoroia Pea Prod., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. C;il. 1941); In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1256-58 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee opinion), reud. on
other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972).
See In re F.P. Newport Corp., 144 F. Supp. 507, 509 (S.D. Cal. 1956), reud. sub nom.
United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959).
15. Missouri v. Glieck, 135 F.2d 134, 136-37 (8th Cir. 1943); In re Mid America Co.,
31 F. Supp. 601, 606 (S.D. Ill. 1939).
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of a United States court shall be subject to all Federal, State and
local taxes applicable to such business to the same extent as if it
were conducted by an individual or corporation."16 The deletion
of the express reference to trustees, receivers, and referees is without significance, since they are clearly "officers" acting under the
authority of a United States court.17 The mention of "Federal"
taxes, which were not previously embraced by this provision, was
"in recognition of the liability of such officers for Federal taxes
under the revenue laws"18 but is without substantive significance,
since the provision "is not a statute which imposes any taxes [but]
serves merely to affirm liability for local, state and federal taxes
which are validly imposed by other statutes."19 Since both the revenue laws and 28 U.S.C. § 960 are acts of Congress, the latter "does
not exclude liability for taxes otherwise validly imposed" by congressional tax legislation on trustees and receivers in bankruptcy
whether or not they are deemed to be "conducting any business."26

B.

The Law to Date

I. Corporate Bankruptcies
Prior to ratification of the sixteenth amendment, which cleared
the way for a general income tax, Congress imposed an excise tax
on the income of "every corporation ... with respect to the carrying on or doing business by such corporation.''21 The Supreme
Court, in United States v. Whitridge, 22 held receivers not subject to
the tax, since the receivers were deemed to be acting "as officers of
the court, and subject to the orders of the court; not as officers of
the respective corporations, nor with the advantages that inhere
in corporate organization as such." The Court also noted that the
law did not "in terms impose any duty upon the receivers of corporations or of corporate property, with respect to paying taxes
upon the income arising from their management of the corporate
assets, or with respect to making any return of such income.''23 The
first income tax24 imposed under the sixteenth amendment likewise
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

28 U.S.C. § 960 (1970), formerly ch. 585, 48 Stat. 993 (1934).
13ankruptcy Act§ 1(22), 11 U.S.C. § 1(22) (1970).
28 U.S.C.A. § 960, reviser's note (1968) (emphasis added).
In re Kirby, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1J 9752, at 86,051 (S.D. Tex. 1962),
See Drown v. Collector of Taxes, 247 F.2d 786, 788 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. II2.
231 U.S. 144, 149 (1913).
231 U.S. at 149.
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 166.
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omitted any express reference to receivers for corporations and
was, accordingly, held not to subject such receivers to tax.25
The response of Congress to the. Whitridge decision was to enact,
in the Revenue Act of 1916, the following provision:
In cases wherein receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, or assignees
are operating the property or business of corporations, joint-stock
companies or associations, or insurance companies, subject to tax
imposed by this title, such receivers, trustees, or assignees shall make
returns of net income as and for such corporations, joint-stock companies or associations, and i_nsurance companies, in the same manner
and form as such organizations are hereinbefore required to make
returns, and any income tax due on. the basis of such returns made
by receivers, trustees, or assingees [sic] shall be assessed and collected
in the same manner as if assessed directly against the organizations
of whose businesses or properties they have custody and control .•••26

The War Revenue Act of 1917 imposed, in addition to the income
tax, an excess profits tax on certain income of "every corporation,
partnership or individual" derived from trade or business.27 Those
provisions came before the Supreme Court in Reinecke v. Gardner,28
in which the Court noted that, since the title in the property of
the bankrupt corporation had vested in the trustee, "the income
in question was not the income of the bankrupt corporation, but of
the trustee and was subject to income and excess profits tax only
if the statutes authorized the assessment of the tax against him.''29
Since the excess profits tax law "made no mention of executors,
receivers, trustees or persons acting in a fiduciary capacity,"30 who
were regarded as a different breed from the corporations, partnerships, and individuals expressly subjected to tax, and since the
above-quoted provision of the income tax law was not deemed to
have been made effectively applicable, the trustee was held not to
be subject to excess profits tax. The Court, however, held the quoted
provision to be valid and effective to subject the bankruptcy trustee operating the business of the corporation to payment of income
tax "in the same manner" as the corporation. With immaterial
verbal changes, that provision continued in effect until the repeal in
1954 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (in which it was section
25. Scott v. Western Pac. R.R., 246 F. 545 (9th Cir. 1917).
26. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 13(c), 39 Stat. 771.
27•. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 2-01, 40 Stat. 303.
28. 277 U.S. 239 (1928).
29. 277 U.S. at 241 (emphasis added).
30. 277 U.S. at 242.
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52(a)); with one significant change, it remains in effect as section
6012(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC or Code):
In a case where a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or assignee, by
order of a court of competent jurisdiction, by operation of law or
otherwise, has possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the
property or business of a corporation, whether or not such property
or business is being operated, such receiver, trustee, or assignee shall
make the return of income for such corporation in the same manner
and form as corporations are required to make such returns.
a. Liquidating v. operating bankruptcies. The most controversial question that has aris"en under section 6012(b)(3) and its predecessors is whether a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy of a corporation is required to file income tax returns and pay tax when he is
merely liquidating the estate of the bankrupt, rather than "operating" its business or property. The express terms of the law in effect from 1916 to 1953 required such filing and payment only of
"receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, or assignees [who] are operating
the business or property of corporations."111 The Treasury Regulations after 1934 took an expansive view of that requirement, how.
ever, by specifying:
If a receiver has full custody of and control over the business or
property of a corporation, he shall be deemed to be operating such

business or property within the meaning of section 52, whether he is
engaged in carrying on the business for which the corporation was
organized or only in marshalling, selling, and disposing of its assets
for the purposes of liquidation.a2

The Internal Revenue Service (Service) argued therefrom that the
term "operating" included "liquidating."83 Close reading of the
quoted regulation by courts, however, disclosed that it referred
only to the obligation of a receiver and said nothing of a trustee in
bankruptcy who, having acquired title, was engaged exclusively in
liquidation.84 Therefore, while the courts generally found even relatively limited activities (such as the making of leases, the collection of rents and royalties, the orderly disposition over a period of
years of realty initially held for sale, and the management of the
31. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch, 463, § 13(c), 39 Stat. 771 (now INT. REV. ConE OF 1954,
6012(b)(3)).
32. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 52-2 (1934) (emphasis added); Treas. Reg, 118, § 39.52-2
(1953) (emphasis added).
33. See Feigenbaum, Observations Concerning Trustees in Bankruptcy and Federal
Income Taxes, 43 REF. J. 73, 74 (1969).
34. See In re Town Crier Bottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 591 (E.D. Mo. 1954): In re
International Match Corp., 43-1 U.S. Tax Cas.1[ 9281 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
§
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investments of an insurance company) to constitute "operating" the
debtor corporation's business or property,35 even when they occurred after an order for liquidation had been entered,36 the courts
generally rejected the proposition that a trustee in bankruptcy or a
·receiver who had disposed of the business of a corporation was taxable on interest earned on funds of the estate pending completion
of administration; 37 on royalties from patents not yet disposed of;38
on income earned by, but not previously taxable to, the corporation
itself; 39 or on recoveries of previously deducted bad debts40 or of
amounts illegally diverted from the corporation by its officers and
directors.41
In response to those decisions, Congress, in 1954, enacted section 6012(b)(3), above quoted, by which a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or assignee was required to file returns for a corporation if
he merely "ha[d] possession of or ... title to all or substantially all
[its] property or business •.. , whether or not such property or
business [was] being operated."42 Clearer words could hardly have
been chosen to establish that the distinction theretofore drawn between operating and liquidating trustees was being repudiated. Unfortunately, apparently in a clumsy effort to strengthen the hand
of the Service in cases still pending under the former law, the committee reports on the 1954 Code state merely that "[a] clarifying
change from the wording of existing law has been made in subsection (b)(3), relating to the filing of corporation returns by receivers
or other fiduciaries." 48
Seizing upon the statement in the reports that the law was merely
clarified by the 1954 amendment, the referee in the recent Statmaster case declared that, while the regulation that prior decisions
had declined to apply had now "purportedly 'become the law,' ,,
35. Pinkerton v. United States, 170 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1948) (receiver); Louisville
Property Co. v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944)
(assignee); United States v. Metcalf, 131 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
769 (1943) (trustee in bankruptcy); State ex rel. Gibson v. American Bonding &: Cas. Co.,
225 Iowa 638,281 N.W. 172 (1938) (receiver).
36. United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959),
37. In re Owl Drug Co., 21 F. Supp. 907 (D. Nev. 1937).
38. Doebler Die Casting Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 38-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9498 (S.D.
Ill.1938).
39. In re Heller, Hirsh & Co., 258 F. 208 (2d Cir. 1919).
40. In re International Match Corp., 43-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,I 9281 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
41. Standard Oil Co. v. Apex Oil Corp., 35 Tenn. App. 225, 244 S.W.2d 176 (1951).
42. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 733 (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6012(b)(3)) (emphasis added).
43. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A396 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 563 (1954).
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Congress had not been "advised of any such sweeping substantive
change."44 Therefore, he concluded that "the statutory words must
be construed narrowly in a procedural sense [in order] to avoid an
unintended change in the substantive law." 45 A nonoperating trustee, he determined, is required to file a return that "need only list
his receipts with notation for informational purposes that they arose
from non-operating activity and therefore do not comprise taxable
income"46-despite the plain terms of the law that the trustee, if
subject to the law at all, must file, not an incomplete return, but
a return "in the same manner and form as corporations are required
to make such returns." 47
In concluding that the nonoperating trustee still need not pay
tax on income of the estate, even though some form of return is
now required of him, the referee noted48 that the 1954 amendment,
section 6012(b)(3), deleted the sentence of section 52(a) of the 1939
Code (and of corresponding provisions back to 1916) that provided
that "[a]ny tax due on the basis of such returns made by receivers,
trustees, or assignees [should] be collected in the same manner as
if collected from the corporations of whose business or property they
have custody or control." That deletion, however, merely reflected
a restructuring of the procedural and administrative provisions of
the tax law,49 whereby provisions that had formerly been grouped
in the income tax chapter under the heading, "Returns and Payment of Tax,"50 were redistributed, together with parallel provisions relating to other taxes, under "Chapter 61-Information and
Returns" (!RC §§ 6001-110)-and "Chapter 62-Time and Place
for Payment of Tax" (!RC§§ 6151-67). Therefore, whereas section
52(a) of the 1939 Code had dealt with both returns and payments,
IRC § 6012(b)(3) referred only to returns, and a general provision
was made in !RC§ 615l(a) that (with an exception not pertinent)
44. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee
opinion), reod. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 F.2d 978
(5th Cir. 1972). Since the preparation of this paper, the referee's opinion in Statmaster
has been followed by a district court. In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 366 F. Supp. 450
(E.D. Pa. 1973). Comments herein on the Statmaster opinion apply equally to that
in Knight.
45. 332 F. Supp. at 1261.
46. 332 F. Supp. at 1261.
47. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3). See State ex rel, Gibson v. American
13onding &: Cas. Co., 225 Iowa 638,281 N.W. 172 (1938).
48. 332 F. Supp. at 1254.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Scss. 133 (1954).
50. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. I,§§ 51-60, 53 Stat. 27.
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"when a return of tax is required under this title or regulations, the
person required to make such return shall, without assessment or
notice and demand from the Secretary or his delegate, pay such tax
to the internal revenue officer with whom the return is filed .•.." 51
Nevertheless, the referee refused to apply section 615l(a) because, in his view, "the legislative history of § 6012(b)(3) .•• gave
Congress no notice that this coupling of these two new sections
was intended to dramatically change the substantive law relating to
taxation of trustees in bankruptcy." 52 Therefore, he concluded tha't
Congress "did not intend to overrule and change the well-established
substantive principle of both statutory and case law to the effect that
a nonoperating trustee in bankruptcy is not subject to federal income taxes." 53 However, when Congress has stated its intention in
unmistakable terms addressed to the specific question, the fact that
the committee reports describe the amendment as "clarifying" cannot be taken as confirming and making applicable to the amended
law those interpretations of prior law that were to the contrary.54
Even if the committee reports were thought to give Congress "no
notice" of the wording of the statute it was enacting, "an uncertain
guess at Congress' intent provides dubious ground for disregarding
its plain language."55
51. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 770l(a)(l) defines "person" to "mean and include an
individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation" and does
not mention "trustee in bankruptcy" in so many words, In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp.,
366 F. Supp. 450, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1973), although the word "includes" is not exclusive,
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(b), and a fiduciary required to file a return "for" a
corporation, !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3), would seem to be as much obligated
as the executor who is required to file "for" an estate. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-l(a)
(1960), which expressly includes a trustee in bankruptcy in the definition of "persons.''
52. 332 F. Supp. at 1260.
53. 332 F. Supp. at 1260-61 (emphasis original).
54. Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1962); United States v. Manufacturers Natl. Bank, 198 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
55. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375,383 (1966). Cf. Albert L. Dougherty, 60 T.C. 917,
925 (1973). The court in In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 366 F. Supp. 450, 458 8: n.23 (E.D;
Pa. 1973), thought that language in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 60ll(e) (redesignated as
(f) in 1971, Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 504(a), 85 Stat. 550), which reads
''For requirement that returns of income, estate, and gift taxes be made whether or
not there is a tax liability, see sections 6012 to 6019:' (emphasis added by court), was
in conflict with the government's interpretation of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6151(a).
Aside from the fact that cross references in the Code are "made only for convenience
and shall be given no legal effect," !NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7806(a), the reference to
section 6012 plainly relates to the fact that "every corporation" is required to file
whether or not it has gross or net income on which a tax might be imposed and that
others must file if they have a certain gross income even if no net taxable income
results. No inference should result that a trustee who does show a net taxable income
on a return that is required by section 6012 to be filed "whether or not such property or business is being operated" need not pay the resulting tax pursuant to section 615l(a).
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In the view of the referee,156 the obligation of the trustee to pay
tax on the return he was admittedly required by the Code to file
must still be found, not in the ta." payment provisions of the tax
law, but in 28 U.S.C. § 960, which states (emphasis added): "Any
officers and agents conducting any business under authority of a
United States court shall be subject to all Federal, State and local
taxes applicable to such business to the same extent as if it were
conducted by an individual or a corporation." The referee followed
the holding of the district court in In re F. P. Newport Corp.rn that
the failure of Congress in 1954 to amend section 960 to extend the
liability for payment of tax to others than those "conducting any
business" meant that nonoperating trustees were still not required
to pay taxes even though they were obliged to file returns. The
Newport case, however, had been reversed by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Sampsell, 58 which held that section 6151 of the Code
imposed the liability for tax on returns required by section 6012.
The Ninth Circuit declared, 1'It is not likely that Congress, in pass.
ing the 1954 I.R.C. would make the income tax liability dependent
on a part of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code." 119 It is
true that Congress has on occasion placed substantive tax provisions
in nontax legislation, notably in certain provisions00 of the Chandler
Act of 1938, where state as well as federal tax liabilities are affected
by the provision, just as they are by 28 U.S.C. § 960. But the latter
statute, the purpose and effect of which have been described above,
is merely permissive and in itself neither imposes nor restrains the
imposition of any tax. 61 It certainly does not withdraw from Congress, which enacted it, the power to impose any tax, whether or
not within its scope, and, since the 1954 amendment dealt only with
federal taxation, there was no occasion to broaden the permissive
terms of 28 U.S.C. § 960.
The referee in the Statmaster case, however, did not find authoritative the holding of Sampsell that IRC §§ 6012 and 6151 were the
determinative provisions and that 28 U.S.C. § 960 had no limiting
effect, In the referee's view, what the Ninth Circuit said in that
connection was unnecessary to its decision since the court (in the
56, 3112 F. Supp. at 1261.
57. 144 F. Supp. 507, 509 (S.D. Cal. 1956), revd. sub nom. United States v. Sampsell,
266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959).
58. 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959).
59. 266 F.2d at 635.
60, Bankruptcy Act §§ 268-71, 395-97, 520-23, 679-80, 11 U.S.C. §§ 668-71, 795-97,

920-23, 1079-80 (1970),
61. See text accompanying notes 11-20 supra.
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part of the decision relating to pre-1954 Code years) had already
held that the trustee's activities constituted "operating the bank~
rupt's business-a conclusion that would subject him to tax liability in any event."62
The referee, citing "myriad unresolved questions of deductions,
procedures, etc." and "some very practical, difficult administrative
problems . . • which would affect the handling of bankruptcy estates if a trustee were required to file returns and pay taxes for 'income' realized from liquidating activities,''63 declared that the courts
"have not been averse to ruling that conflicting provisions of the
tax laws must on occasion bow to the strong social and economic
policies underlying the Bankruptcy Act."~ Congress is the final
arbiter of the conflict between tax law and practical bankruptcy administration, however, and the bankruptcy courts have no power to
override express tax and other statutes that they find inconvenient
for trustee compliance.ll5 The four cases relied on by the referee
are not to the contrary. In United States v. Randall,66 the Court declined to accord the government a "trust fund" priority (ahead of
administration expenses) for taxes withheld from employees by a
debtor in possession under Chapter XI, where there was no traceable fund into which the withholdings had been paid. In so holding,
the Court applied the same tracing requirement that was applicable
under IRC § 7501 to taxes required to be withheld prior to bankruptcy67 and cited the Congressional policy to preserve administration expense funds, not as a ground for overriding the tax law, but as
a ground for not waiving in bankruptcy the general requirement
thereof. In City of New York v. Saper, 68 the Court found that the
statutory interest on taxes69 was subject, like other prescriptions for
interest, to the general rule of bankruptcy law that interest does
not run against the estate while payment of the principal is delayed
62. 332 F. Supp. at 1257.
63. 332 F. Supp. at 1258-59.
64. 332 F. Supp. at 1261.
65. United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 822, 326-27 (1970); Nicholas v. United States, 384
U.S. 678, 692-95 (1966); Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964). See also
quotation from Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904), in text accompanying note
9$Upra.
66. 401 U.S. 51!! (1971).
67. The leading case on this requirement is In re Frank, 25 F. Supp. 1005 (SD.N.Y.
1939).
68. !136 U.S. !128 (1949).
69. Under present law, interest on federal taxes is prescribed by INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 660l(a).
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by the pendency of bank.ruptcy.70 The third case cited by the referee, Reinecke v. Gardner,71 held the trustee in bankruptcy of a
corporation not to be subject to an excess profits tax imposed on
"corporations," in the absence of a provision (such as IRC § 6012
(b)(3)) that expressly extended such tax to trustees in bankruptcy;
however, the Court did not question the effectiveness of the predecessor of§ 6012(b)(3) in requiring the trustee to pay the basic income tax imposed on corporations. The remaining cited decision,
In re Johnson Electrical Corp.,72 had applied the bankruptcy court's
notion of fairness to the debtor to preclude collection of postpetition
interest from the debtor's later free assets when the principal of the
tax liability had been fully paid under Chapter XI; that decision
was later reversed, 73 in reliance on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Bruning v. United States.74
It seems clear, therefore, that, notwithstanding the referee's
views in Statmaster (not discussed by the reviewing courts, which
went off on procedural grounds), present law requires the trustee
to file returns and pay corporate income tax, whether he is operating
the business or merely liquidating.
b. Tax identity of the fiduciary and the corporation. Another
much mooted point is whether section 6012(b)(3) continues the
corporate taxable entity in the person of the trustee in bankruptcy
and thus requires him to file a return "for such corporation" in the
place of the corporate officers, or whether the trustee becomes a new
and separate taxable entity subject to tax "in the same manner" as
the corporation. It has been argued, following the rationale of
Reinecke v. Gardner, 75 that "the income taxable is not that of the
corporation, but that of the 'f;'rustee" 76 and that the "trustee in
70. Although the Bankruptcy Act did not expressly deal with interest on tax claims,
the Court relied on the principles of the English bankruptcy system, on which our
law was modeled. 336 U.S. at 330, citing Se.'Cton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911).
Cf. Bankruptcy Act §§ 63a(l), (5), 11 U.S.C. §§ 103a(l), (5) (1970), which stop interest
on judgments and written instruments.
71. 277 U.S. 239 (1928), discussed in text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
72. 312 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), revd., 442 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1971).
73. In re Johnson Elec. Corp., 442 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1971). Accord, Hugh H. Eby Co,
v. United States, 456 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1972).
74. 376 U.S. 358 (1964), which held undischarged postpetition interest on unpaid
taxes collectible from the debtor's after-acquired assets since the tax law "demonstrates congressional judgment that certain problems-e.g., those of financing govern•
ment-override" general bankruptcy policies. 376 U.S. at 361.
75. 277 U.S. 239 (1928), discussed in text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
76. In re F.P. Newport Corp., 144 F. Supp. 507, 509 n.l (S.D. Cal. 1956), revd, sub
nom. United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959) (emphasis original).
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bankruptcy of a corporate bankrupt simply does not own or control
the corporation involved [but] is vested only with title to its assets." 77
The Service's position to the contrary is embodied in the Income
Tax Regulations under the 1954 Code, which declare that "[t]he
estate of •.. an individual or corporation in receivership or a corporation in bankruptcy is not a taxable entity separate from the
person for whom the fiduciary is acting, in that respect differing
from the estate of a deceased person or of a trust. See section 6012
(b)(2) and (3) for provisions relating to the obligation of the fiduciary with respect to the returns of such persons." 78
Whatever "conceptual problem" may arise from the fact that
the trustee has title to the corporate property but does not control
the corporation,70 it is surely within the power of Congress, which
vested title in him, to impose on him the obligations of reporting
as if he were the corporation to whose property he succeeded and
of paying the resulting tax from the estate. Congress appears to have
done so, in fact, in specifying in section 6012(b)(3) that the trustee
shall make the return "for such corporation"-that is, not for the
estate in bankruptcy as a distinct entity. There is nothing to the
77. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee opinion), reud. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 F.2d 978
(5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis original). In 415 South Taylor Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner,
2 T.C. 184 (1943), the corporation was in reorganization under former section 77B of
the Bankruptcy Act (now Bankruptcy Act ch. X, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970)) during
1935, but the property was reconveyed to the debtor pursuant to the reo:rganization
plan before the income tax return for 1935 became due. The trustee filed no return,
and the corporation filed only a statement that, by reason of the proceeding, it had
had no operations during the year. The Service attempted to assess tax for 1935 against
the corporation, on the ground that, while the trustee stood in its place during the
proceeding, the real and beneficial ownership was at all times in the corporation,
which received the economic benefit of the operation. The Tax Court, however, leaving open what remedies might exist against the trustee, or against the corporation
as transferee of the estate, held that, under Reinecke v. Gardner, 277 U.S. 239 (1928),
the title to the property and income, and hence the primary liability for the tax,
was the estate's and not the corporation's. While the precise issue in the 415 South
Taylor case has been otherwise resolved by provisions (Bankruptcy Act§§ 271,397,523,
11 U.S.C. §§ 671, 797, 923 (1970)) of the Chandler Act of 1938 that expressly permit
assessment against the debtor or successor corporation for tax liabilities incurred during a rehabilitative proceeding, see C.C. Bradley & Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 564
(1943), the decision may still be pertinent in straight bankruptcy cases, as evidence of
the separate taxable entity of the bankrupt estate. However, the Service indicated by
nonacquiescence, 1943 CUM. BULL. 31, that it would not accept the decision as a precedent.
78. Treas. Reg. § l.64l(b)-2(b), T.D. 6580, 1961-2 Cur.r. BULL. 123.
79. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee opinion),
reud. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), a/fd., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir.
1972). The Commission's substitutes-Cor.r1111ss10N REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 4-60l(a),
7-202-for Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § ll0(a) (1970), abandon the "confusing and
erroneous concept" of" 'vesting title' in the trustee" and state instead that certain property is "property of the estate." See CoM11nss10N REPORT, supra,§ 7-201, note 1.
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contrary in Reinecke v. Gardner,80 which relied on the trustee's
title in holding the trustee not subject to excess profits tax as a
corporation in the absence of any applicable provision comparable
to section 6012(b)(3). With respect to the corporate income tax,
the Court upheld the liability imposed on the trustee by the predecessor of that provision81 but had no occasion to consider whether
its effect was to make the estate a separate taxable entity or (for tax
purposes) a continuation of the corporation.
The intent of Congress that the trustee assume the obligations
of the bankrupt in this regard seems to be underscored by section
6903(a),82 which provides:
Upon notice to the Secretary or his delegate that any person is
acting for another person in a fiduciary capacity, such fiduciary shall
assume the powers, rights, duties, and privileges of such other person
in respect of a tax imposed by this title (except as othenvise specifically provided and except that the tax shall be collected from the
estate of such other person), until notice is given that the fiduciary
capacity has terminated.

Despite the suggestion by Krause and Kapiloff83 that section 6903
(a) does not apply to a trustee in bankruptcy, who is generally
elected by and administers the estate for the benefit of the creditors
and, hence, is not "acting for" the bankrupt, the trustee does act
in a fiduciary capacity for the bankrupt, at least in applying property
to its debts and returning the residue, if any. 84 In any event, the
report on the Revenue Act of 1926, in which the provision originated, makes it clear that the trustee in bankruptcy was meant to be
covered.85
80, 277 U.S. 239 (1928).
81. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 13(c), 39 Stat. 71. This section is quoted In text
accompanying note 26 supra.
82. The Tax Court, however, drew the opposite inference from the predecessor provision in 415 South Taylor Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 184, 191 (1943),
83. Krause & Kapiloff, The Bankrupt Estate, Taxable Income and the Trustee in
Bankruptcy, 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 401, 402-03 (1966).
84. See B & L Farms Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 407, 410 (S,D, Fla, 1965),
a/fd,, 368 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967). See also 9 A111, JuR,
2d Bankruptcy § 637 (1963).
85. S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1926). The report expresses the concern
of the Congress "that there ••• be some individual to whom notice may be mailed and
upon whom demand may be made, in the case of, for example, an incompetent, a decedent's estate, or an estate in the hands of a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy." (Emphasis added.) Although the report's only express reference is to the mailing of deficiency notices and demands to the fiduciary, the provision has the further effect of
fixing on the trustee the bankrupt's duty to pay the tax (limited to the amount in
the estate). Cf. Fletcher Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 36, 40 (7th Cir. 1944)
(involving the trustee of a gift in trust). While, on its face, the obligation under
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Treatment of the estate of a bankrupt corporation as a continuation of the corporate taxable entity is consistent with the treatment
of a liquidating trustee for a corporation that is not in bankruptcy.
It has long been established that the conveyance of corporate assets to a trustee in dissolution or liquidation for the purpose of
disposing of the assets and discharging the corporate debts does not
terminate the existence of the corporation for tax purposes. The
trustee is deemed to hold the assets, not as a representative of the
shareholders, but as agent for the corporation, until its debts have
been paid and the residue distributed.86 It makes no difference that
the state law finally terminates the corporate existence upon the
transfer to the trusteeB7 or that the trust instrument expressly disclaims representation of the corporation.BB While it is not legally imIm. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6903(a), is conditional upon the fiduciary's having given notice to the government, it has been held that the assumption of such tax responsibility is
not optional with the fiduciary. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 54,
57-58 (3d Cir. 1944). In any event, the notice required to be given to the district
director of internal revenue by the clerk of the court under section 58e of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 94(e) (1970), suffices for purposes of section 6903(a). Treas. Reg,
§§ 301.6036-I(a)(l), (c) (1960).

86. United States v. Loo, 248 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 928
(1958); J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1957); First Natl. Bank
v. United States, 86 F.2d 938 (10th Cir. 1936); Hellebush v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d
902 (6th Cir. 1933); Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 283 U.S. 862 (1931); National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 345
F.2d 823 (Ct. CI. 1965); Mrs. Grant Smith, 26 B.T.A. 1178 (1932). Liquidation cases
that arose before the 1954 Code placed some reliance on long-standing regulations
that declared:
When a corporation is dissolved, its affairs are usually wound up by a receiver
or trustees in dissolution. The corporate existence is continued for the purpose of
liquidating the assets and paying the debts, and such receiver or trustees stand
in the stead of the corporation for such purposes • • . • Any sales of property by
them are to be treated as if made by the corporation for the purpose of ascertaining the gain or loss ..••
E.g., Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953); Treas. Reg. 45, art. 547 (1919). That provision disappeared when the regulations were reissued under the 1954 Code and was
replaced by a more limited statement that "gain or loss is recognized to a corporation
[in liquidation] on all sales by it, whether directly or indirectly (as through trustees
or a receiver),'' with an exception not here pertinent. Treas. Reg. § 1.336-1 (1955).
The current regulation has been relied on, however, in reaching the same result as
under prior law. Hersloff v. United States, 310 F.2d 947, 950 (Ct. CI. 1962). Furthermore, present Treas. Reg. § l.6012-3(b)(4), T.D. 6628, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 272, 273
links the requirement of filing by a "trustee in dissolution" to the statutorily prescribed filing by "a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy or assignee,'' INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 6012(b)(3), and that statute was relied on in finding continuity between a
corporation and its liquidating trustee in National Metropolitan Bank v. United
States, 345 F-2d 823, 825 (Ct. Cl, 1965). See also Treas. Reg. § l.6012-2(a)(2) (1959) ("A
corporation does not go out of existence if it is turned over to receivers or trustees
who continue to operate it.").
87. United States v. Loo, 248 F-2d 765, 767 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
928 (1958).
88. Whitney Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 429, 431 (6th Cir. 1935), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 668 (1936).
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possible to sever the corporation's tax connection with later transactions by a clear-cut distribution to shareholders, even if they ap•
point a trustee to act for them,80 trustees who were charged, not
merely with disposing of property and paying over the proceeds
to shareholders, but with winding up the affairs of the corporation
and paying its debts, were not permitted to deny their representation of the corporation.00 Such functions, of course, are performed
by a bankruptcy trustee.
Aside from affecting the availability of the corporation~s loss
carryovers to the trustee, the principal practical difference between
the two points of view discussed above is that the Service position
requires the trustee to file a return that includes the portion of the
year before he took title.91 In nonbankruptcy corporate liquidation
cases, which are governed by the same regulation on returns as that
which governs corporate bankrupts,92 it has been held that there is
but one taxable period in the year in which the corporate assets are
transferred to the liquidating trustee. 93 One possible distinction
between the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy situations, however, is
that the bankrupt corporation, instead of passing out of existence,
may obtain a discharge and resume business under the same charter
with fresh capital, as is permitted by section 14a of the Bankruptcy
Act. 94 The fact that this permissible, if relatively rare, occurrence
89. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950); United States
v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1948); Amos L. Beaty&: Co., 14 T.C,
52 (1950); Acampo Winery & Distilleries, Inc., 7 T.C. 629 (1946).
90. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
The same principle has been applied to an assignment by a corporation for the
benefit of creditors. See Louisville Property Co. v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 547 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944). The court held that the assignee, although he
held legal title, was conducting not his own business but that of the corporation
and rejected as "fanciful" the argument "that the beneficial owners were the creditors
and stockholders." 140 F.2d at 549. But cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Apex Oil Co., 35 Tenn.
App. 225,244 S.W.2d 176 (1951), which held that a receiver in a general creditor's suit was
not taxable under the predecessor of INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3), in part because the income was deemed to belong not to the corporation but to its creditors and
shareholders.
91. G.C.M. 12207, XII-2 CuM. BULL. 83, 85 (1933), declared obsolete by Rev. Rul.
71-498, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 434. The declaration of obsolescence presumably refers to
the consolidated return issues dealt with in the ruling, since there has been no pertinent change in the law on the present point.
92. See note 86 supra.
93. National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 345 F.2d 823, 827 (Ct. Cl. 1965);
Mrs. Grant Smith, 26 B.T.A. 1178, 1187 (1932).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 32(a) (1970). See Theobald-Jansen Elec. Co. v. Harry I. Wood Engr.
Co., 285 F. 29 (6th Cir. 1922); In re Marshall Paper Co., 102 F. 872 (1st Cir. 1900); In
re Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 239 F. 155 (E.D. Mo. 1917), revd., 244 F. 719
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667 (1917). The Commission has recommended denying the owners of the bankrupt corporation the option to obtain a discharge and re-
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might result in two entities ·with the same tax identity if the government's position were sustained has been cited as a reason for judicial
narrowing of the application of section 6012(b)(3) of the Code and
for the view, expressed by the referees, that the trustee, if required
to file at all, should report only the income from the estate's own
operations and the corporation should file its own return covering
the prebankruptcy portion of the year (as well as the period thereafter if the corporation resumes operations after discharge).95 Krause
and Kapiloff, on the other hand, accept the Service position that,
in general, the trustee continues the identity of the corporate
bankrupt for tax purposes, but they would· make an exception for
the unusual case where the discharged corporation resumes business
activity. In such a situation, they say, the trustee should not file
corporate returns for the estate in his hands but should file fiduciary (estate) returns in the same manner as the trustee of a bankrupt individual or partnership, since the discharge severs the corporation from the estate.96
The referee in the Statmaster case97 declared that the Supreme
Court, in Nicholas v. United States, 98 "took pains to negate any implication that its decision extended to the filing of tax returns by
the trustee for pre-petition periods." The referee, however, misread
the Nicholas case, in which the Court, in holding a trustee for a
bankrupt corporation subject to civil penalties for failure to file
withholding, social security, and cabaret tax returns that came due
after his appointment but covered periods while the debtor was in
possession under a Chapter XI arrangement, stressed "the continuity
of interest between the debtor in possession and the trustee as officers of the bankruptcy court" 99 and stated that "nothing said in this
opinion may be taken as imposing any obligations upon a trustee
activate the corporate shell. COMMISSION REPORT, sujJra note 3, § 4-505(a) & note 3
thereto.
95. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee
opinion), reud. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), afjd., 465 F.2d 978
(5th Cir. 1972); In re Town Crier Bottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Mo. 1954).
96. Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 405-06, 415. Perhaps that view can be
reconciled with the terms of !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3), on the theory that,
at least from the time the corporation acquires new assets, the trustee no longer
"has possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the property or business
of [the] corporation." (Emphasis added.) Concerning the taxation of the estate of an
individual or partnership as a separate entity, see text accompanying notes 106-34
infra.
97. 332 F. S~pp. at 1259.
98. 384 U.S. 678, 693 n.27 (1966).
99. 384 U.S. at 693 n. 27.
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in bankruptcy to file returns for taxes incurred before the initiation
of proceedings under the Act."100 The Court cited101 I.T. 3959,1 02
which holds that a trustee is not authorized to file an income tax
return for the prebankruptcy period of an individual. In the case
of individuals, however, there is no express statute, such as section
6012(b)(3), that requires the trustee to "make the return of income
for the corporation";10a nor was that provision relevant or given
consideration in Nicholas, since the statute relates only to corporate
income taxes, which were not there involved.
I submit, therefore, that present law requires the trustee in
bankruptcy to file income tax returns as and for the corporate bank•
rupt, without break in the accounting period of the corporation and
without becoming a new and separate taxable entity.1 04
2. Individual and Partnership Bankruptcies

Whereas section 6012(b)(3), whatever its conceptual and practical
inadequacies, at least undertakes to regulate the tax duties of cor.
porate bankrupts and their fiduciaries, the tax law with respect to
trustees for bankrupt individuals and partnerships is a virtual vacuum. The taxing authorities and the courts, therefore, have had to
improvise and apply rules not framed with the bankruptcy situation
in mind.1°11
Since an individual bankrupt, after the transfer of his assets to the
trustee, may obtain new- employment or new assets from which
he will derive income independent of that which the trustee may
simultaneously derive from the assets transferred to him, it has
been the "long-established practice" of the Service to treat the estate
100. 384 U.S. at 693 n.27,
IOI. 384 U.S. at 693 n.27.
102. 1949-I Cu111. BULL. 90.
103. See text accompanying notes 105-06 infra.
104. There appears to be no room to question the proposition that, whatever might
be the general conclusion with respect to trustees, a receiver (of all or substantially all of a
corporate debtor's property), appointed under the Bankruptcy Act and having only
possession and not title (Bankruptcy Act § 2a(3), II U.S.C. § Il(a)(3) (1970); Imperial
Assur. Co. v. Livingston, 49 F.2d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 1931)), stands completely in the
shoes of the debtor in filing returns "for such corporation," rather than becoming a
distinct taxable entity. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § I.60123(b)(4), T .D. 6628, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 272, 273; Treas. Reg. § l.64l(b)-2(b), T .D. 6!l80,
1961-2 CuM. BULL. 123. Therefore, losses of the debtor may be used on the return,
In re Kepp Elec. & Mfg. Co., 98 F. Supp. 51, 53 (D. Minn. 1951), and the receiver files
for the full unbroken accounting year of the corporation, including the period before the receiver took control. Rev. Rul. 69-600, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 241. If the property is restored to the debtor, the debtor files for the full year, including the period
the receiver was in charge. Rev. Rul. 69-641, 1969-2 Cu111. BULL. 241.
105. See Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 44-45 (1973).
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in the hands of a trustee for a bankrupt individual (in contrast to
the rule asserted in corporate bankruptcies) as a taxable entity separate from the individual.106 The Service holds the trustee taxable
under section 641 of the Code, which imposes a tax on "the taxable
income of estates or of any kind of property held in trust," although
the nonexclusive107 list of specific examples that follows that general
language refers to no "estates" other than "estates of deceased persons,"108 and the Service undercuts its case by perversely holditi.g
that not all the tax provisions applicable to "estates" apply to estates in bankruptcy.100
Knowledge of that "long-established practice" apparently escaped the draftsmen of the first regulations promulgated under the
1954 Code. It was provided in the 1956 version of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.64l(b)-2(b) that
[t]he estate of an infant, incompetent, or other person under a
disability, or, in general, 0£ an individual or corporation in receivership or bankruptcy is not a taxable entity separate from the person
for whom the fiduciary is acting, in that respect differing from the
estate of a deceased person or of a trust. See section 6012(b)(2) and (3)
for provisions relating to the obligation of the fiduciary with respect
to returns of such persons.no

Relying on that regulation, the court in In re Kirby 111 held that
the trustee in bankruptcy of an individual is not subject to income
tax and added that, if Congress had meant to impose the tax, it
would have done so expressly, as it had done with respect to corporations. The "estates" subjected to ta.x by section 641 were held
to be confined to decedents' estates. While the case was pending;
the Treasury hastily amended the regulation. The words immediately following "in general" in the old regulation were amended
106. G.C.M. 24617, 1945 Cu111. BULL. 235; Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 COM. BULL. 632,
632. See Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 405.
107. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 770l(b) ("The terms 'includes' and 'including'
when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other
things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined."). See Groman v. Conunissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 86 (1937).
108. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 64l(a)(3).
109. Rev. Rul. 66-266, 1966-2 Cu111. BuLL. 356, discussed in note 112 infra; Rev.
Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CUM. Buu. 301, 303, discussed in text accompanying note 220 infra.
See Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 45 (1973).
110. T.D. 6217, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 336, 344. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(2),
referred to in the regulation, requires an agent, committee, guardian, or fiduciary to
file returns for an individual under disability. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3),
which relates to fiduciaries for corporations, has been discussed in the text accompanying notes 75-104 supra.
111. 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,J 9752 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
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to declare that the estate "of an individual or corporation in receivership or a corporation in bankruptcy [the reference to a bankrupt
individual was deleted] is not a taxable entity separate from the person for whom the fiduciary is acting ...." 112 The Kirby case was then
settled for $140,000.00, out of a claimed $575,644.18 in tax and
penalty, and the government dismissed its appeal. 113
Although the Kirby case remains the only reported decision that
has held a liquidating trustee for a bankrupt individual immune
from income tax, the two reported cases to the contrary114 are less
than satisfactory in their reasoning. Both relied on 28 U.S.C. § 960
and broadly construed the statutory term, "conduct[ing] any business," to embrace "'any activity or operation in connection with
the handling or management of the bankrupt estate' ";UG the later
case added that, in any event, "§960 does not purport to exclude
a liquidating Trustee from paying tax on income received." 116 But,
having neutralized section 960, which neither imposes nor inhibits
112. T .D. 6580, 1961-2 CuM. BuLL. 123, 123. The confusion in the Service concern•
ing the status of a bankrupt estate continued, however. In construing INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 137I(a)(2), under which a so-called "small business corporation," the income of which (if so elected) is taxed to its shareholders and is immune from corporate tax, is disqualified for such treatment if it has any shareholders other than individuals and "estates[s]," the Service ruled that disqualification occurs if a shareholder becomes bankrupt and a trustee in bankruptcy takes title to his shares. Rev.
Ru!. 65-90, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 428. Citing the above-quoted regulation as it had
read before the amendment four years earlier, see text accompanying note HO supra,
the ruling stated that "the estate of a decedent is the only estate which may be recognized as a taxable entity." Rev. Rul. 65-90, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 428, 429. That general•
ization, as well as the reference to the regulation, was deleted when the ruling was
revised and superseded by Rev. Rut. 66-266, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 356. But it was never•
theless concluded, Rev. Rut. 66-266, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 356, 357 (emphasis added),
that "an 'estate,' within the meaning of section 1371 of the Code, includes only the
estate of a decedent," without explaining why the meaning was different for that
purpose than for others. Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-9, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 1, at 17, which
holds than an individual debtor in possession under chapter XII is neither an in•
dividual nor an estate for the purpose of section 1371.
113. United States v. Kerr, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1[ 9184 (5th Cir. 1963). Although it
has been said that the "precedential value of the Kirby case was undermined substantially" by the compromise pending its appeal, Krause 8: Kapiloff, supra note 83, at
410, the view of the Tax Court in similar circumstances is that such a settlement "docs
not affect the vitality of the opinion as an expression of the Tax Court's views on the
issue involved." Cosmopolitan Credit Corp., 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mero. 404, 414 n.4 (1972),
114. In re Steck, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9702 (S.D. Ill. 1962) (referee opinion) (tax•
ing farm income pending sale of farm}; In re Loehr, 98 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Wis. 1950)
(taxing gain on sale of bankrupt's property).
115. In re Steck, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9702, at 85,839 (S.D. Ill. 1962) (referee
opinion), quoting In re Mid America, 31 F. Supp. 601, 606 (S.D. Ill. 1939); In re Loehr,
98 F. Supp. 402, 403 (E.D. Wis. 1950), quoting In re Mid America Co., 31 F. Supp. 601,
606 (S.D. Ill. 1939).
116. In re Steck, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,I 9702, at 85,839 (S.D. Ill. 1962} (referee opinion).
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the imposition of a federal tax,117 the decisions fail to address themselves to the affirmative basis for liability.118
The Kirby referee, like the referee in Statmaster on the corporate
side of the same issue,119 based his finding of the absence of such an
affirmative basis on the principle that" '[t]he extension of a tax by
implication is not favored.' " 120 That principle stems ultimately, at
least in the federal income tax field, from Gould v. Gould,121 a
1917 case, in which the Supreme Court said, "In the interpretation
of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their
provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language
used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not
specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most
strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen." So far
as the Gould case may require construing all doubts against the
government, however, such a requirement "is no longer the law,"122
in view of a later declaration of the Supreme Court:
We are not impressed by the argument that, as the question here
decided is doubtful, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer. It is the function and duty of the courts to resolve doubts.
We know of no reason why that function should be abdicated in a
tax case more than in any other where the rights of suitors turn on
the construction of a statute and it is our duty to decide what that
construction fairly should be.123
Although Gould is, nevertheless, still relied on,124 its role is clearly
limited to the interpretation of provisions levying taxes.125 When
the tax-levying provisions extend, as they do here, to· "all income
from whatever source derived,"126 including "the taxable income of
estates or of any kind of property held in trust,"127 and thus evidence
117. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
ll8. This criticism is noted in Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 409.
119. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1259-60 (S.D. Fla.) (referee opinion),
revd. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), afld., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir.
1972). See text accompanying notes 44-74supra.
120. 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,050, quoting Reinecke v. Gardner, 277 U.S. 239, 244
(1928).
121. 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).
122. Endler v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 945, 949 (D.N.J. 1953). But cf. Busse v.
Commissioner, 479 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1973).
•
123, White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281,292 (1938).
124. E.g., Tandy Leather Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 693, 694 (5th Cir. 1965).
125. See Parker Pen Co. v. O'Day, 234 F.2d 607,609 (7th Cir. 1956).
126. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6l(a).
127. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 64l(a).
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the purpose of Congress "to use the full measure of its taxing
power,"128 the applicable principles are that "those who seek an
exemption from a tax must rest it on more than a doubt or am•
biguity [since] [e]xemptions from taxation cannot rest upon mere
implication,''129 and that even express exemptions from a generally
imposed tax "are to be strictly construed."130
Partnerships are not themselves taxable under the federal income tax law but are treated as conduits, the partners being directly
taxable in accordance with their distributive shares of the income
determined at the partnership level.131 A partnership may, however,
become bankrupt, either separately or jointly with one or more or
all of its general partners.132 Originally, it was ruled that a bankrupt partnership was no more a taxable entity than the partnership
itself and that the trustee should file the regular partnership information return Form 1065 on behalf of the partnership, which
was considered to continue in existence as such during its dissolu•
tion by the trustee; the distributive shares were ruled to be taxable
to the trustees for the bankrupt partners (and directly to any partners not in bankruptcy).138 That ruling was subsequently reconsidered, however, in light of the asserted inconsistency in treatment
of trustees for partnerships and trustees for individuals. It was then
determined that the trustee for a bankrupt partnership, like the
trustee for an individual, should be ta.-x:ed under section 641 of the
Code as an estate, separate from both the partnership and the
partners.184
No separate taxable entity results, however, if a receiver, rather
than a trustee, holds all, or substantially all, the property of an
individual185 or a partnership.136 The law provides that "[i]f an in12s. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940); Blassie v, Commissioner, 894
F.2d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1968).
129. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, '71 (1940).
130. Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940). Accord,
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, '151-52 (1969).
131. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 701-04; United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448
(1973).
132. Bankruptcy Act § 5a, 11 U.S.C. § 23(a) (1970). To the same effect, see Co111MISSION REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 1-102(34), 4-201, -204, -206, -305.
133. G.C.M. 8488, X-1 CUM. Buu.. 270 (1931).
134. G.C.M. 24617, 1945 CuM. BULL, 235; Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CUM, BULL, 301,
Not only does this treatment (which has been tested in no reported case) subject the
bankrupt estate to the highest individual rate schedule (INT, REv, CoDE OF 1954, § I(d)),
but also the lumping of the interests of all the partners into a single entity taxable at
graduated individual rates may place the estate in a substantially higher tax bracket than
its members.
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.64l(b)-2(b), T.D. 6580, 1961-2 CUM. BULL, 123.
136. See text accompanying note 140 infra.
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dividual is unable to make a return ... , the return of such individual shall be made by ... his ... fiduciary or other person charged
with the care of the person or property of such individual," with
an express exception in the case of a receiver of "only a part of the
property of an individual."137 The regulation thereunder specifies
that "[a] receiver who stands in the place of an individual must
make the return of income required in respect of such individual,"
but an individual only a part of whose property is held by a receiver
"must make his own return."188 The Tax Court has held,139 however, that an individual whose property is held by a receiver is not
necessarily "unable to make a return," as the statute provides, and
that the receiver may discharge his obligation by seeing that the taxpayer himself files a return. Whether filed by the receiver or the individual, the return is that of the individual and may be joined in
by the debtor's spouse, in order to take advantage of the lower rates
applicable to joint returns-a privilege that is unavailable to a
trustee in bankruptcy. With respect to partnerships, there was for
many years a regulation that stated that a receiver in charge of the
business of a partnership should file the partnership information re•
turn Form 1065 rather than filing as an estate, as a trustee for a
bankrupt partnership must do.140 While that provision disappeared
from the regulations after 1954, the rule no doubt remains the
same.141

3. Reorganization and Rehabilitation Proceedings
In reorganization and rehabilitation proceedings of the kind
embraced in Chapters X, XI, and XII, whether involving corporations, partnerships, or individuals, and whether administered by a
trustee or receiver or by the debtor in possession, the present Bankruptcy Act provides that "all taxes which may become owing to
the United States or any State[1421 from a receiver or trustee of a
137, INT, REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(2).
138. Treas. Reg. § l.6012-3(b)(5) (1960) (emphasis added).
139. Selma Heasley, 45 T.C. 448, 460-62 (1966).
140. E.g., Treas. Reg. 45, art. 424 (1919); Treas, Reg. 118, § 39.142-4 (1953).
141. The reasons for stating this are that (1) while neither section 142 of the 1939
Code (on which the former regulation purported to rest) nor section 6012 of the
1954 Code directly deals with receivers for partnerships, there is nothing in the latter
section or elsewhere in the 1954 Code to indicate that the prior interpretation was
changed or undermined, and (2) the old regulation and the author's conclusion as to
the present law are consistent with the principle that a receiver is in effect a custodian that does not take title and hence is not a new taxable entity.
142. The Commission would add "or any subdivision thereof," for clarification.
COMIIIISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 7-315(e).
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debtor or from a debtor in possession, shall be assessed against, may
be collected from, and shall be paid by the debtor or the corporation
organized or made use of for effectuating a plan or arrangement
under one of those chapters."143 The italicized words indicate that,
while the obligation to file returns falls upon the receiver or trustee,
if one is appointed and holds all, or substantially all, the property of
the debtor,144 and while the taxes "become owing" from the fiduciary, the debtor is viewed. as the actual taxpayer, even during administration (resulting in continuity of the taxable year and availability of the debtor's loss carryovers),m since the taxes "shall" be
assessed against and "shall" be paid by the debtor (or his successor).
While the taxes "may" be collected from the debtor, they may also
be collected from the estate, with the priority of administration
expenses.146
C. Legislative Alternatives

I. Complete or Partial Exemption of the Trustee from Tax
Under the proposals of the Commission, the trustee in straight
bankruptcy, whether of an individual, a partnership, or a corporation, and whether or not operating or conducting the business of
the debtor, would be relieved of any obligation to file returns or
pay any federal, state, or local tax upon or measured by income
of the estate. However, in order to avoid a windfall to the debtor
in the unusual case where the property available for distribution exceeds the aggregate amount of allowable claims, the taxes for the
entire period of administration would have to be computed on returns to be made by the trustee before approval of his final account,
and the taxes would then be paid ratably from and to the extent of
the amount othenvise distributable to the debtor. The running of
the statute of limitations on assessment and collection of administra143. Bankruptcy Act §§ 271, 397, 523, II U.S.C. §§ 671, 797, 923 (1970) (emphasis
added). The Commission, which would merge such procedures into one procedure
called "reorganization" (even when an individual is involved), would carry fonvard
the substance of those provisions (simplified to state that the taxes "may be assessed
against and collected from" the debtor or successor) in proposed section 7-315(c) and
would extend them to railroad reorganizations (on which the law has heretofore been
silent in this respect) m proposed section 9-101.
144. INT, REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6012(b)(2), (3),
145. In re Lister, 177 F. Supp. 372, 373 (E.D. Va. 1959); Stoller v. United States,
320 F.2d 340, 341-42 (Ct. Cl. 1963). The Service, however, has ruled that an individ•
ual debtor in possession, at least under chapter XII, is a taxable entity distinct from
the debtor himself. Rev. Rul. 74-9, 1974 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 1, at 17.
146. Berryhill v. Gerstel, 196 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1952): In re Gates, 256 F. Supp
1 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
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tive taxes would be suspended until the date of approval of such
account, and any deficiency later determined would be collectible
from the debtor by transferee proceedings147 to the extent of any
distribution he received.148
The proposal to exempt the trustee from tax is not a new one,
and the arguments for it are perhaps adequately summarized in
Judge Yankwich's dictum that, "Historically, income taxes are levied
on the profits of the owners of a successful enterprise, not on the
dividends paid to the creditors on the 'winding-up' or 'closing-out'
of a defaulted and bankrupt business."149 For purposes of analysis,
it is necessary to deal with the two parts of that statement separately.
First, it is not strictly true that, either "historically" or under
current law, only "the profits of the owners of a successful enterprise" are subject to the income tax. Income taxes are determined
on an annual basis and reflect the il)come and deductions of a taxable year; the profitability or unprofitability of the taxpayer's aggregate business over a period of years is relevant only as specific statutory provisions, such as those for loss carryovers, make it so.150 If,
in the application of those provisions, a net income does develop,
"[p]rofits made in the business of liquidation are taxable in the same
way and to the same extent as if made in an expanding business,"151
and, except in so far as carryover provisions may be applicable,
"[t]he fact that it might prove that when the business was fully
liquidated the profits . . . were offset by heavy loss of [other] years
is immaterial."152
The second part of Judge Yankwich's statement assumes that the
tax is imposed upon the "dividend" to creditors. The tax is not, of
course, imposed upon their receipt of payment of their debts (although they may be independently taxable if the payments reflect
recovery of previously untaxed income, rather than of capital). The
147. See !NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6901.
148. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(a).
149. In re F.P. Newport Corp., 144 F. Supp. 507, 510 (S.D. Cal. 1956), revd. sub
nom. United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631 (9~h Cir. 1959) (emphasis original). The
Commission merely "rests on the premise that estates undergoing liquidation in bankruptcy and the officers administering them should be relieved from filing returns and
paying income taxes so long as the payment of such taxes on income earned during
the administration of the estate would diminish the assets of the estate necessary for
the full payment of all its creditors." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104,
note 1.
150. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 :U.S. 359 (1931); United States v. Rexach,
482 F.2d 10, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S., Nov. 20, 1973).
151. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 275 (1938).
152. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 276 (1938).
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taX is on the bankrupt estate (whether deemed to be a continuation
of the identity of a bankrupt corporation or, in other circumstances,
a separately taxable estate), The special circumstance of the trustee's
realization of income and appreciation in value accrued before
bankruptcy is left aside for later discussion.168 In general, the other
forms of income (interest, royalties, rent, or income from the conduct of business) that may be taxed to the bankrupt estate involve
increments in the amount of assets that were available to creditors
at the date of bankruptcy, and while, to the creditors, the greater
amount thereby recovered from the estate merely constitutes a re•
duction of their loss, it is to the trustee-as it would have been to
the bankrupt if he had continued to be the owner of the sourcean accession to income.154 The fact that it was earned by an insolvent
estate under judicial supervision (hence, "in custodia legis'') affords
no more reason for exempting such income than it would for re•
lieving the income of a decedent's estate, a guardianship, or the like,
To paraphrase the Supreme Court's response to a comparable argument that judicial custody precluded property taxation, "the transfer to the trustee [gives] no mysterious or peculiar ownership or
qualities ••• to the property [and does not] withdraw it from the
necessity of protection by the [United States]."166
Essentially, the argument of Judge Yankwich comes down to
what later courts have described as the "manifest inequity" of imposing any taX on the insolvent estate when "its burden would fall
upon the creditors by further reducing what at best is only a partial
recovery of amounts owing to them from the bankrupt,"160 so that,
"[i]n effect, the creditors would ••. be asked to pay a tax on their
loss."157 That argument, as the reviser of Collier has pointed out,
"implies a limitation on the taxing power that may appeal to the
emotion, but has little justification in law."168 The argument may
be relevant to the "negative income" resulting to the bankrupt
through the reduction of his liabilities, which results in no increment in available assets-a form of income for which, in conse153. See text accompanying notes 242-72, 336-85 infra.
154, In re Steck, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.1f 9702 (S.D. Ill. 1962) (referee opinion).
155. Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904), The actual quotation is found fn
the te.xt accompanying note 9 supra.
156. In re Kirby, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,J 9752, at 86,051 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
157. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (S.D. Fla.) (referee opinion),
retJd. on other grounds, 832 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), afld., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir.
1972).
158. 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 62.14[3) (rev. 14th ed. J. Moore 1972). See note
187 infra.
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quence, a conditional exemption has been expressly provided.1119 At
least in so far, however, as the income in question reflects an actual
increment in the amount available to creditors, there is no inequity
in charging such increment first with the "price" exacted from all
citizens for the protection afforded by the government, just as it is
charged with the expenses directly incurred in its production. The
equity of charging that increment with the tax thereon is further
evidenced by the fact that, if the creditors had been paid on the
date of bankruptcy, they would have received only the principal
amount of assets then in the estate, without the later increment, and,
if they had then invested the proceeds and earned interest or other
income therefrom, they would surely have been taxed on that income, notwithstanding their prior unrecovered loss on the debt from
the bankrupt.160
The creditors' loss is properly reflected, for tax purposes, not in
exemption of the estate from tax on its income, but in the creditors'
own deductions for bad debts (or, in some circumstances, in their
not being taxable in the first instance on amounts that they fail to
collect). It may be asked why it would not be simpler, then, to dispense with the trouble of collecting a tax from the trustee and to
make up the difference through the greater taxable recoveries or
lesser deductions resulting to the creditors. The effect of the tw-o
treatments is not identical, however, as may be evidenced by an example: Suppose the bankrupt, with 250,000 dollars of assets, has a
single' creditor to whom he owes 500,000 dollars. During administration, the estate earns 12,000 dollars net of expenses. Under present law, as interpreted in the preceding discussion, the trustee would
pay, say, 2,600 dollars of tax. The creditor recovers 259,400 dollars
(250,000 dollars plus 12,000 dollars less 2,600 dollars) and claims a
bad debt deduction of 240,600 dollars, which reduces his tax (assuming a forty-eight per cent rate) by 115,488 dollars. If the proposed exemption were adopted, the trustee would pay no tax, the
creditor would recover 262,000 dollars (250,000 plus 12,000 dollars),
the bad debt deduction would be 238,000 dollars, and the creditor's
tax would be reduced by 114,240 dollars. In the former case, the
creditor's loss, net of tax saving, is 125,112 dollars; in the latter, it
is 123,760 dollars. The difference reflects the fact that, to the extent
of the 2,600-dollar tax that the interest or other income would have
159. Bankruptcy Act §§ 268, 270, 395-96, 520, 522, 679, 11 U.S.C. §§ 668, 670, 795-96,
920,922, 1079 (1970). See also text accompanying notes 247-59 infra.
160. Cf. Allen v. Trust Co., 180 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.), cert. d1mied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
See also text accompanying notes 256-59 infra.
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borne if earned directly by either the debtor or the creditor, the government, in effect, rebates the creditor's loss rather than bearing
only a fraction thereof through an augmented bad debt deduction.
If, as argued by Krause and Kapiloff, "[i]t is reasonable for the
Government to absorb a share of the rehabilitation process" by forgiving the tax on current income of the estate unless all other creditors have been satisfied in full161-thus, in effect, placing such taxes
on a priority level below general creditors-it would be at least
equally reasonable to do the same with respect to unpaid taxes on
income of past years. The argument expressed by one referee, that
"[t]axing authorities and collectors are not responsible for a dollar's
_worth of goods on any bankrupt's shelves or for one single fixture
in his store and every penny paid in tax priorities is at the expense
of the general creditors,"162 is more appropriately addressed (and
in fact was addressed) to past taxes, which are a dead weight on the
estate, rather than to current taxes, which, in general, take only a
share of the increment and are the price exacted for current governmental protection of the estate.163 Yet, Congress has not heretofore been willing to forego priority over general creditors for past
taxes unless the tax collector has had at least three years before bankruptcy in which to attempt to collect them,104 and it is not recommended even by the Commission that such priority be relinquished
if less than one year has elapsed since the tax fell due.10G Even "stale"
taxes are not disallowed or subordinated but stand on a parity with
general creditors and thus encroach upon the latter's recovery.100
Since there has, of course, been no prior opportunity to collect the
tax on income earned during administration, there would seem to
be even less reason for the government to yield its place to other
creditors with respect to current taxes than with respect to those
incurred before bankruptcy.
It has been urged that section 7507 of the Code affords a precedent for relieving the bankrupt estate from tax on income earned
during administration if payment would diminish the assets neces161. Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 416.
162. In re Raflowitz, 43 Am. Banlcr. Rep. (n.s.) 358, 361 (D. Conn. 1940) (referee
opinion), revd., 37 F. Supp. 202 (D. Conn. 1941).
163. See Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441,444 (1944).
164. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970).
165. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-405(a)(5)(A), to be discussed in part
I(B)(2)(c) of Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Banhruptcy Laws-Priority and Dischargeability of Tax Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. - (1974).
166. In re Autorama Tool & Die Co., 412 F.2d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1043 (1970).
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sary for full payment of all creditors. That provision, first enacted in
1879,167 in general bars the assessment or collection of tax on any
insolvent bank or trust company if the result would be to diminish
the assets available for full payment of depositors. If the precedent
were valid at all, it would support.subordination of past, as well as
current, tax.es to all other creditors. In fact, however, it reflects no
concern for creditors generally, but only the special concern of
Congress for bank depositors as a class peculiarly in need of protection.108
The further argument has been advanced169 that requiring trustees to prepare returns puts an unwarranted financial burden on
estates and tends to defeat the prime objective of economical bankruptcy administration. Nevertheless, that consideration has not motivated Congress to relax the trustee's obligation to account to the
bankruptcy court,170 and it may be questioned whether any "legitimate interest would be served by permitting the trustee to escape
the unburdensome [further] responsibility of merely filing the returns and thereby notifying the United States of the taxes that are
due."171 The Commission had before it, however, unpublished statistics purporting to show that the net return to the Tre~ury is
simply not worth the trouble and expense imposed on bankruptcy
administration, since the aggregate federal tax.es paid on current income of bankrupt estates, at least in the year covered by the study,
is quite small and even that small recovery is offset to a significant
167. Act of March 1, 1879, ch. 125, § 22, 20 Stat. 351,
168. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7507-9(b) (1957). In some circumstances, other creditors
may unavoidably benefit as well where state law places them on a parity with depositors. Treas. Reg. § 301.7507-9(b) (1957); Rev. Rul. 73-294, 1973 INT. REV. BULL.
No. 27, at 17.
169. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, pt. I, at 277-78.
170. Bankruptcy Act §§ 47a(5), (12), (13), 11 U.S.C. §§ 75(a)(5), (12), (13) {1970), now
superseded by BANKR. R. 218.
171. See Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 695 (1966). It is acknowledged that
the Court's reference to an "unburdensome responsibility" was directed to taxes other
than the income ta.", but a more suitable approach to the peculiar problems raised
by income tax returns might be through tax simplification, return simplification, and
expanded taxpayer assistance directed at all taxpayers including trustees, rather than
through exempting one class from the burden because compliance is troublesome. The
bankruptcy trustee's special problems in ascertaining the gain on property acquired
from the bankrupt and in including in his return the prebankruptcy portion of the
taxable year of a bankrupt corporation are dealt with in text accompanying notes 230·
39, 273-95 infra. In a related connection, the Commission itself has discounted the
alarms of two referees, quoted in In re Freedomland, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 647, 650-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), ret1d., 480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.SL.W. 3415 (U.S.,
Jan. 21, 1974) (No. 73-374), that bankruptcy administration would be unduly burdened
by having to withhold taxes on wage dividends to employees and to report such
withholdings. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-405, note IO.
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extent by the fact that such tax payments and the trustee's expenses
of compliance reduce the amount otherwise available for federal
claims of lower priority.172 But statistical summaries, especially when
confined to a single year, tend to obscure individual cases in which
the escape from tax would be far in excess of the relatively nominal
amounts indicated by the averages, 173 as illustrated by the $384,484.52 in tax (covering twenty-seven years in straight bankruptcy,
during which no returns were filed) that was involved in In re
Kirby, 174 and the $492,150.33 in income that was involved (for just
two of the nineteen years that the estate was in straight bankruptcy)
in United States v. Metcalf. 115
Unconditional exemption, therefore, may not be the most appropriate means of relieving the burden on bankruptcy administration. A large part of that burden might be relieved simply by altering the rule-although it is a rule apparently more honored in the
breach than the observance176-that requires trustees to file returns
even when it is obvious that no tax liability will result. The law
(construed as heretofore discussed) now requires the trustee for
every corporate bankrupt to file an annual income tax return even
when the estate has neither gross nor net income177 and requires the
trustee for a bankrupt individual or partnership to file if the estate
has as much as 600 dollars in gross income, whether or not there is any
net income.178 This reflects the general unwillingness of Congress to
leave it to the taxpayer, when his gross income exceeds the minimum
net income on which a tax would be incurred, to determine privately, without setting out his claimed deductions in a return, tliat
his net income is insufficient to produce a tax liability. In view of
the judicial supervision of the trustee's accounts170 and the fact that,
as recommended by the Commission, many estates in the future may
172. To the extent that such other taxes, if owed by individuals, arc not discharge•
able under Bankruptcy Act § 17a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(l) (1970), however, the depletion
of the amount available for their satisfaction from the estate may not be a true meas•
urc of the ultimate offsetting loss to the government.
173. A critical analysis of the statistics is found at pages 48-51 of this writer's report
on Federal Income Tax Returns and Liabilities in Bankruptcy, in which the Commis•
sion did not concur but which it published in part III of its Report. COMMISSION RE•
PORT, supra note 3, pt. III, at 48-51.
174. 62-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 1J 9752 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
175. 131 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 769 (1943).
176. COMIIIISSION REPORT, supra note 3, pt. I, at 277-78.
177. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6012(a)(2), (b)(3); Treas. Reg. § I.6012-2(a)(2) (1958);
Treas. Reg. § I.6012-3(b)(4), T.D. 6628, 1963-1 CUM, BULL, 272,273.
178. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § I.6012-3(a)(l)(i) (1959). See
text accompanying notes 106-09 supra.
179. Bankruptcy Act§§ 47a, 62a(l), 11 U.S.C. §§ 75(a), 102(a)(I) (1970).
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be administered by government-employed professionals,18° Congress might be willing to make an exception and dispense with the
filing of returns by bankruptcy trustees when there is no net taxable
income-although, once the trustee has made the calculations necessary to negate a tax liability, it may be no more of a burden to embody the calculations in a return. A further salutary step might be
to allow exemption from tax (and from return filing) on some minimum amount of othenvise taxable income, the amount to be determined by Congress pragmatically in light of the expense of the trustee's preparation of returns and the fact that some part (but not all)
of the lost tax will, in any event, be made up from the creditors
through reduction of their bad debt deductions, or more directly
in some cases through greater recovery on lower priority tax claims.
Whatever the merits of complete exemption from return filing
and tax payment when incidental income is derived in the course of
liquidation, it seems more difficult to justify the Commission's proposal in so far as it relieves a trustee in straight bankruptcy from
payment of tax on the regular operations of a business, 181 which, in
some instances, have been known to go on for years even without
formal authorization.182 The proposal is, in this regard, a significant
departure from the policy firmly established by Congress for federal
income tax purposes ever since 1916;183 that policy was strongly
affirmed, with respect to state taxes, in 1934, when Congress, in enacting the predecessor of 28 ·u.S.C. § 960, declared: "No good reason is perceived why a receiver should be permitted to operate under such an advantage as against his competitors not in receiver~
180. Unless the creditors choose to elect a trustee, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
3, § 5-101, civil service employees of the United States Bankruptcy Administration
would perform the functions of the trustee in liquidating bankruptcies. Id. §§ 3-102(C),
4-301, 5-IOI(c).
181. Id. § 5-104(a), which exempts the trustee, does not distinguish, under id.
§ 3-303(a), which expands the investment mandate of Bankruptcy Act § 47a(2), 11 U.S.C.
§ 75(a)(2) (1970), between income from the mere investment of funds awaiting distribution and the income from business operations, which may be authorized by the
court under BANKR. R. 216 "for such time and on such conditions as may be in the
best interest of the estate and consistent with orderly liquidation thereof." The bankruptcy administrator, when acting as trustee under the proposed legislation, will be
neither equipped nor authorized to operate the ongoing business of the bankrupt,
Co1111111ss10N REPORT, supra note 3, § 3-202, note 7, other than as an incident to winding
up, id. § 3-202(b)(3), but the proposal contemplates that the court may, in such cases,
direct the administrator to designate a receiver to operate the business. Id. § 4-302(a).
Although the proposed tax exemption extends only to the "trustee" and not to a receiver, the latter would probably share the exemption as an agency of the trustee.
·
182. E.g., United States v. Metcalf, 131 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 769 (1943).
183. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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ship."184 In more recent provisions, which relate to businesses owned
by charitable, educational, and religious organizations, Congress has
further evidenced its strong concern about the unfair competitive
advantage gained when a business is conducted under the shelter
of an income tax exemption and is thus enabled to expand or to
engage in price-cutting at the expense of others whose profit margin
is eroded by tax.es.185 While a business that is in bankruptcy or undergoing reorganization or rehabilitation is subject to a severe economic disadvantage, the practical effect of income tax exemption
is-felt only when the estate has realized profits (and, in the case of a
corporate bankrupt, sufficient profits to absorb loss carryovers avail•
able from the preceding five years). "No good reason is perceived"
why at that point, merely on the ground that the creditors-in effect
the equitable owners of the estate under administration180-have not
recovered their stake in the enterprise, the estate should be favored
over the owners of other enterprises, which are subjected to tax on
their current income whether or not their invested capital is impaired.187 Therefore, any exemption (other than of a relatively nominal amount of income) that Congress may determine to provide
should at least except cases where the trustee is "operating" or "conducting" a business.188
The Commission, in effect, acknowledged that principle in part
by not extending the proposed exemption to the operating income
(as distinguished from income from sales out of the ordinary course
of business189) of estates in reorganization and rehabilitation pro184. H.R. REP. No. 1138, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); S. REP. No. 1372, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1934).
185. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 28 (1950). See also U.S. TREASURY DEPT., REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS [TO
nm SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 89rn CoNG., lsr SESS.] 31-42 (Comm. Print 1965), which
recites numerous instances in which taxable businesses were "placed at a serious competitive disadvantage" that led Congress to tighten substantially the corrective provisions, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 511-14, in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No, 91172, 83 Stat. 487. For the view that "the arguments about unfair competition [that
results from tax exemption of businesses owned by charities, cooperatives, and mutuals]
are based on economic theory that is at best naive and incomplete and is most likely
just plain wrong,'' Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REv. 18,
61 (1972), see id. at 59-68. However, the premises of Professor Klein's argument rest
on the peculiar nature of those entities and would not appear to be applicable where
both competitors are private business corporations.
186. See Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 183·84 (1942),
187. Except in the cancellation-of-indebtedness area, the existing solvency or insolvency of the taxpayer has no bearing on the taxability of income actually realized.
Home Builders Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir, 1948);
Parkford v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943).
188. Cf. text accompanying notes 12, 26 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 242-72 infra.

April 1974]

Tax Recommendations

969

ceedings. It wisely ignored the recent ill-considered resolution of
the National Bankruptcy Conference that, while likewise leaving
such estates taxable on operating income, would have relieved the
trustees of any obligation to file income tax returns.190 Exemption
from filing returns is supportable in circumstances in which tax is
not to be imposed at all, but it seems impossible to justify abrogation of the return requirement where ordinary business operations
are intended to remain taxable. It is unclear who, if anyone, would
be expected, under the Conference proposal, to make formal disclosure of such operating profits. It is hardly to be supposed that
the debtor, divorced from his funds, business, personnel, and books,
could prepare and verify a return of the trustee's operations.191 It
must have been contemplated by the Conference, therefore, that the
Service, in order to determine ·whether the estate had net income
subject to tax, would be required to delve directly into the books
and records of the estate without the aid of a verified declaration by
the fiduciary conducting the operation. A fundamental characteristic of the income tax system, however, is that the tax is "selfassessed" in the first instance and that (except in cases of unlawful
failure to file returns) the starting point for an audit is the tax.payer's own declaration of his income and deduc?ons.192

2. Deductions Allowable to the Trustee
One referee has referred to the "myriad of unresolved questions
of deductions" as one reason why Congress could never have intended to subject nonoperating bankrupt estates to the burden of
filing income tax returns.193 The proper remedy for such uncertainties, however, would seem to be, not to exempt the trustee from
tax (except in the case of estates with minimal income), but to direct
attention to removal of the uncertainties. Even if the Commission's
190. National l3ankruptcy Conference, Summary of Proceedings, Oct. 26-28, 1972,
at 5 (Resolution No. 3) [copy is on file with the Michigan Law Review].
191. Although the referee in In re Town Crier l3ottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 592
(E.D. Mo. 1954), expressed the view that "the government has the legal right to compel corporate officers to file the returns," that seems an unrealistic view. See text accompanying notes 230-35 infra. In any event, that was a straight bankruptcy case and
involved returns for periods before the proceeding.
·
192. In re Statmaster Corp., 465 F.2d 978, 980-81 (5th Cir. 1972). See Commissioner
v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 223 (19#). Cf. United States v. Harrison, 72-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. ,r 9573 (E.D.N.Y.), affd. per curiam, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9295 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973) (holding a taxpayer criminally responsible for failure
to file a return, despite his claim that the Service could have reconstructed his taxable
income from a mass of data available to it).
193. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258-59 (S.D. Fla.) (referee opinion),
revd. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir.
1972).
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exemption proposal is adopted, these ambiguities will remain a
problem in those situations (reorganization, rehabilitation, and
solvent straight bankruptcy cases) where tax is still to be imposed;
the Commission, however, made no recommendations on this
matter.194
a. Administration expenses. The estate of a bankrupt individual
or partnership, like a decedent's estate or a trust, is entitled, under
section 64l(b) of the Code, to the same deductions that are provided
for individuals (with some differences expressly provided for). 10u
Such deductions include "all the ordinary anti necessary expenses
•.. in carrying on any trade or business" (section 162(a)) and "all
the ordinary and necessary expenses ..• (1) for the production or
collection of income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income; or (3) in
connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax"
(section 212).
The first regulation under the predecessor of section 212 was
enacted in 1942 and provided:
The ordinary expenditures incurred in a receivership or bankruptcy proceeding are not deductible. Such expenditures include
expenditures of administration incurred in the performance of the
ordinary duties of a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy, as, for example,
fees paid to the attorney for the petitioning creditors, fees paid to the
appraisers, and disbursements which are made in connection with
the proceeding and which look toward the collection of assets and
their preservation pending ultimate distribution to the parties en•
titled thereto.196
In Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 191 however, the Supreme
Court held that expenses incurred in connection with the distribution of a trust at its termination were just as much a part of the management of the income-producing property of the trust as those
directly concerned with production of the income. Thereupon, the
above quoted paragraph of the regulation and others equally inconsistent with the Bingham rationale were stricken out and the following was substituted:
Reasonable amounts paid or incurred by the fiduciary of an estate or trust on account of administration expenses, including fidu194. The Commission's recommendation concerning the trustee's use of the debtor's
loss carryovers is discussed in text accompanying notes 484-93 infra.
195. Treas. Reg. § l.64l(b), T .D. 7177, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 5, 56.
196. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(a)-15(b), T .D, 5196, 1942-2 CUM. BULL, 96, 99 (em•
phasis added); Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15(b) (1948) (emphasis added).
197. 825 U.S. 865, 372-75 (1945).
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ciaries' fees and expenses of litigation, which are ordinary and necessary in connection with the performance of the duties of administration are deductible under this section, notwithstanding that the estate or trust is not engaged in a trade or business, except to the extent
that such expenses are allocable to the production or collection of
tax-exempt income.19s
In Revenue Ruling 68-48, it was declared that, where a trustee
in bankruptcy of a partnership does not operate the business, the
trustee may deduct under section 212 the estate's payments for compensation of the referee, the trustee, the trustee's attorneys and accountants, the bankrupt's attorney, and the attorneys for the petitioning creditors, as well as the trustee's bond premium, charges of court
reporting and transcripts, and the filing costs of petitioning creditors,
"if and to the extent that, they are paid for services rendered for the
production and collection of income, for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income,
or in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any
tax for the estate in bankruptcy."199 The italicized qualification of
the generality of the ruling, while following the language of the
statute, drains the ruling of practical utility to the trustees in determining the circumstances in which the enumerated items of expenditures are deemed to be made for the purposes stated. There have
been disturbing indications, in fact, that the Service has been reverting to the strict position it took in I.T. 2004,200 an ancient ruling
the substance of which had been embodied in the 1942 regulation201
that was repudiated in the Bingham decision and ~xpunged in
1946.202
While the present regulation denies deduction of the portion of
administration expenses allocable to exempt income (as section 265
198. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15(b), T .D. 5513, 1946-1 Cu111. BULL, 61, 61-62.
Treas. Reg. § 1.212-l(i) (1957) reaches the same result.
199. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 301, 302 (emphasis added).
200. Ill-I CuM. BULL. 292 (1924). The ruling held that administrative expenses of
a receiver, including fees paid to the appraiser, the attorney for the petitioning creditors, and the attorney for the receiver, unless related to the conduct of the bankrupt's
business, were not deductible.
201. See text accompanying note 196 supra.
202. The Chief of the General Litigation Division of the Internal Revenue Chief
Counsel's Office, who is responsible for bankruptcy matters and the putative father
of Rev. Rul. 68-48, after expounding on the ruling in a talk to the National Conference of Referees in Bankruptcy soon after its promulgation, added cryptically,
"However, limitations may e.xist as indicated in I.T. 2004.'' Feigenbaum, supra note
33, at 77. In addition, a very recent decision, although it involved a corporate bankrupt and hence arose under section 162 rather than section 212, viewed I.T. 2004 as
viable authority. See Narragansett Wire Co. v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
11 9234 (1st Cir. 1974).
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of the Code prescribes), neither that regulation nor any decision
that has been found prescribes that the property of the estate be
income-producing at all-although this prescription may be implicit from section 212, on which the regulation rests.203 Like many
decedents' estates, a bankrupt estate may consist primarily or entirely of a residence, an automobile, and nonexempt personal effects, and very little of the trustee's commissions and expenses may
be attributable to interest earned on time deposits, gains on sales
of property, or the like, which may be the estate's only gross income.
Nevertheless, every asset in the bankrupt estate, of whatever nature,
is held for the purpose of sale or other realization for the benefit of
creditors-for whom the trustee acts, as well as for the bankrupt201
-with the object either of collecting the ta."{able income from their
transactions ·with the bankrupt or of minimizing their bad debt
losses.205 It is true that the bankrupt himself could not convert an
asset in personal use into one held for income production merely by
ceasing to use it and putting it up for sale.200 But the trustee for a
bankrupt individual is a separate taxable entity, and the purpose of
his holding must be judged independently of the manner in which
the property was held by the bankrupt.207
The task of the trustee for a noncorporate bankrupt in determining his tax liability would be eased by declaring I.T. 2004 obsolete208 and by striking out the meaningless qualification italicized
in the above quotation209 from Revenue Ruling 68-48. These actions
would be supported by the present regulation, which appears to
have determined unqualifiedly that the statutory requirements are
inherently satisfied by expenses that are reasonable, ordinary, and
necessary in connection with the performance of the duties of administration of an estate.210 If changes in the rulings are not made,
amendment of the statute may be in order.
203. Cf. Whittemore v. United States, 383 F.2d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 1967); Alfred I.
duPont Testamentary Trust, [1974 Transfer Binder] P-H TAX Cr. REP. 1J 62.6.
204. Mascot Stove Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 153, 156 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
315 U.S. 802 (1942); Imperial Assurance Co. v. Livingston, 49 F.2d 745, 748-49 (8th
Cir. 1931).
205. The minimization of a deductible loss is a purpose recognized as incomeproducing under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212. Treas, Reg. § 1.212-l(b) (1957).
206. May v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1962); Frank A. Newcombe, 54
T.C. 1298 (1970).
207. Cf. Aero Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 40, 43 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
379 U.S. 887 (1964); Estate of Jacques Ferber, 22 T.C. 261 (1954).
208. The program of reviewing old rulings to identify those that are no longer
determinative because of changes in law, regulations, or court decisions is described
in Rev. Proc. 67-6, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 576.
209. See text accompanying note 199 supra.
210. See text accompanying note 198 supra.
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The trustee for a corporate bankrupt is subject to the tax provisions applicable to corporations,211 to which section 212 of the
Code, the Bingham decision, and the Bingham-inspired regulation212
do not apply. Therefore, such a trustee's expense deductions, apart
from such items as taxes and interest, which are specially treated,
must qualify under section 162 as "ordinary and necessary expenses
.•. in carrying on any trade or business." The First Circuit has recently held, therefore, in a case involving a receivership that was engaged, not in "carrying on," but only in liquidating the corporate
business, that the expenses of the receivership cannot be deducted.213
Yet, it has long been settled that the final "ordinary and necessary"
step in the carrying on of a corporate business is its liquidation and
that the expenses thereof are properly deductible under section
162.214 Since the trustee for a corporation is not a distinct taxable
entity but stands in the shoes of the corporation,216 he should have
the same right to deduct liquidation expenses as the corporation
would have in the absence of bankruptcy.216
b. Deduction for distributions to creditors. The trustee in bankruptcy for an individual or a partnership, as we have seen, is taxed
as an "estate" under section 641.217 In general, an estate has always
been treated as a conduit for tax purposes, in that it is allowed a deduction for certain distributions that are taxed to its beneficiaries.218
With the enactment of sections 661 and 662 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, all distributions (with exceptions in section 663 that
211. See text accompanying notes 26-104 supra.
212. See text accompanying note 198 supra.
213. Narragansett Wire Co. v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9234 (1st Cir.
1974), which relied on I.T. 2004, III-I CuM. BuLL. 292 (1924). See note 200 supra.
214. Commissioner v. Wayne Coal Mining Co., 209 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1954); Pacific
Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), acquiesced in, 1954-1 CuM. BuLL. 6. Direct
expenses of sales of assets, however, would ordinarily be offset against the proceeds.
See cases reviewed in Of Course, Inc., 59 T.C. 146 (1972).
215. See text accompanying notes 75-104 supra.
216. Concerning the trustee's right to deduct expenses paid by him but incurred
before bankruptcy, see text accompanying notes 226-29 infra.
217. See text accompanying notes 105-34 supra.
218. In G.C.M. 24617, 1945-1 CuM. Buu.. 235, however, it was ruled that a bankrupt estate was not entitled to a deduction for distributions to creditors "because
such distributions represent[ed] capital payments," which were not deductible under
section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939; authority for the ruling was Helvering v. Pardee [sic; actual name-Helvering v. Butterworth], 290 U.S. 365, 370 (1933),
which held that an annuity payable without regard to the availability of income was
not a distribution of income within the meaning of a corresponding provision of
earlier law. The Pardee principle, however, was totally abandoned with the enactment
of sections 661 and 662 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See text accompanying
note 219 infra. The specific application of the principle that was involved in the
Pardee case had earlier been repudiated by section 110 of the Revenue Act of 1942,
ch. 619, § 110, 56 Stat. 808.
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are not pertinent) were to be deductible by the estate and taxable
to the beneficiaries, to the extent that the estate had distributable net
income, even if the distribution came from the corpus and had no
relation to the beneficiary's interest in income of the estate,210 Nevertheless, Revenue Ruling 68-48220 rules that a bankruptcy trustee's distributions are not deductible under section 661 because that section
applies only to distributions to "beneficiaries," and creditors are not
deemed to be such, In support of that conclusion, the ruling cites
Thom(J,S Lonergan Trust, 221 which had so held under earlier terms
of the law,222 and section 643(c), which provides that "the term
'beneficiary' includes heir, legatee, devisee"; it notes that creditors
"do not fall within this definition," even though the law further
provjdes that the word "includes" does not "exclude other things
otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 223 Nevertheless,
while it might be argued that the only "benefici,nies" of a bankrupt estate are the creditors, they may say a silent prayer of thanksgiving that they are not so treated. The distortions reflected in
Harkness v. United States,2 24 which arose from disproportionate distributions by a decedent's estate and which might be mirrored in
the case of a bankrupt estate if priorities or late filing of claims
caused disproportionate distributions among creditors, as well as
the possibility of double taxation of income or income taxation of
capital recQveries, 225 are reason enough for such thanks.
A crucial unanswered question, however, is whether the estate
of a bankrupt individual or partnership is entitled to deduct its
payments to the bankrupt's creditors of expenses and similar obligations that accrued or had their origin before bankruptcy but that
had not theretofore become deductible under the bankrupt's accounting method. Walter Feigenbaum has stated that deductions
''probably would be allowed to the trustee'' for distributions allocable to obligations that would have been deductible if paid by the
219. See Harkness v. United States, 469 F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert, denied, 414
U.S. 820 (1973).
220. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 301, 303.
221. 1968-1 Cul\J. BULL. at 303, citing 6 T.C, 715 (1946).
222. At that time, only distributions out of income were taxable to beneficiaries.
See note 218 supra.
223. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 770l(b).
224. 469 F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973). In Harlmess,
corpus distribution~ to the widow, out of proportion to her testamentary share in the
income of the estate, caused her to be taxed on more of the estate's income than she
was ~ntitled to receive.
225, As envisioned in Krause&: Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 410-l2,
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bankrupt,226 but he cites no authorities, and those that exist suggest
the contrary. The above-cited rulings, which deem distributions to
creditors to be nondeductible "capital payments," relate only to
distributions of "the amount by which the estate's income exceeds
its expenses" and fail to define what expenses may be allowable to
the trustee.227 The bankrupt estate, although succeeding to the business of the individual or partnership, is, nevertheless, a distinct taxable entity,228 and analogous precedents treating as nondeductible
capital expenditures (in the absence of express statutory provision
for their deductibility) the payment of a predecessor's expenses by
transferees, even after tax-free transactions, cast doubt on the trustee's right to deductions in this situation.229

3. Taxable Year of the Corporate Bankrupt
We have seen that, at least in the view of the Service, the taxable
year during which a corporation becomes bankrupt is deemed to
be one unbroken accounting period,236 so that the trustee, having
assumed the responsibilities of management before the end of the
period, must reconstruct-often from the disordered books and
records of a failing corporation-the taxable income or loss arising
before he assumed control.231 Referees have expressed the view that
226. Feigenbaum, supra note 33, at 77. See note 202 supra.
227. G.C.M. 24617, 1945-1 CUM. BULL. 235,236; Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CUM. BULL.
301,303.
228. See text accompanying notes 106-34 supra.
229. Corporate transferees in tax-free transactions were denied deductions for
such expense payments in Birmingham Business College v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d
476, 481 (5th Cir. 1960); Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.
1946); Commissioner v. Breyer, 151 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1945); Merchants Bank Bldg.
Co. v. Helvering, 84 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1936); Falk Corp. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 204
(7th Cir. 1932). Succession to such deductions is now provided in the case of certain
intercorporate transfers. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 38I(c)(4), (16); Treas. Reg.
§§ I.38l(c)(4)-l(a)(l)(ii), I.38l(c)(l6)-l(a)(2) (1964). The estate of a decedent (to which
the bankrupt estate is analogized, see text accompanying notes 106-09 supra) was denied
deduction for the decedent's expenses paid after death in John M. Brown, 11 B.T.A.
1203 (1928), before such succession was expressly provided for by INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 69l(b) (which is confined to estates of decedents).
However, it will be suggested hereafter, in connection with the calculation of the
bankrupt's own tax liabilities, that it may be more appropriate to take amounts paid
by the trustee, and not theretofore deductible by the bankrupt, into account in the
bankrupt's own tax for the period terminating with bankruptcy, rather than to allow
such deductions in computing the estate's own tax liability, if any; such action will
result either in a loss carryover to be used by the estate or in the reduction of a
claim for prebankruptcy tax liability. See text accompanying notes 386-441 infra.
230. See text accompanying notes 91-104 supra.
231. More often than not, of course, a loss will be discovered and the trustee may
be motivated to reconstruct the figures if there were any recent profitable years against
which to carry the loss back. Nevertheless, sales of assets before bankruptcy might
have resulted in a taxable income.
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the trustee should not be required to sign, under the penalties of
perjury,232 a return embracing a period concerning which he has
no personal knowledge and that the court may instead order the
corporation or "the principals of the corporation" to prepare and
file a return for that period; 233 this seems to overlook the fact that
the corporate officers and accounting personnel will no longer be
on the payroll, unless on that of the trustee, and that, while they
may be required to give information, they can hardly be expected
to undertake without compensation the task of preparing a return
that, by law, is not their obligation but that of their former employer. Congress has elected to charge the trustee, as one of his
duties, with the obligation to prepare the return "for such corporation,"234 and, since the trustee will have or can get possession of
the books and records,235 such as they are, and will be employing
the personnel who remain connected with the business, he
is the only one in a position to make a return covering that period. The trustee's possible ignorance of the results of the prebankruptcy period is no greater than that of, for example, the administrator of a decedent's estate, and he will not be penalized if
he bases an honest report on the information available to him or obtainable through the processes of the bankruptcy court.
The Commission, however, has taken the pragmatic view that
there will too rarely be a tax liability resulting from operations of
the last months of a corporation's plunge toward bankruptcy to
warrant imposing on the trustee the administrative burden of preparing a return for that period. Therefore, in addition to relieving
the trustee in a straight bankruptcy case both of filing returns and
of paying tax (in most circumstances) for the period of the bankruptcy, the Commission would relieve him of filing returns for the
bankrupt corporation itself for any period.236 It would, however,
terminate the corporation's taxable year at the date of bankruptcy237
and thus permit the Service, if it believes the results may repay the
232. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 6062, 6065; Treas. Reg. § 1.6065-l(a) (1960).
233. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1259, 1261 (S.D. Fla.) (referee
opinion), revd. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 FJ?d
978 (5th Cir. 1972). Cf. In re Town Crier Bottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D.
Mo.1954).
234. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3).
235. BANKR. R. 108, 205, 402; Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970); COM·
MISSION REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 4-313, -502, -505. See Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147
(1923); Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923); Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 FJ?d 210 (4th Cir,
1949).
236. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(a).
237. Id.§ 5-104(b).
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effort, to audit the prebankruptcy period unaided by a return238 and
to make claim for any tax it may determine. 239
·
If the Commission's proposal to exempt the bankrupt estate from
tax is not adopted, the proposed division of the taxable year of the
debtor corporation, however convenient it may be for the trustee
who is relieved of responsibility for the earlier period, should also be
reconsidered. If the estate later enjoys taxable income against which
the loss carryovers of the debtor might be offset, the division of the
year of bankruptcy into two taxable periods would impose an unwarranted penalty, since each such short period is considered a
"taxable year," and the normal period of five "taxable years" during which the debtor's loss carryovers may be availed of would be
reduced by one year. 240
A similar question of dividing the taxable year arises in noncorporate cases but, since that has no effect on the obligations of the
trustee, it will be considered at a later point.241

4. Gains and Losses on Sales of the Bankrupt's Property
a. Exemption of gains and denial of losses. The Commission,
while not extending to trustees, receivers, and debtors in possession
in reorganization and similar proceedings the same qualified exemption from all taxation of income that it would provide in straight
bankruptcy cases, proposes that, subject to recoupment of the tax
saving for the benefit of the Government if an equity is ultimately
found to exist for the debtor or the shareholders, such fiduciaries
and debtors be exempt from federal, state, or local tax on gains from
sales of property made during the pendency of the proceeding or
pursuant to the plan, other than in the ordinary course of business.242
Except perhaps in a prolonged proceeding, such gains would gen238. Cf. te.xt accompanying note 192 supra.
239. A salutary effect of the Commission's proposal to close the corporation's taxable year at bankruptcy is that it would rectify the existing rule, formulated in
Florida Natl. Bank v. United States, 87 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1937), that the tax (if any is
incurred) for the entire year becomes an administration expense allowable on a parity
with expenses incurred by the trustee and ahead of wages and state and local taxes,
even though the part attributable to prebankruptcy transactions is as much "rooted
in the pre-bankruptcy past," see text accompanying note 462 infra, as any fourth
priority tax. This effect will be discussed, along with other priority questions, in part
I(B)(2)(a) of Plumb, supra note 165.
240. See Treas. Reg. § l.172-4(a)(2) (1956). Cf. the illustration in Treas. Reg.
§ l.38l(c)(l)-l(e)(3) (1960). The tax for the full year should nevertheless be divided for
priority purposes. See note 239 supra.
241. See text accompanying notes 319-35 infra.
242. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 7-315(c). Losses on such sales would also
be disallowed.
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erally result from appreciation in value that occurred prior to the
proceeding or from a low basis that reflected depreciation or depletion deductions previously taken by the debtor,243 and it is regarded
as inequitable to deplete the proceeds available for satisfaction of
creditors by a tax on such gains.
Although the question before the referee in In re Statmaster
Corp.244 concerned only the taxability of a liquidating trustee for a
corporate bankrupt on interest earned during the proceeding, the
referee's extended discussion of the "dramatic change" that would
result in the substantive law if the trustee were subjected to income
tax at all245 included an expression of the rationale for exemption
from tax on gains on sales:
[I]n cases of sale of tangible assets by a liquidating trustee where a
capital gain would occur because of a low basis stemming from the
time when the bankrupt acquired the property ... [taxation of the
gain to the trustee] is highly inequitable, inasmuch as the creditors
would have incurred no such tax burden if the bankrupt had simply
transferred the assets directly to them. A creditor who has supplied
goods and is not paid in full for them has suffered a capital loss [and
taxation of the estate's gain] could lead to the spectacle of the general creditors of the bankrupt indirectly paying a capital gains tax
upon their capital Iossl 246
Actually, of course, the creditors themselves incur no tax (except
in so far as their claims include previously untaxed income), whether
the property is sold pursuant to a proceeding under the Bankruptcy
Act or the debtor simply transfers his property directly to the creditors. Whether the imposition of tax is "inequitable" in the former
circumstance-or any more "inequitable" than the general priority
of tax claims over unsecured creditors-depends, therefore, on the
validity of the premise that taxing the trustee causes a greater erosion of assets available to creditors than would have resulted from
a direct transfer. That requires consideration of (1) whether a direct transfer by the debtor would have been taxable; (2) whether the
debtor's loss carryovers, if unavailable to the trustee, would have
minimized the tax, if any, payable by the debtor; and (3) whether
, 243. Trustees for both corporate and individual bankrupts use the same asset basis
as the debtor. See text accompanying notes 273-80 infra, In fact, in the case of debtor
relief and reorganization proceedings, whether corporate or individual, the debtor continues to be the taxpayer against whom the tax is assessed. See notes 142-46 supra and
accompanying text.
244. 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1250-62 (S.D. Fla.) (referee opinion), revd. on other
grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), afjd., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972).
245. See text accompanying notes 44-55 supra.
246. 332 F. Supp. at 1260.
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the creditors might, in effect, have enjoyed a preference over any
tax payable by the debtor.
(I) As a general rule, it is well established that one who transfers
property to his creditor in satisfaction of an obligation is taxable, or
realizes a loss, on the difference between the value of the property
and its basis, exactly as if he had sold the property and used the
proceeds to pay his debt. 247 Ordinarily, the fact that a person is
insolvent and still has a negative net worth after realizing certain
income does not affect the income's taxability.248 Logically, the taxability of the quasisale with which we are here concerned should
no more be affected by the insolvency of the debtor than if the insolvent had first sold the property and then assigned the proceeds
to his creditors, a transaction that was held taxable in Home Builders Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, where the court said, "Both the
solvent and the insolvent may receive profits and be liable for the
tax thereon .... (I]t is immaterial whether or not the proceeds of
the sale were sufficient to pay the indebtedness of the taxpayer in
full." 249 In one exceptional situation, the solvency of the taxpayer
has a direct bearing on the taxability of income. When an indebtedness of the taxpayer is forgiven in whole or in part, he may be taxed
thereon (in the absence of an applicable exemption) on the ground
that he has "improved his net worth," 250 and, if he repurchases a
bond or other obligation for less than he had received upon its issuance, he is taxed because the transaction "made available . . .
assets previously offset by the obligation ... now extinct."251 But
if the taxpayer is insolvent after, as well as before, such transaction,
there is no improvement in net worth, and no net assets are freed
from the claims of creditors, so the justification for taxability is
deemed not to exist. Whatever advantage the taxpayer may have
enjoyed, by the initial receipt of funds, property, or services for
which he need no longer pay, has already vanished with his insolvency.262 To the extent, however, that actual, existing property
247. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); United States v. General Shoe
Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); Lutz &: Schramm
Co., 1 T.C. 682, 688-89 (1943); Carlisle Packing Co., 29 B.T.A. 514 (1933).
248. Parkford v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
741 (1943) (compensation taxed to earner although collected by his trustee in bankruptcy).
249. 165 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1948).
250. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 38 (1949).
251. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
252. See Dallas Transfer &: Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d
95 (5th Cir. 1934); Commissioner v. Simmons Gin Co., 43 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1930);
Rev. Rul. 58-600, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 29.
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values-not vanished values-are applied toward the debt, no forgiveness or cancellation of indebtedness is involved, and the insolvency of the debtor should be irrelevant to taxability of the resulting gain. 253 In Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v.
Commissioner, 254 the insolvent taxpayer had transferred property to
its creditor in return for cancellation of indebtedness. The taxpayer
had conceded in the trial court255 that it was taxable on the difference between its basis and the actual fair market value of the property applied in satisfaction of its debt, and it was only the excess of
the indebtedness over such value (which was forgiven, not satisfied)
that was held nontaxable because of the taxpayer's insolvency. On
the other hand, in Main Properties, lnc., 256 in which the Commissioner acquiesced, 257 the· insolvent taxpayer was not taxed on any
gain on its transfer of a building and leaseholds, with a value of
$260,256.72 and a basis of $212,182.02, in return for the cancellation
of $600,000 in bonds. Under the foregoing reasoning, there should
have been a taxable gain of $48,074.70, and the Court's failure to
tax any gain might be deemed a rejection of such analysis. But the
Court's attention was fixed on the Commissioner's claim that the
entire excess of the $600,000 debt over the basis of the property was
taxable, and the Court did not address itself to the possibility that a
lesser amount might be taxed on a different theory. Therefore,
neither the decision nor the Commissioner's acquiescence therein
can be regarded as authority that the insolvency rule would exempt
from tax the actual appreciation in value of property applied by the
debtor himself in satisfaction of his debts, or as supporting the argument that the trustee should, accordingly, also be exempted.21i 8
"Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the
253. Cf. J.K. McAlpine Land &: Dev. Co., 43 B.T.A. 520, 526·27 (1941), affd. on
other issues, 126 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1942),
254. 70 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1934).
255. 27 B.T.A. 651, 656 (1933).
256. 4 T.C. 364, 383 (1944).
257. 1945 CUM. BULL. 5.
258. Although Texas Gas Distrib. Co., 3 T.C. 57 (1944), has also been cited on
this question, it is not authority thereon. That taxpayer conveyed its assets, subject
to a $400,000 lien, for $14,610 in cash (concededly taxable) and the assumption of
other liabilities of $108,649. Since the aggregate of the cash and liabilities exceeded
the taxpayer's cost of $455,155.82 by $68,103.18, the Commissioner sought to tax that
amount as gain. The Tax Court held the taxpayer nontaxable on its relief from in•
debtedness that exceeded the value of its assets. However, since the court also found
such value to be only $235,000, which was less than the taxpayer's cost, the question
whether insolvency would have relieved it from tax if the value had been as great as
the Commissioner contended was not resolved.
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attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as
having been so decided as to constitute precedents."259
(2) Krause and Kapiloff, on whom the Statmaster referee relied
in asserting inequity to creditors,260 actually made no claim that tJ?.e
debtor would not have been taxable if he had transferred appreciated assets to creditors. Rather, they pointed out that, if the bankrupt is an individual or a partnership (rather than a corporation, as
in Statmaster, where their argument was misapplied), the trustee's
tax may be greater than the debtor's would have been because of
the unavailability to the trustee of the debtor's loss carryovers,261 a
deficiency in the law that is more appropriately dealt with by making such carryovers available to the trustee than by wholly exempting the gain.262
(3) A further, but generally unspoken, practical difference is that,
if the debtor, without making provision for payment of tax on the
gain, had simply transferred all his nonexempt property to his creditors, the tax he incurred on the resulting gain would have gone
unsatisfied, and the creditors would have received correspondingly
more than they receive in bankruptcy. That difference, however,
reflects only the unpleasant fact of life that the occurrence of bankruptcy precludes preferences and requires that the debtor's obligations be satisfied in the prescribed order of priority; 263 while the
creditors might have escaped with their preference if events had
taken a different course,264 they can hardly complain of inequity
when bankruptcy forestalls them.
259. Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507,511 (1925).
260. 332 F. Supp. at 1260, citing Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 417-18.
261. "While the debtor would not have to pay the tax because he could use his
business losses to offset the income, the bankrupt estate (of an individual] does not
have a similar right to use the debtor's pre-bankruptcy business losses to offset any
income it realizes. The Government receives a tax windfall by virtue of the bankruptcy
proceedings, which is at the expense of the creditors." Krause & Kapiloff, supra note
83, at 417-18 (emphasis added).
262. See text accompanying notes 484-93 infia. Although Krause & Kapiloff,
on broader grounds, urged total exemption of the trustee from tax, their alternative,
if full exemption were denied, was, not to exempt the gain on the sale as such, but
to allow the trustee "all of the tax benefits to pe derived from a debtor's pre-bankruptcy history of operating losses." Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 418. Actually,
even where the debtor is an individual, in the rehabilitation cases with which we are
here concerned the estate is not considered a taxable entity separate from the debtor,
see text accompanying notes 142-46 supra, and the inequity envisioned by those
authors would not arise.
263. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 64, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 104 (1970). Cf. Sampsell v.
Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215,219 (1941).
264. See, e.g., Hartman v. Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881, 886-88 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 965 (1957).
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The unsoundness of the proposal is underscored by the fact that
there is complete continuity for tax purposes between the debtor,
the estate, and the corporation (if any) that is "organized or made
use of for effectuating a plan." The trustee (or debtor in possession)
stands in the tax shoes of the debtor, whether corporate or individual, and the law expressly directs that all tax.es that become owing
during administration shall be assessed against and paid by the
debtor or the successor.265 Both the estate266 and the successor corporation267 have the same asset basis as the debtor, the premise being
that the creditors step into the shoes of the shareholders in the ownership of the reorganized or rehabilitated corporation.288 The anomalous result of the proposal would be that, if the debtor sold assets
out of the ordinary course of business before the proceeding began,
or if the creditor-controlled successor (or continuing corporation)
sold the same assets under like circumstances after consummation
of the plan, a tax.able gain, measured by the debtor's original basis
(adjusted for depreciation, etc.), would be realized, but the identical
gain would be tax-free if the sale were made by the estate, standing in
the shoes of the debtor, in the interval between the petition and
the consummation. The effect would be to place a premium on
maximum liquidation of assets in a proceeding designed, not for
liquidation, but for rehabilitation of the business.
Moreover, there is no conflict between the taxation of these
gains realized during administration and the policy declared in
265. Bankruptcy Act §§ 271, 397, 523, 11 u.s.c. §§ 671, 797, 923 (1970). COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 3, § 7-315(e), is in accord. In corporate cases, this reaffirms the tax
identity established by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3). See text accompanying
notes 75-104 supra. In individual rehabilitations, unlike liquidating bankruptcies where
the debtor is severed from his properties and obligations and goes his separate way,
tax identity is established by sections 397 and 523 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 797,923 (1970). See text accompanying notes 142-46 supra.
266. See text accompanying notes 273-80 infra. Cf. United States v. Sampse1I, 266
F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1959).
267. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 372(a), 374(b). Those provisions relate to a corporate
or railroad reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act, as well as under a receivership,
foreclosure, or "similar proceeding," but probably do not embrace a chapter XI proceeding in which a successor corporation is utilized. See Tillinghast &: Gardner,
Acquisitive Reorganizations and Chapter X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 26 TAX L.
REv. 663, 688-89 (1971); Practical Techniques for Handling Tax Problems in Ba11l,ruptcy: A Panel Discussion, N.Y.U. 27TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1115, 1129-30 (1969), In
some chapter XI and XII cases, however, the general provision for inheritance of basis,
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 362, would be satisfied when a corporation succeeds to the
property of a corporate or individual debtor. The Commission would bring all forms
of reorganization and rehabilitation proceedings in bankruptcy under the basis provisions of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 372, but with an adjustment for certain reductions
of indebtedness. See note 270 infra.
268. Treas. Reg. § I.371-l(a)(4) (1955). Cf. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Lime•
stone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 183-84 (1942).
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sections 268, 395, and 520 of the Bankruptcy Act, 269 by which no
taxable income or gain results from the modification or cancellation
of indebtedness pursuant to a Chapter X plan or a Chapter XI or
Chapter XII arrangement. The rationale on which such relief from
tax may be supported is that, in the typical case, the equitable ownership of the business has passed to the creditors and it would truly be
making them "pay a tax on their loss" if the business were saddled
with a tax on income measured by what the creditors gave upvalues that have either disappeared or been contributed to the corporation by the creditor-mvners themselves. 270 On the other hand,
when the trustee in a reorganization or similar case sells assets for
more than their basis, the gain reflects, not values that no longer
exist or values contributed to capital by the creditors, but an increment in the value of the assets of the debtor, an increment that is
thereby made available either for satisfaction of the debtor's obligations or for other purposes.
The argument that the depletion of the sum available to creditors
through the imposition of a tax on the estate's realization of accumulated appreciation requires the creditors to "pay a tax on their
loss" is essentially the same contention that is advanced for complete
exemption of the insolvent liquidating estate from income tax, and
the answer is the same. There is no inequity in first charging the
realized appreciation with the "price" exacted from all citizens for
the protection afforded by government,271 provided that the erosion
of the value available for creditors is the same whether the sale or
application of the property on debts occurs before, during, after, or
in the absence of the proceeding in bankruptcy. That condition is
met in the case of reorganization and debtor relief proceedings, individual or corporate, as well as in corporate liquidating bank269. 11 u.s.c. §§ 668, 795, 920 (1970).
270. Where the indebtedness reduced was not owed to a creditor who acquires an
equity, the tax on the debtor is (with some exceptions) merely postponed through
an adjustment to the basis of property for future gain or loss or depreciation, Bankruptcy Act §§ 270, 396, 522, 11 U.S.C. §§ 670, 796, 922 (1970), and the Commission
would confirm that treatment and make it more uniform. COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 3, §§ 7-315(d), 9-101; id. at 296 (proposed amendment to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 372(a)). But such basis adjustment is and would continue to be inapplicable where
an equity security is substituted for the debt. This important distinction will be explored in depth in Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws-Reorganizations, Carryovers, and the Effects of Debt Reduction,
29 TAX L. REv. - (1974).
271. See text accompanying notes 149-68 supra. However, for reasons discussed in
the text accompanying notes 442-51 infra, it would be more appropriate to recognize
the gain (or loss) in computing the tax of the debtor (allowable as a claim against the
estate) than the tax of the estate.
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ruptcies. It is not met in the case of noncorporate liquidating bankruptcies, but the remedy for the inequity in those cases is not tax
exemption, but allowance to the trustee of the benefit of the bankrupt's carryovers.2 72
b. Treatment of gain or loss if not exempted. If, as here recommended, exemption of gains on sales of assets in reorganization and
debtor relief proceedings is not to be provided for, and if the bankrupt estate in other situations is not to be exempted from tax, certain other matters should be considered.
(1) Proof of asset basis. One of the difficulties confronted by trustees in bankruptcy in filing returns is the establishment of the basis
of property of the estate. As a general rule, the estate's basis is the
same as that of the bankrupt or the debtor. In the case of a corporate
bankruptcy, or any debtor relief or reorganization proceeding, this
follows from the premise that the trustee stands in the tax shoes of
the bankrupt or the debtor, without change in the taxable entity.273
But the same conclusion has been reached in the case of individual
and partnership bankruptcies, despite the fact that the trustee is
there regarded as a taxable entity distinct from the bankrupt.274
Although the courts have been singularly remiss in discussing,
or even identifying, the statutory foundation for so holding in noncorporate cases, the Service, in Revenue Ruling 68-48,271l relied on
section 1012 of the Code, which prescribes that the basis of property
shall be its cost, unless otherwise provided. But the "cost" of property is not ordinarily considered to be what was paid by someone
else, a distinct taxable entity.276 On the contrary, before express provisions of law made applicable a basis other than cost, the "cost" to
one who acquired property by gift or to a corporation that succeeded
to the property of another corporation with the same shareholders
was held to be, not the transferor's cost, but the fair market value at
the time the taxpayer acquired the property.277 Rather, the applicable provision appears to be section 1015(b), which prescribes that
272. See text accompanying notes 484-93 infra.
273. See United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1959). See text
accompanying notes 75-104, 142-46 supra.
274. In re Loehr, 98 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Wis. 1950); Homer A. Martin, Jr., 56 T.C.
1294, 1299 (1971); Norris Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745, 750 (1969), motion denied, 54 T.C.
554, 556 (1970); Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 301, 303. See text accompanying
notes 105-34 supra.
275. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 301.
276. See Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 219 (1935).
277. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1562 (1919) (gift); Maltine Co., 5 T.C. 1265, 1271-72 (1945)
(reincorporation).
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the basis of property "acquired ... by a transfer in trust (other than
by a transfer in trust by a gift, bequest, or devise) ... shall be the
same as it would be in the hands of the grantor increased in the
amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss recognized to the
grantor on such transfer," although a technical objection to its application might be made on the ground that the bankrupt estate,
for other tax purposes, has been viewed, not as a trust, but as an
estate.278 Since it has been held that a bankrupt realizes no gain or
loss upon the transfer of his property to the trustee in connection
with the discharge of his debts, 279 the trustee inherits the bankrupt's
basis without adjustment, and it is the estate, not the bankrupt, that
realizes, on subsequent sales by the trustee, the taxable gain or deductible loss that was inherent in the bankrupt's property.280
The possibility exists that the information on basis may be unobtainable by the trustee, or obtainable only at excessive cost, particularly if the bankrupt's records have been poorly maintained. The
problem parallels that of the donee of property, who is required to
use as his basis the basis of the property in the hands of the donor or
of the last preceding owner by whom it was not acquired by gift (or,
in the case of a loss, the lesser of such amount or the value at the date
of the gift).281 The law provides that, if the facts concerning such
previous owner's basis are unknown to the donee, the Service shall
itself, if possible, obtain the facts from the previous owner or any
other person; if that is impossible, the basis is to be the fair market
value as found by the Service as of the approximate time when such
previous owner acquired the property, according to the best information the Service is able to obtain.282 That provision in effect places
the burden of investigating the facts upon the Service, which has
inquisitorial powers,283 as well as access to past returns in which
such basis may have been pertinent, although the Service might still
try to disallow any basis if it is unable to find the necessary evidence.284 The situation of the trustee (whether treated as a separate
taxpayer or as acting for a bankrupt corporation or debtor in a re278. See text accompanying notes 106-34 supra.
279. Homer A. Martin, Jr., 56 T.C.1294, 1299 (1971).
280. Schilder v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1f 9595 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Norris
Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745, 750 (1969).
281. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1015(a).
282. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 1015(a).
283. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 7402, 7602-05; Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
517 (1971).
284. See, e.g., James E. Caldwell & Co., 24 T.C. 597, 613, 621 (1955), revd., 234
F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956).
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organization or similar proceeding) is comparable to that of the
donee, in the sense that the information needed to determine the
basis may be in the possession of others. But the trustee's position
differs from that of the donee in that, through the Bankruptcy Act2811
and Rules,286 the trustee may avail himself of inquisitorial powers
comparable to those available to the Service287 and, as statutory
successor to the bankrupt, may demand access to the Service's files
of the bankrupt's past returns.288 Therefore, any proposal to impose
on the Service the burden of ascertaining basis, as is done under
section 1015(a), must be based not on need, but on economy of
bankruptcy administration. In any event, it does not appear that the
possibility of difficulty of proof in some cases in itself affords any
justification for exempting the gains from ta." when a gain is found
to have been realized.
(2) Character of the gain or loss. The Revenue Service, in Revenue Ruling 68-48, has taken the following position:
The tax treatment of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of
each asset depends upon the nature of the asset in the hands of the
bankrupt. For example, if the bankrupt held certain assets for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of business, the sale of these
assets by the trustee would give rise to ordinary income or loss. Conversely, the sale of assets which were capital assets in the bankrupt's
hands would generate capital gain or loss income when sold by the
trustee in bankruptcy.2so

That principle is sound enough in the case of a corporate bankrupt
(which was not involved in the ruling), and it would be sound as
applied to individual bankrupts if, as hereafter proposed,290 the
gain or loss were treated as if realized by the individual. In general,
the fact that a sale is made in liquidation does not convert property
to a capital asset when it has been theretofore held for sale to customers, with no interim period of holding for some other purpose.291
Nor, conversely, does the fact that property, formerly held for investment or for use in business, is sold in the course of orderly liquidation convert such property into an ordinary income asset held for
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Bankruptcy Act§ 14c, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970).
BANKR. R. 205; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-310.
See text accompanying notes 230-35 supra.
Treas. Reg. §§ 30I.6103(a)-l(c)(l)(ii)(d), (iii)(d), (iv)(d), (vii)(d) (1961).
1968-1 Cur.r. BULL. 301, 302-03.
See text accompanying note 417 infra.
E.g., Estate of Freeland v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968); Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963);
Donald J. Lawrie, 36 T.C. lll7 (1961).
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sale to customers.292 However, when a sale is made by a trustee for
a noncorporate bankrupt, which is a distinct taxpayer, analogous
precedents determine the character of the asset exclusively by the
activities of the seller with respect thereto, without regard to how
it was held by the previous owner. In Estate of Jacques Ferber,293 an
executor who was liquidating a decedent's stock of goods was deemed
not to be holding them for sale to customers, even though the decedent had so held them and could not himself have changed their
character by making a bulk sale. Similarly, the character of assets
received in liquidation of a corporation is judged exclusively by
the recipient's use of them,294 even when the recipient succeeds to
the corporation's asset basis.295
If the proposal to exempt gains realized by the estate is not
adopted, it may be desirable to confirm by legislation the result indicated by Revenue Ruling 68-48, which makes more sense than the
rule of the cases last described.
(3) Priority status. To the extent that gains on sales made during
a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act are taxable, either generally, as here recommended, or limited to sales in the ordinary
course of business, consideration should be given to the impropriety
of according top priority, as an expense of administration, to taxes
attributable to the realization by the estate of appreciation in value
arising before the proceeding commenced.296

5. Personal Holding Company Tax
The federal tax law imposes a special tax at a prohibitive seventy
per cent rate on the undistributed income of a personal holding
company (which, in brief, is a closely held corporation with predominantly passive investment income).297 The object is to force such
companies to distribute their income to shareholders so that the income ·will be subjected to individual tax rates and will not enjoy
the shelter of the generally lower corporate rates. In a recent case,298
the Service attempted to impose the personal holding company tax
292. Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967).
293 •. 22 T.C. 261 (1954).
294. E.g., Grcenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956); C. Frederick
Frick, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 286 (1972). But cf. Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382
F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967).
295. Aero Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 40, 43 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 887 (1964).
296. See note 239 supra.
297. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 541-47.
298. In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 366 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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on a corporation in bankruptcy, which had primarily interest income, but the court concluded, in reliance on the referee's opinion
in Statmaster, 299 that the estate was not taxable at all; thus, it did
not reach the question whether, if taxable, a bankrupt estate could
be a personal holding company.300 If, as here urged, the bankrupt
estate is subjected to income tax, the law should make clear that the
personal holding tax, the purpose of which is wholly foreign to the
bankruptcy situation, is not to be imposed.
!I.

INCOME

TAX LIABILITIES OF THE DEBTOR

The Commission recommends that bankruptcy not be regarded
as involving a premature disposition of the bankrupt's property,
causing him to incur the burden of "recapture" of investment credits previously allowed to him. 301 The Commission further proposes
that the tax liability, if any, of an individual bankrupt, computed
to the date of bankruptcy, be made allowable as a claim against the
estate, rather than leaving the full year's tax as an obligation collectible only from his exempt and after-acquired property; 302 it stops
short of the full relief that could result from lumping into that allowable amount the tax attributable to sums earned by the bankrupt before the petition and collected thereafter by the estate (although taxed to the earner as postbankruptcy income) and from reducing such tax by allowing deductions for expenses incurred by him
and satisfied by the trustee from his assets and declines to treat the
occurrence of bankruptcy as the event at which gain or loss on the
assets dedicated to the bankrupt's debts is realized.303

A. Investment Credit Recapture
In order to stimulate investment in tangible personal property
for productive use in business, the federal ta." law allows an "investment credit," to be applied in reduction of income tax otherwise
payable, in an amount generally (omitting many refinements) equal
to seven per cent of the qualified investment in such property.804 To
prevent excessive benefit being derived from credits based on purchases of assets expected to be replaced within a short time, the law
299. 366 F. Supp. at 459-60, dting 332 F. Supp. at 1250-62. See text accompanying
notes 44-74 supra.
300. See 366 F. Supp. at 460 n.25.
301. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 293 (proposed INT. REV, CODE OF 1954,
§ 47(d)).
302. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(b).
303. See text accompanying notes 336-451 infra.
304. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46-50.
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allows no credit if the expected useful life of the property to the
taxpayer is under three years and bases the credits on graduated
percentages of the investment if the useful life is three to seven
years.805 Since the life estimated at the outset may differ from the
facts as they actually develop, provision is made for the "recapture"
of excessive investment credits previously allowed if the property
is disposed of prematurely, other than by reason of death or of
certain tax-free intercorporate transfers or by reason of "a mere
change in the form of conducting the trade or business so long as
the property is retained in such trade or business as [qualified]
property and the taxpayer retains a substantial interest in such
trade or business."ao 5
Since the trustee for an individual bankrupt, unlike the trustee
for a corporation, is considered an entity distinct from the debtor
for tax purposes,807 and since the debtor is considered to have
retained no "substantial interest" in the business in the hands of
the estate, bankruptcy becomes the occasion for imposing on the
distressed debtor an obligation to disgorge tax benefits enjoyed by
him in palmier days. 308 Although imposed as an "increase" in the
income tax for the year of such disposition, it is payable even if
the return for that period shows a substantial loss.309 And since
that period, under present law, is unbroken at bankruptcy, the tax
for the year is deemed a postbankruptcy obligation burdening the
debtor's exempt and after-acquired property.310 The Commission
would afford relief from that burden on the individual, consistently
with the general principle of not taxing him on his relief from
debts that he is unable to pay,311 by amending the Internal Revenue
Code to make clear that the transfer of title to a trustee in bankruptcy is not, in itself, to be deemed a disposition of the property
causing recapture of investment credits.312 While the trustee's own
305. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 46(c)(2), 48(a).
306. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 47.
307. See text accompanying notes 75-113 supra.
308. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 46-47 (1973).
309. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 47(a)(l); Treas. Reg. § 1.47-l(b)(l) (1967).
310. See text accompanying notes 319-35 infra. In contrast, in the case of a corporate bankrupt, there is no "disposition" unless and until the trustee liquidates the
property, and the resulting liability then falls on the estate. See text accompanying
notes 75-104 supra.
311. Treas. Reg. § l.61-12(b) (1957).
312. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 293 (proposed INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 47(d)). Using the reasoning employed by the Tax Court in Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C.
36, 46-47 (1973), one could conclude that bankruptcy of an individual would cause
deferred gains on installment sales previously made by him to become taxable under
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subsequent sale of the property would be such a disposition, the
proposal to relieve the trustee of all income taxes in liquidation
cases313 would preclude recapture of the credit from the estate.
Recapture of investment credits may also result, as if the property had been partially disposed of, when "the basis (or cost) of
[qualified] property is reduced, for example, as a 1·esult of a refund
of part of the cost of the property . . . . " 314 A further provision
of the Commission's proposed amendment would preclude misapplication of that principle to cause recapture of investment credits
when the basis of property is reduced, not as a result of renegotiation of the price, but merely as a convenient device adopted by
Congress to postpone the liability for tax on income otherwise resulting from an adjustment of indebtedness,316 whether in Bankruptcy Act cases or otherwise.316 Since the freedom of debtors in
straight bankruptcy from tax on their relief from indebtedness317
is not conditioned upon reduction of the basis of any property,318 this phase of the proposal would not affect tax liabilities
of the bankrupt in such cases.
B. Allocating Income, Deductions, and Tax Liability
Before and After Bankruptcy

I. Closing the Individual's Taxable Year at Bankruptcy
The taxable period of an individual bankrupt, like that of a
corporation, 319 continues without interruption at the date of banksection 453(d)(l) of the Code when the obligation is "disposed of" to the trustee. Al•
though the Commission does not deal directly with this matter, the inequity would
be relieved by its general proposal to cut off the debtor's taxable year at bankruptcy
for the purpose of making the tax computed to that date allowable as a claim against
the estate rather than a postbankruptcy obligation of the debtor. See text accompanying notes 319-35 infra.
313. See text accompanying notes 147-92 supra.
314. Treas. Reg. § I.47-2(c)(l) (1967).
315. See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 39, 45-56 (1949).
316. The Service has ruled that recapture of investment credits occurs in a non•
bankruptcy situation where basis is electively reduced under section 1017 of the Code
as an alternative to immediate taxability of income derived by a debtor from repurchase of his bonds below face. Rev. Rul. 1974-17, 1974 INT. R.Ev. Buu.. No. 17, at 6.
But the same principle might be applied where basis is adjusted to reflect debt reductions under the reorganization and rehabilitation provisions of the Bankruptcy Act§§ 270, 396, 522, 11 U.S.C. §§ 670, 796, 922 (1970). See Tillinghast & Gardner, supra
note 267, at 701.
317. Treas. Reg.§ l.61-12(b) (1957).
318. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1017, reduces basis only where the debt adjustment
would otherwise have been taxable. Retail Properties, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. M:em.
1463, 1474-75 (1964).
319. See text accompanying notes 75-104 supra.
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ruptcy.820 But, in the case of an individual, it is not the trustee
but the individual himself who files a return for the unbroken
taxable year,821 while the trustee (under existing law) files independently for the estate to reflect its transactions during the period
of administration.822 Although it is generally assumed that the
bankrupt will have a loss for the immediate prebankruptcy period,
it is entirely possible that he will have a net taxable income. His
misfortune may have resulted from extravagance in personal, nondeductible expenditures; he may have sold property for more than
its depreciated cost; or, being on the cash basis of accounting, he
may have had taxable receipts in excess of the business expenses
he was in a position to pay323-and he gets no credit for their subsequent payment by the trustee out of his assets324 or for the losses
the trustee may sustain on the sale thereof. 325 Since his tax liability
is not determinable until the end of the year, it has been held326
that no part of the tax for the year in which bankruptcy occurs
can be collected from the estate as a tax "legally due and owing"
at bankruptcy and that, even though the benefits of prebankruptcy
transactions that gave rise to the tax liability may have passed to
the trustee, the tax is collectible, if at all, only from the bankrupt's
320. Homer A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1294, 1298 (1971); Norris Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745,
749 n.5 (1969).
321. Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 Cu:r.1. BULL, 632.
322, See text accompanying notes 106-34 supra.
323. Such was the situation in Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 43 (1973), where a
prebankruptcy taxable income of 60,000 dollars resulted from the debtor's inability to
pay and qualify for deduction of expense obligations that were in a greater amount.
See text accompanying notes 400-21 infra. Cf. F.R. Humpage, 17 T.C. 1625, 1631-32,
1640 (1952), in which a corporation, although rendered insolvent by its guaranty of its
subsidiary's bonds that it was unable to meet (and hence could not deduct), nevertheless had over 2 million dollars surplus in its earnings and profits account for tax
purposes.
324, Cf. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 43 (1973).
325. Schilder v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1[ 9595 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Norris
Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745 (1969).
326. In re Cooney, 35 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 247 (N.D.N.Y. 1938) (referee opinion).
See Frances M. Parkford, 45 B.T.A. 461, 466 (1941), affd., 133 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1943).
Cf, In re International Match Co., 79 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1935). The referee in the Cooney
case adverted to the fact that no attempt had been made by the Commissioner to
terminate the individual's taxable year at the date of bankruptcy under the predecessor of section 6851 of the Code, which permits such action in order to enable immediate assessment and collection when the taxpayer "designs ••• to do any ••• act
tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to collect
the income tax for the current • • • taxable year unless such proceedings be brought
without delay." The inference that the result of the Cooney case would have been
altered if that had occurred, however, seems unfounded. The termination of the taxable year is merely a provisional remedy, and the tax is to be redetermined and
adjusted on the basis of the full taxable year after completion of such period, Irving
v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Ludwig Littauer & Co., 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938);
hence, the liability for the year would still be a postbankruptcy obligation.
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exempt and after-acquired property.327 That effect might be avoided
if the courts were to give a broad construction to the words "debts"
and "claims,"328 unencumbered by the concept of "legally due and
owing," which appears only in the provision320 that establishes priority, not in the provisions with regard to provability and allowability.330 The part of the bankrupt's income tax attributable to
the prebankruptcy portion of the year should be viewed as a contingent claim against the estate, readily determinable when the taxable year ends a few months after the filing of the petition and,
hence, provable and allowable under sections 57d and 63a(8) of the
Bankruptcy Act.381 At the date of bankruptcy, the inchoate tax liability, while subject to modification by events later in the year,
exists as a claim against the bankrupt as surely as the inchoate
right to a carryback refund (when a loss was sustained in that period)
existed as an asset of the bankrupt in Segal v. Rochelle,832 and
it is as surely "rooted in the prebankruptcy past." It is doubtful,
however, that this equitable result can be assured without legislation.
The Commission proposes, therefore, that the taxable year of
an individual bankrupt be tentatively closed at the date of filing,
solely for the purpose of making the income tax, computed to that
date, an allowable claim against the estate.333 If the actual tax for
the full taxable year proves to be greater, the excess would be a
postbankruptcy obligation of the debtor, neither collectible from
the estate nor dischargeable; if less, only the actual tax liability
would be allowed against the estate.334 Since the taxable period would
327. In contrast, a corporate ta" for the year in which bankruptcy occurs not only
is collectible from the estate but also ranks as an administration expense and thus

raises an entirely different set of problems. See note 239 supra.
328. See, e.g., In re Plankinton Bldg. Co., 135 F.2d 273,275 (7th Cir. 1943).
329. Bankruptcy Act§ 64a(4), II U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970),
330. Cf. In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 102-06 (3d Cir, 1964),
which held employment and withholding taxes incurred during the proceeding, with
respect to payments of prebankruptcy wages, to be provable debts or claims rather
than administration expenses but then (by dictum) stretched the general understanding of "legally due and owing" to bold the taxes to be fourth priority items, The
Commission's proposals abandon the "legally due and owing" concept, even for
priority purposes, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-405(a)(5), but still determine
the existence of allowable nonadministrative claims as of the date of filing of the
petition. CoMMISSION REPORT, supra, § 4-403(b).
331. 11 U.S.C. §§ 93(d), l03(a)(8) (1970). See Coclin Tobacco Co, v. Griswold, 408
F.2d 1338, 1341 n. 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969).
332. 382 U.S. 375 (1966). See text accompanying notes 455-67 infra.
333. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(b). The device of tentatively closing
the taxable year, subject to final calculation on a full-year basis, has precedent in
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851. See note 326 supra.
334. The proposal in these respects docs rough, rather than exact, justice to the
bankrupt. In the rare cases in which the bankrupt's income spans a significant range
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be divided only for this limited purpose, there would be no injection of short "taxable years" with resultant curtailment of the aggregate period in which loss carryovers may be used.335

2. Income Earned Before, but Deemed Realized After, Bankruptcy
Merely dividing the individual bankrupt's taxable year, as proposed by the Commission, would only begin to resolve the inequity,
for many items of income that would fall into the debtor's postbankruptcy taxable period under the rules of tax accounting would
nevertheless become assets of the bankrupt estate.
Under the bankruptcy law, the trustee takes title to the bankrupt's nonexempt and transferable or leviable claims for compensation for services rendered before bankruptcy,336 including compensation for uncompleted services if the contract is divisible,337 although
the bankrupt retains the right to the full compensation for then
uncompleted work if no part is payable in the absence of further
performance of services.338 The trustee's title is not affected by the
fact that the amount payable is determined only by later resolution of a dispute 339 or that it is contingent upon future profits
or other subsequent events, provided the bankrupt has done before
bankruptcy all that he is required to do to entitle him to payment.340
Any other causes of action, which may be productive of taxable
income, also pass to the trustee. 341 The trustee, of course, also
acquires the right to accrued rents, interest, and dividends from
the bankrupt's property, as well as his right to the proceeds of sales
previously made by him.
of tax brackets, the higher applicable brackets, rather than an average, will be applied to his income for the postbankruptcy portion of the year. If he has net income
for the early part of the year and suffers a net loss after bankruptcy, the loss, which
his future resources must bear, reduces a prebankruptcy liability rather than being
available to offset his future taxable income.
335. See text accompanying note 240 supra.
336. In re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1972); Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir.
1966). The Commission would delete the requirement that the property be transferable
or subject to seizure under state law. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-601,
notes 1-2.
337. In re Brown, 4 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1924). But cf. Fischer v. Liberty Natl. Bank
&: Trust Co., 61 F.2d 757,759 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 611 (1933).
338. In re Leibowitt, 93 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 652 (1938);
In re Coleman, 87 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1937); In re Furness, 75 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1935).
339. In re Evans, 253 F. 276 (W.D. Tenn. 1918).
340. Hudson v. Wylie, 242 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1957); In re Wright, 157 F. 544 (2d
Cir. 1907). See Lockhart v. Mittleman, 123 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1941); In re Leibowitt,
93 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1937).
341. Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 118 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1941).
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Among the basic principles of tax law are the principles that the
one rendering services is taxable on the income therefrom,842 that the
one owning property is taxable on interest or dividends accruing
while he owns it,343 and that the seller of property is taxable on the
profit from the sale344-even though the amount is never collected
by him but is applied directly to "procure a satisfaction that can be
obtained only by the expenditure of money or property," whether
that is the nonmaterial satisfaction involved in a family gift845 or
the payment of one's debts.346 The fact that the amount payable is
in dispute at the time of the transfer3 47 or is dependent upon future
events348 affects the timing, but not the existence, of the earner's
liability for tax.349 Those principles are controlling even where the
application of the payment on the taxpayer's debts is involuntary, by
attachment or other levy,350 and they have been held equally applicable in bankruptcy, notwithstanding that the debtor would have
been discharged of his debts whether or not the creditors realized
anything.a111
In principle, there can be no quarrel with the holdings that
income earned by the bankrupt before bankruptcy should be taxable to him, whether or not the event fixing the time of tax.ability
under his accounting method has yet occurred.852 To the bankrupt
342. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
343. United States v. Joliet &: Chicago R. R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942); Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. Il2 (1940); Austin v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947),
344. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Wood Hannon
Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963); Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th
Cir. 1952). Concerning the taxability of deferred gains on installment sales upon the
occurrence of bankruptcy, see note 312 supra.
345. Helveringv. Horst, 311 U.S. 112,117 (1940).
346. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 465-66 (1959); Steckel v. Commissioner,
253 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1958).
347. Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918, 924 (2d Cir. 1963).
348. J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir, 1957).
349. But cf. Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1962).
350. Ward v. Commissioner, 224 F,2d 547, 552-53 (9th Cir.1955).
351. Parkford v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
741 (1943). Parkford happened to involve a taxpayer on the accrual basis, who would,
in any event, have been immediately taxable on his compensation when earned, irrespective of its later disposition, and the Tax Court for this reason had felt it un•
necessary to rely on the foregoing line of cases. Frances M. Parkford, 45 B.T.A. 461, 470
(1941). But the Ninth Circuit squarely relied on those principles, in taxing the bank•
rupt not only on amounts fully earned before bankruptcy but also on compensation
that was contingent on the subsequent results of his prebankruptcy services. The Tax
Court itself has applied those principles to a bankrupt using the cash basis, in Charles
E. Cooney, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mero. 264 (1942), remanded pursuant to settlement, (2d
Cir., May 29, 1944). Cf. Orval C. Walker, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 690, 692 (1973) (under
chapter XIll).
352. See note 351 supra.
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estate, the money is not income (as interest earned during administration would be) but the collection of capital in the form of an
account receivable that came to the estate as property of the bankrupt under section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act.363 "It is idle to
contend it is inequitable to tax [the bankrupt] upon it because [he]
did not personally receive it. All of it was used to pay [his] debts,
and, if equities were to be weighed, it would be far more inequitable
to the fiscus to permit the income to escape taxation altogether." 3154
What is ·wrong with this application of the rule is that, although the
trustee collected the earnings as prebankruptcy property, the tax
incurred by the bankrupt thereon was a postbankruptcy item that,
in the bankruptcy proceedings, was held not to be a provable claim
against the estate. The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to give the
bankrupt "an unencumbered fresh start,"366 "'a new opportunity
in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt,' "366 is frustrated when
the mechanical application of rules of tax law causes income earned
before bankruptcy and appropriated by the trustee to be taxed to
the individual bankrupt in periods ending after bankruptcy, for
which the tax liability is not chargeable against the estate. The
bankrupt's "fresh start" is, of course, inevitably "encumbered" by
nondischargeable taxes that the assets in the estate are insufficient
to satisfy, but it is wholly inconsistent with the "fresh start" principle to burden the bankrupt with continuing liability for a tax
on prebankruptcy earnings that are paid over to the trustee and
that the estate, including the amount of that income, would have
been adequate to satisfy at the fourth priority level.
That merely dividing the taxable year at the date of bankruptcy
would not remove the inequity is evident from the fact that, under
the principles discussed above, a taxpayer on the cash basis becomes
taxable only at the time his earnings are collected by his assignee,
rather than at the time of the transfer.357 Although an exception is
353. II U.S.C. § ll0(a) (1970). Cf. Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241 (1927),
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 584 (1928); William. C. Frank, 6 B.T.A. 1071 (1927) (which, before Congress dealt expressly with the subject, see text accompanying notes 866-72
infra, held that a decedent's estate received the decedent's uncollected and untaxed
compensation and interest earnings as corpus of the estate and was not subject to
income tax thereon).
354. Frances M. Parkford, 45 B.T.A. 461, 470 (1941), afjd., 133 F.2d 249 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943).
355. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
356. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970), quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934).
357. Jones v. United States, 395 F.2d 938, 943 (6th Cir. 1968); Sol C. Siegel Prods.,
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recognized in cases where the transfer is made for a present consideration,858 the prevailing view is that the transfer to the trustee
of assets from which the bankrupt's liabilities will ultimately be
satisfied or discharged is not, in itself, such a transfer for a consideration.859 In any event, and even if the bankrupt uses the accrual
basis of accounting, taxability would be postponed to the individual's postbankruptcy period if the amount were contingent, since
it cannot be known how much of the bankrupt's debts will be satisfied from the assigned income right until the contingency is
resolved. It seems desirable, therefore, to devise a way to make
postbankruptcy taxes, to the extent attributable to prebankruptcy
earnings appropriated by the trustee, allowable against the estate.
The way to accomplish that purpose would be to make taxable
in the period ending with the date of bankruptcy all items of theretofore untaxed income that pass to the trustee, whether or not they
would yet have been taxable under the bankrupt's method of accounting. There is precedent for such action in cases involving
the liquidation of corporations. Under section 446(b) of the Code
and predecessor provisions, when a taxpayer's regular method of
accounting "does not clearly reflect income," it must be computed
"under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary or his delegate, does clearly reflect income." In order to prevent the permanent
escape of tax on earned income that at the time of liquidation had
not yet become taxable under methods of accounting that took earnings into ta.xable income only when received in cash or its equivalent or when contracts were completed, the courts have sustained
findings by the Service that income can be clearly reflected in the
final year only by modifying the accounting method to pick up all
accrued income or a percentage of the income on uncompleted
contracts.360 That precedent is deficient, however, in that it does
not reach items of income that, while fully earned, are still contingent in amount at the crucial date and, therefore, would not be
Inc., 46 T.C. 15, 23-25 (1966); Estate of Florence E. Carr, 37 T.C. 1173 (1962); Rev,
Rul. 72-312, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 22.
358. E.g., Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
359. Homer A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1971). But cf. Charles R. Stuart, 38
B.T.A. II47, II51 (1938).
360. Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962): Idaho First Natl,
Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959); Standard Paving Co, v. Commissioner,
190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); Jud Plumbing &: Heating,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946).
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taxable in that final period under any recognized method of accounting.861
A more effectual precedent is found in section 42 of the Revenue
Acts of 1934,362 1936,863 and 1938864 and of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939365 as originally enacted. As a result of court decisions
that held a decedent's estate not taxable on the collection of income
that had not previously been taxed to the decedent,866 Congress
enacted the following: "In the case of the death of a taxpayer there
shall be included in computing net income for the taxable period
in which falls the date of his death, amounts accrued up to the date
of his death if not otherwise properly includable in respect of such
period or a prior period." The Supreme Court, in Helvering v.
Enright,861 broadly construed the term "amounts accrued" in order
to effectuate the legislative purpose that no income should escape
taxation as a result of death. The Court, therefore, taxed in the
decedent's final return his share of fees from unfinished business
of his law partnership. In other cases it was held that the amounts
so taxable include executors' and trustees' commissions that would
have become fixed and payable only upon final settlement and that
would not have been accruable by a living taxpayer before that
time.868
Under that provision, the courts also struggled with the treatment of dividends, which may be declared on one date, payable
at a later date, to those who were shareholders at some intermediate
record date. In Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner,869 it was determined that a dividend declared before death, payable to shareholders of record on a date after death, was not "accrued" income
taxable to the decedent. Although declaration of the dividend
creates an obligation to the shareholders, the Court concluded that
361. See, e.g., Telephone Directory Advertising Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp.
884 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
362. Ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat. 694.
363. Ch. 690, § 42, 49 Stat. 1666.
364. Ch. 389, § 42, 52 Stat. 472.
365. Ch. 1, § 42, 53 Stat. 24.
366. Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241 (1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 584 (1928);
William G. Frank, 6 B.T.A. 1071 (1927).

367. 312 U.S. 636 (1941).
368. Helvering v McGlue's Estate, 119 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1941); Estate of Lewis Cass
Ledyard, Jr., 44 B.T.A. 1056, 1064 (1941), affd. on this issue sub nom. Commissioner
v. United States Trust Co., 143 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 727 (1944).
369. 324 U.S. 393 (1945).
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it "leaves the identity of the recipient at large.''370 The Court noted
that, unlike the situation in the Enright line of cases, the income
would not go untaxed if not made taxable to the decedent, since
a dividend on stock owned by the estate on the record date would
be taxable to it.371 Even though the stock, in which the earnings
and the right to the declared dividend inhere, comes to the estate
as capital, the scheme of the tax law is to treat the severance of
earnings from the stock and from the corporation as the event giving
rise to taxable income to the shareholder.372
Following the pattern of that provision, it might be provided
that income that had been earned by the bankrupt's services or
property prior to bankruptcy should continue to be taxable to him
but should be deemed income of the short taxable period ending
with his bankruptcy (if not properly reportable in an earlier period).
With respect to income from services, from certain causes of action,
and from other nonproperty-connected income, the standard applied
should be whether the right to the income passes to the trustee: 873
If it does, the taxability of the income to the individual should be
accelerated into the prebankruptcy taxable period-irrespective of
whether the income has technically "accrued," even by the broader
standard of the Enright case-since the purpose is to make the tax
a claim against the estate if the estate collects the income; if the
right to the income is dependent upon further action by the bankrupt, so that the estate does not become entitled to it, the tax
thereon should not be a claim against the estate but should be
imposed on the individual in the postbankruptcy period in which
the income would be taxable under his regular accounting method.
In the case of income from property that passes to the estate, that
line of demarcation could not be used, since the trustee will acquire
the right to such income whether it accrues before or after bankruptcy; therefore, the test in this instance should be, as under former
section 42, whether the income had "accrued" at the date of bankruptcy.
This proposal, of course, raises a problem of reporting the income
and establishing a claim for the tax. The individual, in filing his
return for the short period, will be unable to anticipate what
recoveries may be made by the trustee on theretofore uncollected
370.
871.
(1957).
372.
373.

324 U.S. at 400.
324 U.S. at 396-97. This is still the situation today. Treas. Reg,
United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 171-72 (1921),
See text accompanying notes 336-41 supra.

§

l,61-9(c)
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items, particularly those that may be contingent. Therefore, his
obligation to file a return should be deemed satisfied if he determines his income on his regular basis of accounting. If a tax is
shown on such return, or if (with or without a filed return) the
Service determines a tax on that basis, claim for so much thereof
as is allowable against the estate should be filed in the usual manner.
There should be no requirement to file a claim, however, with
respect to the tax on additional collections, of which the trustee
would have :firsthand knowledge. A claim, if required, would necessarily be based on information furnished by the trustee himself,
since the income giving rise to the claim would be received during
administration. It would, in any event, be impossible to file the
claim within the time prescribed by section 57n of the Bankruptcy
Act; 374 moreover, while the claim timely filed with respect to the
original return could be amended after the time for filing to
increase the amount, 375 there might have been no original claim if
there were no tax or only a nominal tax shown on such return (if
filed).
In lieu of requiring a claim, the trustee should be made responsible for reporting such additional income taxable in the bankrupt's final prebankruptcy period by amending either the bankrupt's
return or the calculations reflected in the government's claim. If there
has been no claim, the trustee's responsibility should be deemed
discharged if his report of additional income and tax starts from a
base of zero (although, if the bankrupt had a loss, it would be in
the estate's interest to ascertain that fact and reflect it in the calculations). Such reporting might be required either annually or at
such times as dividends on priority tax (or lower-ranking) claims
are to be distributed.
No prejudice to the administration should result from the existence of an open-ended priority claim for which no claim need be
filed. Each increase in the liability will reflect a correspondingly
greater increment in the estate, from which the amount of the
anticipated tax liability may be reserved without reducing the
amounts projected to be available for other creditors. The administration would not be prolonged thereby, since the estate would
presumably be kept open in any event so long as significant amounts
of the bankrupt's earnings remain to be collected. If the trustee
374. 11 u.s.c. § 93(n) (1970); BANKR. R. 302(e). See COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 3, § 4-40l(a). Cf. In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1974) (No. 73-374).
375. See Menick v. Hoffman, 205 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1953).
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sells the right in order to close the estate, the proceeds will be the
final amount taxable. If he abandons a contingent or disputed
claim to the bankrupt in order to save further expense of administration,376 the bankrupt would be taxable on subsequent collections, if any, as if the right had never vested in the trustee.
One advantage of making the trustee responsible for reporting
such income, without need for a claim, is that such a requirement
avoids the inequity that may result if the government neglects or
chooses to refrain from filing a claim and thus causes the estate
to be disbursed to creditors whose claims, if unsatisfied, would have
been discharged, while the tax that could have been satisfied as a
priority claim out of the assets of the estate survives as an unsatisfied
and undischarged obligation of the individual.377
It should be noted, in connection with the precedent cited above
for this proposal, that Congress soon abandoned taxation of "accrued" earnings in a decedent's final return, on the ground that
the ad hoc change of his accounting method caused hardship when
income that in the usual course might have been taxable over a
period of years was bunched into a single year at higher rates. 8 78
Therefore, Congress instead prescribed,379 in what has since become
section 69l(a) of the Code, that income of a decedent not properly
includible during his lifetime under his accounting method should
be taxed as income of his estate or of its beneficiaries. Despite the
argument that the amounts passed to them as capital, it was held
constitutional to tax them on what would have been income if
received by the decedent.380 In view of the trustee's representation
of the bankrupt as well as of the creditors,881 it would presumably
be equally valid to treat like income as taxable to the bankrupt
estate if that should be the legislative choice.
376. Abandonment is provided for in BANKR. R. 608 and COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 3, § 4-611. See First Natl. Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1905): In
re Kokoszka, 4'79 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S., Dec. 10,
1973) (No. 73-5265).
3'17. See Newberg v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), affd., 296 F.2d
152 {2d Cir. 1961). Cf. In re Curtis, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1J 9433 (W.D. Mich. 1969)
(referee opinion), which refers to previous legislative proposals to correct this in•
equity. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4--401(c), like the recently adopted BANKR.
R. 303, entitles the debtor or the trustee to file a tax claim on the creditor's behalf,
in order to avoid this result: the claim would be of no avail where the potential
existence of the claim is unknown at the time proof thereof must be filed.
378. H.R. REP. No. 2333, '77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 7'lth
Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942).
379. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 619, § 134(e), 56 Stat. 831 (1942).
380. Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
802 (1962). Cf. Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929); text accompanying note 353 supra.
381. See, e.g., B 8: L Farms Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 407, 410 (S.D, Fla.
1965), a[Jd. per curiam, 368 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967),
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Trucing the trustee rather than the individual permits imposing
the tax for the years of actual receipt rather than bunching the
income in one taxable period. But it is doubtful that, in the bankruptcy situation, there would be many cases in which the bunching
of income in the individual's return would cause tax in very high
brackets, and, if such situations were to arise, relief is now available
to individuals under the provisions for five-year averaging of income,382 which were not in the law in 1942, when Congress retreated
from trucing the decedent rather than his estate. Therefore, the
determination of whether the tax ought to be imposed on the bankrupt or the trustee (in either event, collectible from the estate) may
rest on other considerations.
One objection to imposing the tax on the estate, rather than
on the individual, is that, if the estate, even as augmented by such
recoveries, is insufficient to pay all taxes, including the tax on such
items, the liability will be uncollectible from anyone, whereas, if
the tax is imposed on the bankrupt, the unpaid balance would remain as a nondischargeable liability. Such tax liability would be
nondischargeable if the income had been realized shortly before
bankruptcy, and there appears to be no good reason why the fact
that prebankruptcy earnings of the bankrupt happen to be collected after, rather than before, bankruptcy should relieve the individual of the tax thereon if it cannot be collected from the aggregate assets of the estate. It should be enough that he is relieved of
the existing inequity of having the tax on his uncollected prebankruptcy earnings charged entirely against his exempt and afteracquired property, rather than ·first against the estate into which
those earnings were paid.
It seems clear, in any event, that the tax on prebankruptcy
earnings collected by the trustee after bankruptcy, should remain
at the individual level (although made collectible as a claim against
the estate) if the Commission's proposal to exempt the trustee
entirely from tax in most situations is adopted, since the trustee's
collections of income earned by the bankrupt are in no sense administrative income, and since the fortuity that such earnings are collected after, rather than before, the date of bankruptcy and that
the bankrupt had used the cash basis of accounting (or that the
claim was contingent) should not alter its taxability to someone.383
382. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1301-05. The higher tax rates applicable to estates,
as contrasted with either married or single individuals, compare section I(d} with
sections I(a}-(c), might well nullify any remaining advantage from avoiding bunching
of income in the bankrupt's return.
·
383. See text accompanying notes 147-88 supra.
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Further, even if the trustee remains a taxable entity, such earnings
ought, in any event, to be ta.xable at the individual level unless
(a) the bankrupt's loss carryovers are made available to the trustee
(as the Commission has proposed), so that they may offset the trustee's
taxable income reflecting such prebankruptcy earnings; 384 and (b)
the trustee's tax liability is made apportionable, so that the portion
of the ta.""C attributable to such prebankruptcy earnings, earnings
that reflect collections of capital of the estate rather than increments
therein, would not enjoy the priority status of an administration
expense.385
While the foregoing discussion has focused on individual bankruptcies, the same treatment ought to be applied in corporate cases
if the trustee is granted exemption from tax, since there is no
justification for exempting prior corporate earnings merely because
they are collected after bankruptcy. There would be less need to
apply it to corporate bankruptcies if the estate remains a taxpaying
entity, since corporations are not subject to the inequity suffered
by individuals who now incur a postbankruptcy tax on income that
is taken by the trustee. But if the estate of a corporate bankrupt
is to remain taxable on such income, the tax should be apportioned,
as above suggested, so that the amount attributable to prior earnings will not enjoy the priority of an administration expense.
3. Deductions for Expenses Incurred Before Bankruptcy
The foregoing problem has its analogue on the deduction side,
in situations where the individual bankrupt had incurred expenses
of a deductible nature but his right to deduct them had not matured
before bankruptcy, either because the amount was not yet fixedaso
or because the bankrupt, being on the cash basis of accounting,
had not made payment.3 87
In the early case of Charles R. Stuart,388 the bankrupt was a
corporate director against whom a judgment for over 7 million
dollars had been entered shortly before he filed a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy. He claimed on his individual return a deduction
for a loss, equal to the cost basis of property turned over to the
384. See text accompanying notes 473-79 infra.
385. The impropriety of treating as an administration expense a tax attributable
to prebankruptcy income will be discussed in part I(B)(2)(a) of Plumb, supra note 165.
386. E.g., Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944); Lucas v.
American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930); Commissioner v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, 281
F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961).
387. Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940).
388. 38 B.T.A. 1147 (1938). -
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trustee. The Service, declaring that no loss is sustained upon the
transfer of one's property to a trustee in bankruptcy,889 although
conceding that the judgment itself would have resulted in a deductible loss if the bankrupt had been using the accrual method
of accounting,890 denied the deduction. The court, however, unanimously rejected the view that taxpayers using the cash basis could
be permanently deprived of deductions to which they would have
been entitled if they were using the accrual basis and declared that
"[t]he only difference in treatment countenanced by the income
tax law is the year of deduction."891
·
In B & L Farms Co. v. United States,892 the facts generally parallelled those of the Stuart case, except that the bankrupt was a corporation. The bankrupt, which used the cash basis of accounting, had
over 2.4 million dollars of unpaid and undeducted trade accounts,
which its trustees paid in the year following bankruptcy. Seeking to
avail itself of a loss carryback to its last profitable year, three years
before the year of bankruptcy, the bankrupt (through its trustees)
claimed deduction of those expenses as if they were satisfied in the
year title was transferred to the trustees, rather than in the subsequent year, when they were actually paid.893 The district court held
that the accounts were not satisfied by the transfer of the accounts to
the trustees, who represented the interests of the bankrupt as well as
of his creditors and who did not, at that time, have "any fixed duty to
pay over any specific amounts to any particular creditors."894 The
court initially distinguished Stuart as involving "a specific deductible
loss, arising from a court judgment"395-although a hundred trade
accounts are surely as "specific" as one judgment-and then, on rehearing, rejected Stuart outright as "directly contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority on this point." 396 (The court was re389. It relied on I.T. 2898, XIV-I Cm.r. BULL. 70 (1935).
390. On the accrual basis, the extreme unlikelihood that an otherwise deductible
item will ever be paid by a failing or insolvent debtor is not a ground for denying
or deferring a deduction therefor. Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955); Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d IOU (8th Cir. 1942); Edward L. Cohen,
21 T.C. 855 (1954), acquiesced in, 1954-2 Cu11r. BULL. 4; Rev. Rul. 70-367, 1970-2 Cm.r.
BULL.37.
391. 38 B.T.A. at 1151.
392. 238 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Fla. 1965), affd. per curiam, 368 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967).
393. A three-year carryback, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(l)(A), from the year
of payment by the trustee would not have reached the last profitable year.
394. 238 F. Supp. at 410.
395. 238 F. Supp. at 411.
396. 238 F. Supp. at 414.
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ferring3 97 to cases that hold that "payment" of expenses by a cashbasis taxpayer must be made in cash or its equivalent, and not merely
by changing the form of the obligation.) The Fifth Circuit affirmed
without opinion, approving "the conclusions" of the district court
over the dissent of Judge Brown, who argued in vain that upon
adjudication the bankrupt "lost irrevocably control over the use or
disposition of corporation assets," that "[b]y every realistic standard
the creditors were 'paid' at the moment the Trustee came into pos•
session and control of the Bankrupt's assets under the inescapable
obligation to hold and distribute them (or their proceeds) to creditors,"398 and that "the Trustee's obligation, first, foremost, and
always, is to the creditors" and only incidentally to the bankrupt.800
In the recent case of Henry C. Mueller,400 the Tax Court, without
referring to Stuart, held B &- L Farms equally applicable to individual
bankrupts. Because of his inability to pay $100,000 of offsetting expenses, $43,702.31 of which was, in fact, paid two years later by the
trustee from the proceeds of his assets, Mueller was found to have
taxable net income of $60,000 to the date of his bankruptcy. No
deduction was allowed to the bankrupt either in the year of bankruptcy or by way of carryback from the later taxable year of the
estate,401 which, as a distinct ta."{payer, lacked income to offset the
expenses.402 The Tax Court felt that the rationale of the district
court opinion in B &- L Farms, in effect approved by the Fifth Circuit
to which Mueller would go on appeal,403 left no room for distinguish397. 238 F. Supp. at 410-11, citing Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940); Doggett
v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1960); P.G. Lake, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1945); Citizens Natl. Trust 8: Sav. Bank v. Welch, 119 F.2d 717 (9th
Cir. 1941); Arthur Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553 (1962); Vander Poel v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.
407 (1947).
398. 368 F.2d at 571.
399. 368 F.2d at 572.
400. 60 T.C. 36, 44 (1973).
401. Concerning carryovers or carrybacks of losses between the trustee and the
individual, see text accompanying notes 484-517 infra.
402. It is open to question whether the trustee, as a distinct taxpayer from the one
who incurred the expense, would have been entitled to the deductions in any event.
See text accompanying notes 226-29 supra. No claim was made that the bankrupt himself might deduct the expenses in the year of payment by the trustee. In some circum•
stances, the payment of one's expenses by another may entitle the obligor to a deduction. Leward Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1957); Norman
Cooledge, 40 B.T.A. 1325 (1939). But cf. Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553, 566·67 (1962):
Hanna Furnace Corp. v. Kavanagh, 50-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,i 9443 (E.D, Mich, 1950),
However, the fact that the debtor would meanwhile have been discharged of his obligations might be an impediment in this instance.
403. The Tax Court, although a court of nationwide jurisdiction, considers itself
bound by a decision of the court to which the particular case would go on appeal.
Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 756-58 (1970), afjd. on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th
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ing individual from corporate cases. It ignored the very real difference that a trustee for a corporate bankrupt is taxed under section
6012(b)(3) as a continuation of the taxable entity of the corporation
so that the transfer of title to the trustee in such a case involves
payment to the taxpayer's alter ego404 and denial of the deduction at
that time to the cash-basis corporation affects only the timing, not the
ultimate allowability, of that taxpayer's deduction.405 The individual
bankrupt, in contrast, passes his property to a distinct taxable entity
at the date of bankruptcy,406 and a deduction denied to him then,
although incurred and accrued in his business, is lost to him forever,
solely because of his choice of accounting method.
Five judges, dissenting in Mueller, declared that the effect of that
decision was to tax a cash-basis bankrupt on his gross receipts and
that "this disparity in result as between a cash basis taxpayer and an
accrual basis taxpayer ... [cannot] be allowed to stand."407 They
referred to Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,408 in which, in another
connection, the Second Circuit had stated, "There is no justification
for making an accounting method inadvertently chosen by the taxpayer determinative of the tax benefits ... of that taxpayer."409 Unfortunately, however, the Second Circuit was stating an ideal rather
than reflecting reality, since such discriminations are not uncommon
in our tax system.410 Three judges who concurred in the prevailing
decision in Mueller although they viewed its results as "unfortunate"
were perhaps more realistic in recognizing the problem as calling
for a legislative, rather than a judicial, solution.411
In considering the appropriate legislative solution, we must first
clear away some underbrush, reflected in the prevailing opinion in
Mueller, which, in partial justification for denying the bankrupt the
benefit of deductions attributable to expenses paid from the proceeds
of his assets, declared:
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). It was not precluded, however, from finding a
relevant appellate decision to be distinguishable, cf. Estate of George I. Speer, 57 T.C.
804, 812 (1972), particularly as the Fifth Circuit had endorsed only the "conclusions"
below.
404. See text accompanying notes 75-112 supra.
405. See text accompanying note 391 supra.
406. See text accompanying notes 106-34 supra.
407, 60 T.C. at 48.
408. 60 T.C. at 48, citing 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir, 1972).
409. 470 F.2d at 924.
410. E.g., United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 113-17 (1966); United States v.
Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 20 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S., Nov. 20, 1973);
Willging v. United States, 474 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1973).
411. 60 T.C. at 47-48.
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· A bankrupt ta.xpayer does not have a diminished interest in his
bankrupt estate because of expenses or losses incurred by the estate,
but rather his creditors receive a lesser amount. In fact, through the
bankruptcy proceedings, the bankrupt taxpayer is discharged from
liabilities which here were (and usually are) greatly in excess of the
basis in the property which he turned over, and is also relieved from
any income from cancellation of indebtedness as well.412

Four points in that statement require comment.
First, the court's statements about the amounts that were cancelled were gratuitous, since the issue concerned not the tax treatment of amounts that went unpaid, but the deductibility of amounts
that the bankrupt's assets sufficed to pay. There is no necessary relationship in any given case between the amount of otherwise deductible debts in fact paid from such assets and the amount of capital
obligations or ot4er nondeductible items that go unpaid and result
in at least a theoretical benefit to the discharged debtor, a benefit
that, under long-standing judicial and administrative policy, is relieved from tax.413 If the policy of exempting the latter is unsound,
one should attack it directly, rather than enforce a "trade-off" by
denying deductions for actual payments that may be greater or less
than the benefit derived from relief from obligations that go unpaid.414
Second, the court's remark415 about the discharged debts' being
in excess of the basis of the debtor's property, while uncalled for in
the particular case (in which the debtor sought to deduct no more
than the adjusted basis of the property applied to his debts), does
point to the fact that a logical, and perhaps necessary, corollary to
treating the transfer to the trustee as satisfaction of the individual's
obligations would be to treat such transfer as realizing gain or loss
equal to the difference between the adjusted basis and the value of
the property so applied, 416 contrary to the Tax Court's view that no
taxable disposition occurs at such time.411
412. 60 T.C. at 45.
413. Treas. Reg.§ l.61-12(b) (1957). Cf. text accompanying note 269 supra.
414. Cf. quotation from Tillinghast & Gardner, supra note 267, at 714, in note 508
infra. The Commission has proposed that, except where the creditor involved succeeds to an equity interest in the debtor, the debtor's carryovers and other deductions
for periods ending after the discharge should be adjusted to exclude the effect of
obligations that will never have to be paid. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3,
§ 7-315(b); id. at 293 (proposed INT. R.Ev. Com~ OF 1954, § 172(d)(7)). See Plumb, supra
note 270.
415. 60 T.C. at 43.
416. See text accompanying notes 442-51 infra. Such is the rule in the absence of
bankruptcy. See note 446 infra. Mueller's deduction of only the amount of the ad•
justed basis of the property transferred was a shortcut to a similar result, although
it could differ if, for example, the gain was capital and the expense was ordinary.
417. Homer A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1971).
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Third, while it was true in Mueller that the allowance of the deduction that reduced tax liability for the year in which bankruptcy
occurred would have benefited the discharged bankrupt rather than
his unsatisfied creditors, that would no longer be true under the
Commission's proposal to make the bankrupt's tax, computed to the
date of bankruptcy, an allowable priority claim against the estate,418
since any deduction permitted against such liability would make
more assets available for creditors.419
Fourth, despite the preachments of the opinion against allowing
deductions even for satisfied obligations when others have been discharged, the Tax Court has not in this generation questioned the
axiom that an accrual-basis taxpayer may deduct even expenses that
he is patently unable to pay and does not pay;420 moreover, it seems
clear that, even on the cash basis, the trustee for a corporate bankrupt,
standing in the debtor's shoes, may deduct and carry back to prebankruptcy years the expense claims actually paid from the estate.421
Clearly, an unwarranted penalty is imposed if, in a bankruptcy
situation, a tax is, in effect, imposed on gross income or gross receipts
of a noncorporate cash-basis taxpayer and otherwise allowable deductions are lost forever as a result of the intervention of the trustee as a
technically separate taxpayer. It is no answer to allow the deductions
to the trustee,422 even if (contrary to the Commission's recommendation) the estate remains subject to tax, for such treatment may separate the deductions from the income to which they relate423 and there
is a high probability that the estate will have insufficient gross income
during the period of administration to offset an accumulation of the
bankrupt's previously unpaid expenses. Nor would it be appropriate
418. See text accompanying notes 319-35 supra.
419. If, instead of net income, the bankrupt had had a net operating loss for the
year of bankruptcy and had had net income in past years against which to offset it,
the benefit of the deduction would have been enjoyed by the creditors, whether under
present law, Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), or under the proposed legislation.
See text accompanying notes 455-67 infra.
420. See note 390 supra. In an earlier day, the Tax Court stood firm against such
deductions only to have the government concede the case on appeal. Millar Brainard,
7 T.C. 1180 (1946).
421. Cf. text accompanying notes 75-104 supra. The government's position in B & L
Farms Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Fla. 1965), affd. per curiam, 368
F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967), was not that expense payments by a corporate bankrupt could not be deducted, but that, on the cash basis,
the corporation, represented by the trustee, could not deduct them until payment by
the trustee.
422. Concerning present law, see text accompanying notes 226-29 supra.
423. This occurred in the Mueller case. See text accompanying notes 400-02 supra.
While the matching of income with the related deductions is an ideal not invariably
achieved in the tax law, see, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); Heaven
Hill Distilleries, Inc. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1327, 1336-37 (Ct. CI. 1973), such matching in the hands of the same taxpayer is a desirable legislative goal.
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to allow the expenses to the individual bankrupt in any period ending after the filing of the petition and, thereby, supplement his "fresh
start" with postbankruptcy tax savings that are "rooted in the prebankruptcy past.''424 Since the deductible items, so far as satisfied at
all, are paid from the estate and deplete the assets available for other
creditors, the appropriate legislative solution would be to allow the
individual to deduct at the time of bankruptcy all otherwise deductible obligations that are, in fact, ultimately satisfied in the proceeding.425 In this manner, the deductions either would reduce a tax that
(under the Commission's proposal) would be allowable as a claim
against the estate426 or would become available for carryback or carryover for the benefit of the estate.427 The deductions would also be
matched against the yet uncollected income, which, under my preceding proposal, would be taxed in the same period.428
In support of this recommendation, I tum again to the precedent of the 1934, 1936, and 1938 Revenue Acts and the 1939 Code
as originally enacted, by section 43 of which the "accrued" deductions of a decedent were allowed in his final return, regardless of
his accounting method, in a manner similar to the treatment of
accrued income items under section 42, discussed above.429 The
Board of Tax Appeals (predecessor of the Tax Court) held that section 43, like section 42, dispensed with the usual requirement that,
in order to have "accrued," an item must have been :fi..xed or determined in amount (that is, not contingent or in contest) within the
taxable period,430 but that decision was reversed by the Second
Circuit.431 The legislation here suggested should make clear that,
consistently with its purpose, any deductible items constituting
424. Cf. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
425. The Tax Court in Mueller, 60 T.C. at 44 n.6, protested that "[o]bviously, allo•
cation of percentage receipts between business and nonbusiness creditors would pose
many problems." Yet, the allowance by the court of discrete claims makes the apportionment far simpler than, for example, the task, which the Tax Court has not
shunned, see Sidney Merians, 60 T.C. 187 (1973), of apportioning a lump sum legal fee
among services of a deductible and nondeductible nature. Cf. Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2
CUM. Buu.. 179.
426. See text accompanying notes 319-35 supra.
427. Under present law and the Commission's proposal, refunds of individual taxes
resulting from carrybacks from the period in which bankruptcy occurs become assets
of the estate, and the Commission would also make carryovers from such period al•
lowable to the estate, if it is taxable at all. See text accompanying notes 452-535 infra.
428. See text accompanying notes 336-85 supra.
429. See id.
430. Estate of Lewis Cass Ledyard, 44 B.T.A. 1056, 1066-67 (1941), reud. sub. nom,
Commissionerv. United States Trust Co., 143 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.1944).
431. Commissioner v. United States Trust Co., 143 F.2d 243,245 (1944).
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allowable claims against the estate, whether or not fixed in amount
before bankruptcy, should be accumulated in the tax computation
for the debtor's final prebankruptcy period, which would be held
open for the purpose.432
In corporate bankruptcies, provided the estate is not exempted
from tax,433 there may be less need to accelerate the deduction·
of expenses into the period preceding bankruptcy, since the· estate
continues the tax identity of the bankrupt,434 and the creditors,
through the estate, will theoretically get the same benefit whether
the deductions are allowed in one year or another. As the B & L
Farms case435 illustTates, however, in a bankruptcy situation a
deduction deferred will very likely be a deduction lost, for the
delay pending liquidation of assets and payment of debts may well
make it impossible for losses during administration to be carried
back as far as the corporation's last profitable period. To avoid
penalizing creditors for the law's delays,436 as well as to lessen the
discrimination against cash-basis taxpayers, I suggest that this proposal be applied to corporations, as well as to individual bankrupts.
In addition, while somewhat different considerations apply, the
treatment adopted for expense items should be applied consistently
to income.
It may be noted that the foregoing proposal would not eliminate
the discrimination between cash- and accrual-basis taxpayers (or
their creditors, who would indirectly benefit from their cleductions),
since the tax liabilities of those on the accrual basis :will have been
reduced, not merely by the deduction of obligations that are satisfied in the proceeding, but also by the deduction of those obligations that it proves impossible to pay from the assets of the estate.
One might suppose that the better way to equalize cash- and accrualbasis taxpayers in this respect would be to undo the prior accrual
of expenses to the extent that it is established in bankruptcy that
432. The reporting procedure described above, see text accompanying notes 374-76
·
433. If the Commission's exemption proposal is adopted, there is strong reason to
accelerate the deductions for expenses attributable to the prebankruptcy period, since
these expenses have nothing to do with administration and should not be wasted
merely because payment was deferred.
·

supra, should be followed.

434. See text accompanying notes 75-104 supra.
435. See text accompanying notes 392-99 supra.
436. Cf. American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261,
266 (1914), in which, in stopping interest from running during bankruptcy, the Court
said, "As this delay was the act of the law, no one should thereby gain an advantage
or suffer a loss."
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they will never be paid,437 rather than to give the cash-basis taxpayer an equal right to an unearned deduction for unpaid expenses.438 There would be merit in that view if the deductions
might benefit the debtor. But to deny the deductions against taxes
that are collectible from the estate or to deny resulting carrybacks
or carryovers from which the estate might benefit depletes the very
funds that might otherwise be available to pay the defaulted obligations and make them deductible.439 It would be just to give the
unsatisfied creditors, in effect, a preference over so much of the
bankrupt's tax liability as is incurred solely by reason of his inability
to satisfy other creditors, by allowing deductions to cash-basis taxpayers, individual or corporate, for accrued expenses unpaid at the
time of bankruptcy for the purpose of computing the tax claim
allowable against the estate and any resulting carrybacks or carryovers, but not for the purpose of computing the debtor's nondischargeable liability for such tax or any carryover from which he
may benefit.440 I submit that this suggestion is not inconsistent
with the substance of the Commission's proposal, which I support,
to reduce the debtor's (or a successor's) loss carryovers by the amount
of deductions attributable to obligations that go unpaid as a result
of a proceeding in bankruptcy.441 That proposal is designed to
prevent the debtor, or creditors other than those who suffered the
loss, from gaining a benefit from such deductions, but it is not meant
to deprive the unpaid creditors of such benefit, as is evidenced by
the fact that the disallowance is expressly made inapplicable to
unpaid obligations for which a creditor receives an equity security
and thus retains a stake in the resulting tax benefit.
437. The tax consequences of debt reduction in bankruptcy will be more fu]]y
discussed in Plumb, supra note 270.
438. The Service resists efforts by cash-basis insolvents to change to the accrual
basis in order to avail themselves of deductions for expenses they cannot pay. See
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Womack, Inc., 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9146 (E.D. Va. 1972), affd.
on another issue, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9326 (4th Cir. 1974). Cf. Millar Brainard, 7 T.C.
USO, ll82-83 (1946).
439. See Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55 HARV. L, REv. 1141,
1149 (1942). Cf. United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 946 (1968) (funds of bankrupt confidence man exhausted by claim for taxes on
his ill-gotten gains, to exclusion of obligation to repay victims); Irving v. Gray, 344
F. Supp. 567,573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afjd., 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973).
440. The Commission would deny an individual any carryover of prebankruptcy
losses against his postbankruptcy income. See text accompanying notes 503-10 infra.
441. COJ',!MISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 293 (proposed INT. REV.
§ 172(d)(7)). See Plumb, supra note 270.

CODI!: OF
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4. Gain or Loss on the Bankrupt's Property Applied to His Debts

It has been urged above442 that there is no justification for
exempting from taxation the gains on sales by the trustee of property
of the bankrupt or for denying deductions for losses on such sales,
but it does not follow that the trustee is the proper party to whom
such gains and losses should be recognized. I suggest that it would
be more appropriate to treat the occurrence of bankruptcy as the
event by which gain or loss is realized, not by the trustee but by
the debtor, as if he had then applied the property, to the extent
of its value, in satisfaction of his debts.443 While it may be argued
that the surrender of the debtor's property to the trustee does not
per se discharge his debts,444 the application of the property to the
partial satisfaction of the debts is certainly the contemplated result
of the series of transactions initiated by the petition, and the intervention of the trustee as the instrument for liquidation and· payment may properly be ignored.445 The suggested treatment is, furthermore, the logical concomitant of the preceding proposal to treat
bankruptcy as the event giving rise to deduction by the debtor of
his previously undeducted expenses.446
Where losses would result from disposition of the property, as
is likely when the bankrupt's property is obsolete or in poor condition, treatment of the occurrence of bankruptcy as the loss-realizing
event would provide greater flexibility in absorption of the loss
deductions against income. The estate, if exempted from tax, would
itself have no use for the deduction of losses on its subsequent
sales and, if taxable, could use them only against the (probably)
limited income of the period of administration. While the bankrupt,
too, may, during the three full years before bankruptcy, have had
little net income against which a loss might be offset (with result442. See text accompanying notes 242-72 supra.
443. Under present law, the bankrupt's surrender of his property to the trustee,
although it results in discharge of his debts, is not a transaction resulting in gain or
loss to him. Homer A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1971); Norris Bloomfield, 52 T.C.
745, 749 (1969); Frances M. Parkford, 45 B.T.A. 461, 471 (1941), afjd., 133 F.2d 249, 251
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943). Cf. I.T. 2898, XIV-I CuM. BULL. 70 (1935).
444. See Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 43-44 (1973), discussed in text accompanying
notes 400-21 supra,
445. Cf. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1942).

446. In general, the application of property to the satisfaction of deductible ob•
ligations results in realization of gain or loss, in addition to the deduction. United
States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843
(1961); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
Cf, United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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ing benefit to the estate through tax refunds),447 the chance that the
loss may be absorbed against income of the debtor or of the estate
at some
in the carryback or carryover period is enhanced.
It is assumed, of course, that this suggested treatment will be coupled
with adoption of the Commission's proposal to allow the trustee
to utilize carryovers qf any individual losses on the estate's returns,448
so that turning the loss into an individual one will not make it
unavailable to the estate to the extent that it is not absorbed against
past income of the debtor.
Where gains would result, creditors would, of course, be better
off if the gain were deemed realized by the estate, assuming adoption of the proposed exemption. Nevertheless, I submit that the
prebankruptcy values thus realized are not income incident to
administration of the estate and should not enjoy the exemption.
If the estate remains ta'Cable, some creditors (preferred wage claimants and state and local governments) may prefer the treatment here
suggested, which would reduce the resulting tax from its present
inappropriate priority status as an expense of administration. If the
tax is not satisfied from assets of the estate, the suggested treatment
would leave it outstanding as a nondischargeable obligation of the
debtor, whereas, at present, it can be satisfied only from the estate.
That effect is regarded by Krause and Kapiloff as an undesirable
one, which "would frustrate the theory of rehabilitation of giving
the debtor a fresh start."449 So long as Congress has seen fit, however, to "frustrate" that theory to the extent of making certain taxes
nondischargeable, it is difficult to see why any different treatment
should be given to the tax on appreciation realized and made available for satisfaction of the bankrupt's debts, whether the property
is sold before or after the occurrence of bankruptcy. In many cases,
the effect of this proposal on the bankrupt may be neutral, since
the consequence of treating the tax on the trustee's gain as an administration expense, as at present, may be to leave other nondischargeable outstanding taxes unsatisfied; it would also be neutral, of
course, if assets, including the appreciation on which the tax is
imposed, suffice to pay both first and fourth priority items.
As a matter of strict principle, only the tax that would have·
been incurred on a sale at fair market value at the date of the petition should be treated as proposed, since the tax on any further

time

447. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), discussed in text accompanying
notes 458-67 infra.
448. See text accompanying notes 484-92 infra.
449. Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 417.
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increment in the gain may be regarded as an incident to administration. To split the gain and the resulting tax, however, would
require the expense of an appraisal at the date of the petition, and
the chance that realizable values in a bankruptcy sale (unless possibly in the case of a mineral strike or a prolonged administration
in an inflationary period) would exceed the fair market values at
the date of bankruptcy seems too remote to justify imposing such a
requirement.46 ~ Therefore, I suggest that the measurement of the
gain or loss should be deferred until sale by the trustee, even
though the taxable event is deemed to be the transfer from the
bankrupt to the trustee.451 This deferral of determination of the
gain also permits eliminating from taxability the appreciation on
any property that is returned to the bankrupt without sale, either
as exempt property or as property in excess of debts.

JI!.

Ar.LOCATION OF CARRYOVERS AND CARRYBACKS BETWEEN THE
EsTATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR

The Commission would confirm the present rule that the trustee
for an individual bankrupt is entitled to recover for the estate any
refunds that result from the carryback of losses incurred before
bankruptcy and would preclude the dilution of such carrybacks
by income the debtor may realize in the postbankruptcy portion
of the year in which bankruptcy occurs.452 In addition, carryovers
of such losses to postbankruptcy years would, in all cases, be denied
to an individual bankrupt and would be made available to offset
income of the estate in those unusual situations in which, by reason
of the ultimate solvency of the estate, the estate's income would
remain taxable.453 No provision is proposed to be made, however,
for the trustee, in such cases, to step into the shoes of the bankrupt
450. Nevertheless, it may be appropriate to charge the administration with so
much of the gain as equals depreciation and depletion deductions taken on the
property during administration, at least so far as the deductions resulted in tax
benefit to the estate.
451. While this would make the amount of the priority claim uncertain until disposition of the property, it should not interfere with normal administration, since the
contingent priority claim cannot exceed the proceeds of the unsold property, which
itself should suffice as provision therefor. See text preceding note 376 supra. In the
rare case in which the sale proceeds exceed the value at the date of bankruptcy while
the nondischargeable tax imposed on the bankrupt under this proposal remains unsatisfied from assets of the estate, it may be appropriate to relieve the bankrupt to the
extent that the unsatisfied amount exceeds what his tax would have been if measured by the value of date of bankruptcy.
452. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c). However, certain cash equivalents, including tax refunds, would be exempt to an aggregate amount of 500 dollars.
Id. § 4-503(c)(3).
453. Id. § 5-104(c).
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individual with respect to miscellaneous carryovers, accounting
methods, application of the tax benefit rule, and the like.41i4
A. Net Operating and Capital Losses

I. Carrybacks
In the typical case, a business bankruptcy will have been preceded by a period of net operating losses that extended to the date
when the trustee took over the business and property. Such losses,
for federal income tax purposes, may ordinarily be carried back to
offset any net income the debtor may have had in the three years
preceding the taxable year of the loss and thus result in refunds
of taxes previously paid.455 Since the trustee in bankruptcy of an
individual does not succeed to the tax identity of the bankrupt
and the individual's taxable year is not interrupted by the occurrence of bankruptcy,456 the courts at one time supposed that refunds
that resulted from the carryback of losses for the year of bankruptcy
were postbankruptcy assets that did not pass to the trustee.m In Segal
v. Rochelle,458 however, the Supreme Court held that the right to
refunds, so far as they are based on the carryback of the portion
of the bankrupt's net operating loss that had been incurred before
bankruptcy, is an asset that existed at the date of bankruptcy and
passed to the trustee, under section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act,409
as "property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing
of the petition he could by any means have transferred . . .. " The
Court declared that the "main thrust" of that provision is "to secure
for creditors everything of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when he files his petition,"460 that it was
equitable to give the creditors the benefit of the carryback because
"the very losses generating the refunds often help precipitate the
bankruptcy and injury to the creditors,"461 and that the refund is
454. See text accompanying notes 536-43 infra.
455. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(l)(A).
456. See text accompanying notes 106, 319-22 supra.
457. Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1963); In re Sussman, 289 F.2d
76 (3d Cir. 1961). No similar question arose in corporate cases or in individual rehabilitation proceedings, where the estate steps into the tax shoes of the debtor. See
text accompanying notes 75-104, 142-46 supra. Concerning the possible exception when
a corporation in straight bankruptcy obtains a discharge and resumes business, sec
notes 94-96 supra.
458. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
459. II U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970).
460, 382 U.S. at 379.
461. 382 U.S. at 378, citing the misgivings of the courts in the earlier adverse decisions cited in note 457 supra. Although the debtor, too, has lost his stake as a result
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"sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past and so little entangled
with the bankrupt's ability to make an unencumbered fresh start
that it should be regarded as 'property' under § 70a(5)."462 The
contingency that "earnings by the bankrupt after filing the petition
might diminish or eliminate the loss-carryback refund claim"463
did not negate its character as property under the Act, since "an
interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or
because enjoyment must be postponed."464 The argument that
the rights were property that the bankrupt could not "by any means
have transferred" was rejected on the ground that, while assignments of claims against the United States, before their allowance,
are by law made "absolutely null and void,''465 that provision voids
a transfer only as against the government and does not affect its
validity between the parties to the assignment.466 The Commission
would confirm and codify the Segal rule by prescribing that, notwithstanding any federal or state law to the contrary, "[t]he right
to any refund of taxes paid by the debtor, resulting from the carryback of net losses sustained before the date of the petition, shall
be vested in the trustee and may be recovered as property of the
debtor."467
Since the trustee is not entitled to file a return for the individual, the approved procedure for his obtaining the benefit of the
carryback refunds is to file a claim for refund in his capacity as
representative of the bank.rupt.468 If the bankrupt improperly obtains
of his operating losses, it is the creditors who are entitled first to be made whole out
of the assets existing at bankruptcy.
462. 382 U.S. at 380.
463. 382 U.S. at 380.
464. 382 U.S. at 379.
465. 31 u.s.c. § 203 (1970).
466. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 384 (1966), citing Martin v. National Surety
Co., 300 U.S. 588, 596 (1937). Matured income tax refund claims bad earlier been held
to pass to the trustee, Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1925), and to be transferable to a receiver in a chapter XI arrangement. In re Kepp Elec. 8e Mfg. Co., 98 F.
Supp. 51 (D. Minn. 1951). The requirement of alienability would in any event, under
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-601, no longer be a condition to the passing of
property to the estate.
467. Id. § 5-I04(c). In prescribing a federal set of standards for exemptions, in lieu
of those established by state law and section 6 of the present Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 24 (1970), the Commission would exempt certain cash equivalents, including tax
refunds, in the aggregate amount of 500 dollars plus the excess of the debtqr's "homestead" exemption (5000 dollars plus 500 dollars for each dependent) over the value
of the equity in his home. CoMl\IJSSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-503(b)(2), (c)(3). But
such exempt property would vest in the trustee for the purpose of collection and administration. Id. §§ 4-601(a)(l), -503 n.1,
468. Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 CtJM. BULL. 632. The requisites for refund claims
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the refund in his ovm right (for example, by accompanying his
return filed after bankruptcy with an application for a "quickie"
refund for the earlier years469), the bankruptcy court may order
the bankrupt to tum over the amount recovered to the trustee. 470
Sometimes, however, the carryback will result, not in a refund, but
in reduction of a proposed deficiency for the earlier years to which
the loss is carried, a reduction that the trustee may assert as a
defense to a tax claim filed by the government in the bankruptcy
proceeding. If, before bankruptcy, the bankrupt had filed a petition in the Tax Court contesting the deficiency, the Tax Court
retains jurisdiction concurrent with the bankruptcy court, and the
amount of the liability will be settled by the first court that reaches
a decision.471 The trustee may make himself a party to the Tax
Court case and assert the bankrupt's defenses.472
by trustees in their representative capacity are set out in Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(e)
(1955). A claim by the bankrupt himself is improper even if the estate has been
closed. Brangan v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,i 9214 (E.D. Va. 1973),
469. Refunds based on loss carrybacks are required to be paid within 90 days after
application therefor (made after filing of the return for the loss year), subject to subsequent audit. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6411; Treas. Reg. § 1.6411-1, T.D, 6950, 1968-1
CUM. BULL. 528, 538,
470. This procedure was followed in Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525 (1st
Cir. 1963), although (since the case arose prior to the Segal decision) the First Circuit
vacated the order of the district court inasmuch as it felt that it was not improper for
the bankrupt to claim the carryback refund,
471. In re Fotochrome, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Fotochromc,
Inc., 57 T.C. 842 (1972). See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6871. The Commission's proposal to permit removal to the bankruptcy court of "any civil action" pending on the
date of the petition, C0Minss10N REPORT, supra note 3, § 2-202, would not apply to a
Tax Court case since it relates only to actions "in a state or federal district court."
472. Treas. Reg. § 301.6871(b)-l(a), T.D. 6425, 1959-2 CUM. BULL, 384, 413, See
BANKR. R. 610. If the carryback exceeds the income determined for the earlier year,
the Tax Court may find an overpayment. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6512(b). The Tax
Court seems clearly in error in holding, in Norris Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745 (1969),
motion denied, 54 T.C. 554 (1970), that, since the trustee and the bankrupt arc separate
taxpayers and the carryback, under the Segal rule, belongs to the trustee, the carryback
cannot be allowed in a case instituted by the bankrupt, even if the trustee is made a
party. The carryback, on the contrary, belongs to the trustee, not as a taxpayer, but
as one to whom an asset of the bankrupt has passed by operation of law. It originates
as an inchoate right before the estate comes into existence, Segal v. RocheUe, 382 U.S.
375, 380 (1966), and is measured by income and deductions of the individual, not of the
estate; there will be a refund only if, taking the carryback into account, the banlirupt
has overpaid his tax for the earlier year. 'While the Tax Court correctly, see United
States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 542 (1937), pointed out, 52
T.C. at 750 n.7, that it had no power to order payment of the refund to the trustee,
it improperly abdicated its statutory, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6512(b), function of
determining by how much, considering the carryback, the individual taxpayer had
overpaid his tax. The Bloomfield decision apparently puts the estate to the further
trouble, expense, and delay of separately litigating the carryback issue in the bankruptcy court in defense to the government's claim for the deficiency found by the
Tax Court, a defense that would not be barred by res judicata if, as Bloomfield holds,
the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to pass on the issue, INT, REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 65ll(d)(2)(B)(i); Hanson Clutch & Mach. Co. v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas,
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2. Offset of the Debtor's Income for the Balance of the Year
For two reasons, the present structure of the federal tax law
does not permit carrying the Segal rationale to its logical conclusion.
The first is that, because the individual debtor's taxable year is
unbroken at bankruptcy, any loss he may suffer in the prebankruptcy portion will first be offset by his earnings, if any, during
the balance of the year, thereby reducing the amount available to
produce carryback refunds for the benefit of the estate473 and giving
the debtor a windfall in the form of tax-free treatment of income
that is unavailable to his creditors.474 This problem would be resolved
by the Commission's proposal (applicable to state and local, as
well as federal. taxes) that the loss for the prebankruptcy portion
of the year be made available for carryback for the benefit of the
estate, unreduced by postbankruptcy income, on which the debtor
would be subject to tax.475
0

3. Carryovers
The second impediment to giving full effect to the equitable
principle of the Segal case is that frequently the bankrupt will have
had insufficient net income in the three preceding years to absorb
the losses and produce maximum refunds for the benefit of the
estate; the unabsorbed operating losses-to which are added
excess capital losses, which can be carried only forward and not
back476-may then become available to reduce the taxes that would
otherwise have been incurred by the discharged debtor on his
income for five postbank.ruptcy years.477
,I 9303 (N.D. Ohio 1972). So far as the carryback offsets the deficiency determined by
the Tax Court, it will be barred if not raised as a defense in the bankruptcy court.
Cohen v. United States, II5 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1940). But if a net overpayment results
from the carryback, the trustee would apparently have to fragment the case still further by filing first a claim for refund and then a plenary suit, since the bankruptcy
court would have no power to grant affirmative relief against the United States. In re
Vista Liner Coach &: Trailer, Inc., 447 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
954 (1972). The Commission's proposal to permit the trustee to proceed in the bankruptcy court to collect claims on behalf of the estate, COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 3, § 2-20l(a), including claims against the United States, id. § 1-104, would
make unnecessary the third stage of fragmentation, the plenary suit. The Bloomfield
jurisdictional aberration is not otherwise dealt with and, unless Congress takes the
initiative, must be left to the Tax Court's power of self-correction.
473. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172(c).
474. On the other hand, if the bankrupt suffers a further loss during the balance
of the year, it appears that the refunds resulting from the carryback of the loss for
the full year are to be apportioned between the estate and the individual. See Segal
v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 n.5 (1966).
475. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c). This legislative solution had been
suggested in Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525, 527 n.3 (1st Cir. 1963). See also
Seidman, Some Implications of Segal v. Rochelle, 40 REF. J. 107, 108 (1966).
476. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1212(b).
477. INT, REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(l)(B).
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The Segal decision left open, but implied a negative answer to,
the question whether the estate might recoup the ta."C savings enjoyed
by the debtor from carrying the unabsorbed loss forward to succeeding years.478 The loss could, in any event, not be used against
income of the estate as a taxable entity, since loss carryovers, in the
absence of an express statutory provision, may not ordinarily be
offset against income of another taxpayer.470 Theoretically, on the
other hand, the estate should be as entitled to recoup the ta."C saved
by the individual through his use of the prebankruptcy losses to
offset his future income as it is to recover the refunds of past taxes
resulting from carryback of those losses. The individual's tax savings
through carryovers to later years are as much "rooted in the prebankruptcy past" as the refunds resulting from carrybacks, and the
bankrupt's right to an "unencumbered fresh start" does not require
that he enjoy freedom from income tax on his subsequent earnings
by reason of carryovers of prebankruptcy losses, the burden of which
fell on his creditors. Loss carryovers and carrybacks are essentially
averaging devices, "designed to permit a taxpayer to set off [his]
lean years against [his] lush years, and to strike something like an
average taxable income computed over a period of longer than one
year."48° Congress could as easily have provided for the loss to go
back eight years, in which case the entire benefit of the losses would
belong to the trustee under the Segal principle. The fact that Congress elected for practical reasons to have the loss carried three years
back and five years £orward481 does not alter the equities.
The Court in Segal, however, suggested482 a conceptual impediment to such an extension of the principle: Whereas the carryback
refund reflects the offset of income earned by the individual in the
past against a loss already sustained and is contingent only on the
possibility that his earnings later in the year of bankruptcy will
deplete the loss, the tax saving from carryovers is subject to the
further contingency that the individual have future earnings against
which the loss may be offset. The Court also took note of the practical impediment that the estate might have to be held open for a
number of years awaiting the realization of sufficient earnings by
the bankrupt to offset the earlier losses.483 It might also have observed
478. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 381 (1966).
479. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934). Cf. Libson Shops, Inc.
v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 385-86 (1957).
480. Libson Shops, Inc, v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382,386 (1957).
481. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 172(b)(I)(A)(i), (l)(B). Longer periods for carryback
and carryover are provided in section 172(b) for special situations.
482, 382 U.S. at 381.
483. 382 U.S. at 381.
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that, since the carryover results, not in a claim for tax refund, but
in a reduction of the bankrupt's tax bill, the trustee would have
to recover the difference by proceeding against the bankrupt himself for the amount saved.
An alternative to incurring the practical difficulties of policing
the debtor's later tax situation and of keeping the estate open
during the five-year carryover period484 ( or of reopening the estate
for unadministered assets, if necessary485), in order to reclaim later
tax savings from the debtor, would be to make the debtor's loss
carryovers available directly to the estate as a taxable entity, to be
offset against any net income realized by the estate during administration.486 There is legislative precedent for transferring loss carryovers to a different taxable entity where there is sufficient continuity of beneficial interest (as there is here, under the Segal rationale, between the individual in his prebankruptcy period and
the trustee as representative of the creditors, who bore the burden
of the loss). The unused operating and capital losses of an estate or
trust, after its termination, are made available, by section 642(h)(l)
of the Code, for use against income of the "beneficiaries succeeding to the property of the estate or trust," a phrase that the regulations interpret to mean "those beneficiaries ... who bear the burden
of any loss for which a carryover is allowed.'' 487 And such loss carryovers of one corporation are made available by sections 38l(c)(l)
and (3) to offset income of another corporation, if the latter succeeds
to all or substantially all of the farmer's assets in certain tax-free
transactions, subject to certain restrictions488 on the transferability
of the benefit of the loss carryovers to new owners who did not bear
the burden of the losses. Although the present situation is unusual
in that the individual taxpayer in whose returns the losses originated continues to exist, whereas under section 642(h)(I) and in
most cases under section 381 the transferor's existence is terminated,
there is precedent for such a case as this. In certain corporate reorganizations within the scope of section 381 it is permissible for the
484. In the case of capital losses, the carryover period may last for the taxpayer's
lifetime. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1212(b).
485. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(8), 11 U.S.C. § ll(a)(8) (1970). Cf. Brangan v. United
States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9214 (E.D. Va. 1973). See J. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY§ 307, at 366 (1956).
486. See Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 417-18, who urge, as an alternative
to their preferred course of exempting the estate entirely from income tax, that "at
the very minimum, the trustee in bankruptcy should be entitled to all of the tax
benefits to be derived from a debtor's pre-bankruptcy history of operating losses.''
487. Treas. Reg.§ l.642(h)-3(a) (1956).
488, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 382-83.

1020

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:935

transferor to continue in existence,489 although the transferee succeeds to the transferor's loss carryovers,490 and the transferor makes
a fresh tax start.4 01
Therefore, in lieu of making the discharged debtor's tax savings
through carryovers recoverable by the trustee for the benefit of the
estate, the Commission has proposed that prebankruptcy losses of an
individual in straight bankruptcy (so far as they are not carried
back against the debtor's income and made available to the estate
under the Segal principle) "shall not be allowed [as carryovers] to
the debtor but shall be allowed to the estate in the computation of
any [federal, state, or local] taxes on or measured by income of the
estate in the same manner and for the same periods in which such
carryovers would have been allowable by law to the debtor." 492
The transfer of the debtor's loss carryovers to the estate will, in
most cases, be a futile gesture, so far as creditors are concerned, if
Congress adopts the Commission's companion proposal to exempt
estates in straight bankruptcy from any taxation of their income,
except in the unusual cases in which all debts can be paid and
there remains a surplus for the debtor. 403 But even if the estate
remains subject to income taxation, it may have little administrative
net income against which to absorb the loss carryovers and, in fact,
may itself suffer an operating loss, particularly if the expenses incurred by a debtor on the cash basis, paid from the proceeds of
liquidation, are not accumulated as deductions in the debtor's last
prebankruptcy return (as I have urged above494) but are considered
expenses of the estate. The question then arises whether the estate's
own unused losses and those it inherits from the bankrupt might
be availed of by the creditors on their own tax returns. Reference
has been made above to section 642(h), by which unused loss carryovers of an estate or trust are made available to the "beneficiaries
489. Rev. Rul. 68-358, 1968-2 CuM. BuLL. 156, which holds that a reorganization
described in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(l)(C) (the acquisition by one corporation,
solely in exchange for all or part of its own or its parent's voting stock, of substantially all the properties of another corporation) may exist even if the transferor retains
the stock received in exchange and continues to exist as a holding company.
490. World Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1973); Treas,
Reg. § I.382(b)-l(b)(2) (1962). Although the government attempted (unsuccessfully)
to deny the carryovers in the cited case, the attempt was on the basis of its inter•
pretation of restrictive language in section 382(b) of the Code, which there would be
no occasion to make applicable to the present situation.
491. Treas. Reg. § l.38l(b)-l(c) (1960).
492. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c). The final clause is intended
to ensure that the period during which the carryovers will remain available will not
be shortened as a result of the injection of an additional "taxable year" when the
carryovers pass from the debtor to the estate. See text accompanying note 240 supra,
493. See text accompanying notes 147-88 supra.
494. See text accompanying notes 386-441.
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succeeding to the property," whose shares were diminished as a
result of the losses.495 The Tax Court, in denying the inheritance
of the estate's unused losses to the debtor himself, has declared that
it is not he but the creditors who "receive a lesser amount" when
the estate has suffered a loss.4911 The court has also ruled, however,
that the estate of an individual bankrupt, even though the only
basis on which it has been held a taxable entity is that it is an
"estate" within the meaning of the revenue law,497 is not an "estate"
for purposes of section 642(h).498 In any event, the creditors receive
their distributions, not as "beneficiaries" in the sense commonly
understood, but as payees of obligations.499
The practical difficulties of making the unused losses deductible
directly by the creditors argue strongly against adopting that expedient, and the Commission has not recommended any amendment
toward that end. It would be impracticable to apportion the benefit
of the losi;i among a mass of creditors with different priorities, even
if they found it feasible to calculate the losses sustained in the
absence of any returns by the trustee. Furthermore, since the only
equitable ground on which the creditors might be entitled to such
a benefit would be that it enables them to recoup a portion of their
uncollected claims,500 logic would require that the amount of any
ultimate tax saving they personally enjoy should itself be taxed to
them as a recovery on their previously deducted bad debts"°1 or on
claims they had not theretofore taken into income.502
In my opinion, the Commission erred in recommending5°3 that
the individual debtor himself be deprived of the right to use his
own loss carryovers, even when the estate is unable to utilize them.
In justification of its position, the Commission states: "Nor should
the bankrupt have the benefit in future years of loss carryovers when
the very debts reflecting the losses have been cancelled and the loss
has been sustained not by the bankrupt but by his creditors. The
bankruptcy law is designed to give the bankrupt a 'fresh start'not a 'head start.' " 504 I submit, however, that the unqualified denial
495. See note 487 supra.
496. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 45 (1973).
497. See text accompanying notes 106-18 supra.
498. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 45 (1973).
499, Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 301, 303. See text accompanying notes
217-25 supra. Cf. Greggar P. Sletteland, 43 T.C. 602,610 (1965).
500. Cf. .!iegal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
501. See First Natl. Bank of Lawrence County, 16 T.C. 147, 153 (1951). Cf. INT. REv.
Com, OF 1954, § 111.
502. See Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 290,292 (4th Cir. 1943).
503. CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c).
504. Id., pt. I, at 280. Although the verbal flourish in the second sentence is ap•
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to the debtor of any benefit from his unabsorbed loss carryovers
represents a meat-ax approach to a problem to which the Commission has elsewhere properly applied a scalpel. The amount of the
carryovers may differ substantially from the amount of unpaid debts
and may not even include any such unpaid debts if the debtor had
used the cash basis of accounting and was entitled to deduct only
the expenses he had paid. 505 The proper remedy for any undue
advantage to the debtor that results from inclusion in the carryover
of accrued but unpaid obligations is not to deny the carryovers
absolutely, but to reduce the carryovers to the extent that they
reflect deductible obligations that are cancelled or reduced in the
proceeding, thereby confining the carryovers to the actual economic
loss suffered by the debtor. Curiously, the Commission recognized
that principle in a companion recommendation by which carryovers
generally would be so reduced. 500 In reorganization and rehabilitation proceedings, that is the only adjustment that would or should
be made. 507 To deny the individual discharged in straight bankruptcy the benefit of his own unabsorbed carryovers, properly so
adjusted, is not only unjust discrimination, but unsound tax Iaw.u 0a
parently derived from the dissent in Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 21 (1970) (Harlan,
dissenting), that case involved a very different issue (the debtor's right to receive,
free of the claims of creditors, vacation pay that he had earned before bankruptcy).
The Commission's viewpoint, however, accords with that of the prevailing opinion
(but not of a clear majority) in Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 45 (1973), discussed in
text accompanying notes 400-21 supra, although the carryover denied there was based,
not on expenses paid by the debtor before bankruptcy, but on expenses of the debtor's
business paid from his assets by the trustee as a distinct taxable entity.

J.,

505. In fact, the proposed forfeiture of past carryovers would apply even if every
dollar of the debtor's previously unsatisfied debts is paid by the trustee from his
assets. Cf. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 48 (1973) (Quealy, J., dissenting).
506. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 293 (proposed INT. REv. CODE OJ.' 1954,
§ 172(d)(7)). See also text accompanying note 441 supra.
507. It would not be made in such cases if the creditor received an equity security
for the debt and thus became a participant in the continuing enterprise by which the
carryover is to be utilized. For the same reason, no such adjustment should be made in
the carrybacks and carryovers so far as they benefit the estate rather than the debtor.
Cf. text accompanying notes 437-41 supra.
508. A similar case of "overkill" is reflected in the reasoning of Willingham v.
United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 828 (1961), where, among
other grounds for denying loss carryovers following a bankruptcy reorganization, the
court referred to the purpose of the carryover provision to enable a ta.xpayer to
"'set off its lean years against its lush years,'" and declared that "[t)his loss ta.xpayer
'set off its lean years' by having them wiped out in the reorganization proceedings."
289 F.2d at 287, quoting Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 385 (1957). It has
been pointed out:
Willingham fatally oversimplifies a most complex situation. There is at best an
uncertain relationship between the benefits of a discharge of indebtedness and
the detriment of eliminating net operating losses • • • • [T]here is no necessary
relationship between the amount of debt discharged and the amount of the
existing net operating loss •••• This analysis suggests that if there arc unjus•
tifiable tax windfalls growing out of a Chapter X or XI proceeding, they should
not be dealt with by an arbitrary denial of net operating loss-they should be
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Unquestionably, the ta.'s. benefit to be derived from the debtor's
loss carryovers, even when they reflect actual cash expenditures by
him, is something of value that is "rooted in the prebank.ruptcy past"
and should be subjected so far as practicable to the superior equity
of the creditors.609 Provision has properly been made in the Commission's recommendation for the· use of such carryovers by the
trustee in so far as they can be availed of, and, practical considerations aside, it would be appropriate to entitle the trustee to reach
the debtor's own tax savings from use of the unabsorbed carryovers. 610 However, the superiority of the creditors' unexercised equitable right detracts nothing from the subordinate, but nonetheless
real, equitable right of the debtor himself to utilize losses arising
from his assets and business, with proper adjustment for deductions
attributable to unpaid expenses. When the creditors have had all
the benefit they can practically derive from the carryovers as an
asset of the debtor, that asset ought, in effect, to be abandoned to the
debtor rather than forfeited to the taxing authorities.
For the same reason, I submit that the unabsorbed losses sustained by the estate itself, when the creditors, through the estate,
have gained all the advantage that it is practicable to give them,
should be made available to the debtor to reduce his postbankruptcy
taxes. The losses of the estate, although it is a legally distinct taxpayer, derive from the trustee's payment of deductible items with
the bankrupt's assets, from the realization by the trustee of declines
in the value of the bankrupt's assets below his cost, and from the
administration of the bankrupt's assets for the satisfaction of his
debts. Such losses do not differ qualitatively from the debtor's own
losses; the former and latter together, with due adjustment for
unpaid items, reflect the debtor's economic loss.
No doubt the Commission's proposal to relieve the trustee of
filing any returns will, if adopted, raise a practical impediment to
the determination of the estate's tax losses, as well as of the amount
of the individual's prebankruptcy carryovers that would have been
absorbed by income of the estate if it had been taxable. But an
expedient adopted for convenience in bankruptcy administration
should not be made to penalize the debtor. The amount of the
estate's losses or income can presumably be reconstructed from the
accounts required to be filed with the court, and, if the debtor underremedied through modification of the cancellation of indebtedness and basis
adjustment rules.
Tillinghast&: Gardner, supra note 267, at 714.
509. Cf. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966). See text accompanying notes
478-81 supra.
510. But see text accompanying notes 482-85 supra.
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takes such a reconstruction, he should be entitled to the benefit of
the losses.
If those losses are to be made available to the debtor, consideration must be given to the taxable years to which they should be
carried. If the pattern of section 642(h) were followed, the losses
would be carried first to the taxable year of the bankrupt that is
in progress when the administration terminates and then forward
to succee~g years. 511 Application of that principle, however, would
gr~atly restrict the period ·within which the carryovers of net operating losses may be absorbed. The customary three-year carryback
would not be available at all, 512 and the five-year carryover period
would be constricted into as few as three calendar years by the rule
that each short taxable period is considered a "taxable year" for
this purpose.513 The twelve-month period in which bankruptcy
occurs and the trustee succeeds to the bankrupt's carryovers would
embrace two such periods, 514 and two more "taxable years" of availability would be embraced in the twelve-month period in which
the proceeding ends and the carryovers revert to the bankrupt_llll,
To illustrate: A, who files returns on the calendar-year basis, becomes
bankrupt on July I, 1974, having suffered a net operating loss for
the period ending on that date, much of which remains unabsorbed
by carryback against income of earlier years. The trustee, who also
reports on the calendar-year basis, terminates the administration on
November 30, 1975, leaving part of the loss still unabsorbed. Under
the foregoing principles, the "taxable years" in which the loss carryover may be used would be (1) the estate's six-month period ending
December 31, 1974; (2) the estate's eleven-month period ending
November 30, 1975; and the bankrupt's calendar years (3) 1975,
(4) 1976, and (5) 1977.516 Absent bankruptcy, a loss sustained in
1974 could have been utilized in years through 1979. In the interest
of equity, as well as of rehabilitation of the bankrupt, a device
adopted to make the debtor's losses available to the estate for the
511. See Treas. Reg. § l.642(h)-l(b), T.D. 6828, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 264, 265-66.
512. The unused losses of an estate or trust, under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 642(h), may be carried only forward, not backward, by the beneficiaries. Treas. Reg.
§ I.642(h)-5(b) (1956). Although not observed by the court, which was right for tlte
wrong reasons, the debtor in Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 43 (1973), relying on INT,
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 642(h), erroneously sought to use the bankrupt estate's unused net
operating loss, in part, by carryback to a year earlier than that in which it was sustained.
513. Treas. Reg.§ I.172-4(a)(2) (1956).
514. Cf. Treas. Reg. § l.38l(c)(I)-l(e)(3) (1960). See note 240 supra.
515. Treas. Reg. § l.642(h)-l(b) (1965).
516. The trustee's selection of a taxable year ending with a different month from
the bankrupt's could vary the details, but the effect would generally be the same fol•
lowing the reversion of the carryovers to the bankrupt.
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benefit of his creditors to the extent needed should not be permitted
to reduce the period in which he may utilize the amount the trustee
does not need. I suggest, therefore, that the losses not consumed by
income of the estate during the full period of administration be
made retroactively available to the bankrupt, to be used by him
for years during and after bankruptcy as if bankruptcy had not
occurred.517
4. Losses on Partnership and Joint Returns
a. Partnerships. The dual status of a partnership creates special
complications in dealing with carrybacks and carryovers in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Act marshals partnership assets first against
partnership debts and individual assets first against individual
debts. 518 But since the income tax law treats the individual partners,
before bankruptcy, as liable for tax on the partnership income and
entitled to deduct its losses,519 it is the individual bankrupt estates
from which the tax on any prebankruptcy income is to be collected,520
and to which, under the normal operation of tl1e Segal rule, the
refunds attributable to carrybacks of partnership losses would flow. 521
The Commission properly proposes that the amount of any refunds
of individual taxes that is fairly apportionable to the carryback of
partnership losses (unless such losses were reimbursed by the partner) shall become assets of the estate of the partnership, whose creditors suffered the burden of those losses.522
Following bankruptcy, the partnership estate is no longer treated
for tax purposes as a mere conduit of income to the partners or their
estates but is treated as a distinct taxpayer. 523 The Commission's
proposal would assure that, to the extent that such estate may remain
taxable, it would be entitled, to the exclusion of the individual
estates, to deduct the individual loss carryovers fairly apportionable
to partnership losses.
517. This detail is consistent with the principle of the Commission's more limited
recommendation that the bankrupt's carryovers be allowable to the estate "in the
same manner and for the same periods in which such carryovers would have been
allowable by law to the debtor." Cm,rMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c).
518. Bankruptcy Act§ 5g, 11 U.S.C. § 23(g) (1970). The Commission would modify
this rule to permit partnership creditors to share in the partners' estates on a parity
with individual creditors but would still subordinate individual creditors in partnership assets. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-405(f) & n.14.
519. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 701-04; United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448
(1973).
520. Cf. United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408 (1925). The Commission's remedy
for this problem will be dealt with in part I(B}(2}(c) of Plumb, supra note 165.
521. This question was inherent in the fact situation in Segal, where the bankrupts
were a partnership and its partners, but was not the subject of the litigation.
522. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(d).
523. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
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If a partnership becomes bankrupt but one or more of its partners does not, 524 the nonbankrupt partners' rights to refunds based
on the carryback of their shares of the partnership's losses would
nevertheless, under the proposal, vest in the partnership estate,11:m
but the carryovers of such losses would remain available to them
and would not be allowable to the partnership estate, 626 Such treatment is beneficial to the creditors, however, since the partnership
estate, unless solvent, would be nontaxable anY'vay under the Com•
mission's proposal and could gain no benefit from the carryovers,
while the nonbank.rupt partners, not having the benefit of a discharge, would enhance by use of the carryovers their future assets,
which partnership creditors may reach. 627
b. Joint returns. Where the bankrupt had filed joint returns
with his or her spouse, losses may be apportioned between them
for the purpose of giving the trustee the benefit of the carrybacks.1128
If the year to which the losses are carried back is also a joint return
year, it may be claimed, in certain states where rights to money
may be so held, that the refund right belongs to the husband and
wife as tenants by the entirety, 520 exempt from creditors of either
spouse under state law and hence unreachable by the trustee under
the present Bankruptcy Act1530 (unless the nonbankrupt spouse dies
within six months after the filing of the petition). li31 In an effort to
make uniform the exemptions applicable in bankruptcy (heretofore
governed by widely varying state laws), the Commission proposes632
524. See Bankruptcy Act § 5a, 11 U.S.C. § 23(a) (1970); Liberty Natl. Bank v. Bear,
276 U.S. 215 (1928).
525. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(d) entitles the partnership estate
to any refunds "of a partner's tax" attributable to partnership losses and is not con•
fined to bankrupt partners.
526. Under id., § 5-104(d), only carryovers "allowable to the estate of a partner in
accordance with [§ 5-104(c)]" become allowable to the partnership estate to the extent
attributable to partnership losses and are disallowed to the "debtor." Such language
can refer only to a partner who is himself bankrupt.
527. Bankruptcy Act § 5j, 11 U.S.C. § 23(j) (1970). Cf. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U.S. '
695 (1913).
528. Cf. Treas. Reg. § l.172-7(d) (1956), concerning apportionment of joint return
losses carried to separate returns.
529. See In re Sussman, 188 F. Supp. 320, 323-24 (E.D. Pa, 1960), a[fd,, 289 F.2d
76 (3d Cir. 1961), in which the district court referred to but did not rely upon the
referee's conclusion to that effect. But the court in In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972), found no such intention manifested by
mere joinder in a single tax return in order to use the more favorable ta.x rates
applicable thereto.
530. Cf. Hayes v. Schaefer, 399 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1968) (similar argument made by
bankrupt not accepted by court due to interpretation of state law); Reid v. Richardson,
304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962) (dictum),
531. See Bankruptcy Act§ 70a, II U.S.C. § IIO(a) (1970),
532. CoM11nssroN REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-60l(b). Since the banluupt spouse's
interest is not an outriglit half interest but is subject to mutual survivorship rights,
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to make available to the trustee the bankrupt spouse's interest in
property held by the entirety, an effort that may prove ineffective
if the courts adhere to the view 588 that the immunity of entirety
property results, not from an exemption, but from a constitutionally
protected right of the nonindebted spouse to the enjoyment of the
whole property, shared only with the spouse. But even if that provision is not enacted or is ineffective, it would be only the carryback
refunds that the immunity would affect, and the use of carryovers
of the bankrupt spouse's losses could validly be made available to
the trustee; the carryovers are not a property right of the spouses
but exist by grace of Congress,534 and what Congress gives it can
take away or confer upon another (the trustee).585
B. Other "Tax Attributes"
Although attention is generally focused on loss carryovers, there
are numerous other "tax attributes," including such matters as
accounting and depreciation methods, carryovers of excess charitable
contributions and pension plan deductions, investment credits, and
the like, the carryover of which may be of concern in any business
succession. Congress, in section 38l(c) of the Code, has identified
twenty-two such tax attributes, in addition to losses, that it has concluded ought to follow the business into the hands of successors in
certain intercorporate transfers, and there may be as many more not
expressly dealt with. 536 In the case of a corporate bankruptcy, the
trustee's succession to such tax attributes is assured, since the law
places the trustee in the tax shoes of the corporation as if there had
been no transfer. 537 But, because the survivai of the individual as a
taxpaying entity, although divorced from his business and most of
it appears that the nonbankrupt spouse would be paid the actuarial value of his or
her interest in the proceeds of the claim. See id. § 5-203(c).
533. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951). See Plumb,
Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade 11, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 634-40
(1968).
534. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,440 (1934).
535. The resulting anomaly that the bankrupt and his spouse would then enjoy
the benefit of the prebankruptcy loss to the extent that he and his spouse had prebankruptcy income to offset it and that the creditors would benefit only from what
they are unable to absorb in that manner must be blamed, not on the legislative pro•
posal, but on the anachronism of property law.
536. See Reese, Reorganization Transfers and Survival of Tax Attributes, 16 TAX
L, REV, 207, 208 (1961). Their inheritance in intercorporate transfers is left to the illdefined "common law" of taxation. Treas. Reg. § 1.381(a)-l(b)(3)(i) (1960); Rev. Rul.
68-350, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 159.
537. The further right to carry over tax attributes from a debtor corporation or its
estate to a successor in a reorganization, a right that is doubtful under present law,
would be provided for by the Commission in proposed amendments to sections 381
and 382 of the Code. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 296-97. See Plumb, supra
note 270.
·
.-
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his assets, necessitates treating the estate of a noncorporate bankrupt as· a new and distinct ta.-xpayer, it is unlikely that the tax attributes follow the business in such cases.
Among other questions in this area, it is uncertain whether the
estate, if required to repay an amount on which the bankrupt had
been taxed when he received it erroneously but under claim of
right, 538 would be permitted, as the bankrupt would have been,1mo
to relate the repayment back to the year of receipt and thus to
recover an amount equal to the tax the bankrupt had paid thereon
for that year. 540 It is also doubtful that the trustee would be entitled
to exclude from taxable income of the estate a recovery of a bad
debt or of an overpayment of a tax or expense that the bankrupt
had deducted in a loss year without enjoying any tax benefit from
the deduction, 541 although the bankrupt himself would not have
been taxable on such recovery. 542 It is also unlikely that the trustee
would succeed to, or be bound by, the established methods of
accounting, inventory, and depreciation of the bankrupt individual
or partnership whose assets and business he assumed. 54 3
The Commission made no recommendation on these matters,
perhaps because, under its proposal, the estate will rarely be a taxpayer (although that did not deter the Commission from dealing
with the transfer of loss carryovers in such circumstances). At least
if estates in bankruptcy are to remain generally taxable, Congress
ought to provide that the trustee for a bankrupt individual or partnership, even though deemed a new taxable entity, should, nevertheless, succeed to those and other tax attributes of the business he
has taken over, in the same manner that a trustee for a bankrupt
corporation would do.
538. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
539. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341.
540. The Service holds such relief unavailable to a decedent's estate when death
intervenes between the receipt and the repayment. Rev. Rul. 67-355, 1967-2 Cur.r.
BULL. 296. Contra, Estate of Good v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 521 (E.D, Mich, 1962)
(rejected by Rev. Rul. 67-355). See Estate of Samuel Stein, 37 T.C. 945, 958 (1962),
computations afjd., 40 T.C. 275 (1963).
541. Cf. Michael Carpenter Co. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 51 (7th Cir, 1943) (die•
tum); National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 12 T.C. 717 (1949), But cf. Ridge Real•
ization Corp., 45 T.C. 508, 523-26 (1966), not acquiesced in, 1972-2 Cu11r. BULL, 4.
In certain intercorporate transactions, the successor now steps into the predecessor's
shoes for this purpose. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 381(c)(l2).
542. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 111; Treas. Reg. § 1.111-l(a) (1956).
543. Cf. Te.xtile Apron Co., 21 T.C. 147 (1953) (involves LIFO inventory method,
following a tax-free transfer to a controlled corporation). The trustee may also be
regarded as a new taxpayer for the purpose of the adjustments required by INT, REV,
CODE OF 1954, § 481, if the estate adopts or is obliged to adopt a method different from
the bankrupt's. Cf. Ezo Prods. Co., 37 T.C. 385 (1961); Frank G, Wikstrom &: Sons, Inc,,
20 T.C. 359 (1953). Congress has provided for continuity of such methods following
intercorporate transfers in INT, REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 38l(c)(4), (5), (6),

